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This thesis has identified and examined four motivational factors that influence why 
firms establish corporate foundations. While factors that determine firms’ engagement 
in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and corporate philanthropy are generally 
well understood in the academic literature, little is known about why firms 
specifically choose to establish corporate foundations as their ‘giving’ mechanism. A 
comprehensive investigation of the extant literature explored the historical context of 
corporate foundations, including their long-established social legitimacy. It also 
examined the advantages of corporate foundations over other corporate philanthropy 
approaches. Yet, within this literature there is limited attention of the motivational 
factors including firms’ establishment of corporate foundations. This thesis used a 
qualitative approach to explore this issue, interviewing 16 Australian corporate 
foundation managers. Following Deakin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee’s approval, invitations were sent to managers of 37 Australian corporate 
foundations for a response rate of 43%. 
A process of thematic analysis of these transcribed in-depth interviews was then 
conducted to identify motivations that led to the firm’s establishment of corporate 
foundations. An open-coding approach was applied across the firms to establish 
general themes, followed by axial coding to further develop and consolidate sub-
themes and identify their relationship to other sub-themes. This led to the 
identification of 10 sub-themes under four broader motivation themes, which are as 
follows: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving with two sub-themes – i) focus and 
formalisation of corporate giving practices, and ii) separation from business activities 
– 2) Stakeholder Influences with three sub-themes – i) board and executives of 
establishing firm, ii) lawyer influence and other advisors, and iii) isomorphic 
influences from other firms – 3) Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure 
with two sub-themes – i) foundation corpus, and ii) taxation benefits – 4) Strategic 
Benefits to the Establishing Firm with three sub-themes – i) reputational benefits, ii) 
staff engagement and participation, and iii) shared value strategy.  
This thesis also explored the Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence from 
the establishing firm, which comprised five sub-themes: 1) strength of relationships 
between foundation trustees and the firm; 2) involvement of senior management of 
establishing firm in foundation activities; 3) how the establishing firm funds and 
supports the foundation; 4) shared objectives of the foundation and establishing firm; 
and 5) establishing firm staff volunteering and giving through foundation.  
This research has found that most firms establish corporate foundations to undertake 
strategic philanthropy. That is, assisting those in need while capitalising on the 
legitimising social benefits of these foundations in helping to achieve corporate 
objectives, which includes the establishing firm having extensive control over their 
governance and operations. Many firms use their corporate foundation as a form of 
commercial advertising, including proactively marketing its activities to their own 
staff for the purpose of enhancing internal engagement. Interestingly, these research 
findings have also shown that there is rarely any reduction in agency costs despite the 
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use of a structured corporate foundation over corporate ad-hoc giving – these same 
costs instead appear to shift from the firm to the foundation. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that involvement of executives in the corporate foundation’s management 
negates the opportunity to reduce agency costs, due to an apparent lack of 
independence. It would appear that most firms closely monitor the philanthropy 
activities of other commercial competitors, with their decision to establish a corporate 
foundation following a pattern of normative isomorphism. Surprisingly, this thesis 
found that few firms are motivated to establish corporate foundations for taxation 
benefits; most are instead focused on tax implications associated with promoting their 
staff’s involvement (i.e. employee giving), as well as increasing the foundation’s 
reach by raising funds via the general public (i.e. tax deductibility of personal 
donations). It should also be noted that this apparent lack of motivation to establish 
corporate foundations for tax incentives is inconsistent with other academic literature.  
Another key finding in this research was the observation of close associations 
between external board members of the corporate foundation and the establishing firm 
within 11 of the 16 cases. This may be of concern to government regulators, as such 
actions are non-compliant with current legal requirements on the operation of 
corporate foundations as legal trusts (Private Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2009; Public 
Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011). These results also raise concerns that foundations 
are often being used to deliver material benefits to the establishing firm, such as 
through their use of the corporate foundation for commercial advertising purposes. 
In the context of managerial implications, this thesis has identified that firms often 
lack relevant information on how to establish a best-practice corporate foundation. 
Thus, a checklist to assist with such decision-making has been developed and 
provided within the discussion of managerial implications (Section 5.10). These 
research findings also indicate the need for more explicit legal definitions of material 
benefits, to ensure that corporate foundations are truly separate from the establishing 
firm. Furthermore, it would appear that not all corporate foundations are meeting the 
Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) criteria with respect to recipient grants being 
considered gifts (ATO Taxation Ruling TR 2005/13 p.6 para36). This potential breach 
of taxation guidelines may be of particular concern to government regulators in 
reviewing current corporate foundation practices.  
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1.05 Terms and Definitions 
 
ATO  Australian Tax Office 
ACNC Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission 
Benefaction The act of conferring a benefit. Grants occur 
with the sole intention of benefiting the 
recipient to be considered a gift, thereby are 
eligible for tax deductibility benefits. 
Cause related marketing (CRM) A marketing-led, sales-based relationship 
between for-profit and non-profit 
organisations, established for mutual gain. 
Corporate philanthropy 
 
Mirrors individual philanthropy except that 
a corporation is donating funds or alternate 
values rather than an individual. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) A set of guidelines on the appropriate 
conduct of organisations within a legal, 
ethical, regulatory framework. 
Corpus The principal amount of an estate or trust, 
typically allocated at the creation of these; 
also known an endowment. 
Common law Laws that has been developed on the basis 
of preceding rulings by judges. 
Deductible gift recipient (DGR) An ATO classification of an organisation or 
fund that enables donors to that organisation 
or fund to claim a tax deduction. 
Fiduciary duty Common law duty of trustees to exercise 
rights and powers in good faith for the 
benefit of beneficiaries of any trust, and not 
in their own interest. 
Financial services (FS) sector A term which describes organisations 
involved in the facilitation of commerce and 
money systems, including services within 
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banking, insurance, investments, 
superannuation, funds management, etc. 
Foundation – corporate 
 
A trust (perpetual or time/condition bound), 
designed to make grants to charities or carry 
out charitable purposes. 
Income tax exempt fund (ITEF) A non-charitable fund that is endorsed by 
the ATO to be exempt from income tax. 
Mutual society 
 
A financial organisation, such as a credit 
union or building society, which shares 
profits and expenses with policyholders 
Non-profit sector 
 
A voluntary sector that is the locus of social 
activity undertaken by organisations that are 
neither private nor public sector bound.  
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) An organisation which operates within the 
non-profit sector. 
Pecuniary benefit A benefit measurable in terms of money. 
Philanthropy The practice of performing charitable or 
benevolent actions 
Public benefit A purpose that an entity has is for the public 
benefit if and only if: a) it is aimed at 
achieving a universal or common good; b) it 
has practical utility; and (c) it is directed to 
the benefit of the general community or to a 
sufficient section of the general community. 
(2) A purpose is not directed to the benefit 
of a sufficient section of the general 
community if the people to whose benefit it 
is directed are numerically negligible. 
Regulators Those that ensure the ongoing processes of 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
the law. 
Responsible person (RP) An individual of good public standing that 
is able to fulfil a capacity as chairman of a 
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non-profit board of directors. 
Social enterprise (SE) A hybrid non-profit organisation that 
combines elements of the non-profit and 
private sectors. 
Statutory law Written laws passed by legislature and 
government of a country. 
Tax concession charity (TCC) An ATO classification that enables a charity 
to be exempt from paying tax and enables 
the reclaiming of any franking credits 
received on dividends from Australian 
companies; this includes public benevolent 
and charitable institutions, charitable funds, 
and health promotion charities. 
Ultra vires A Latin phrase meaning “beyond the 
powers”, used by the legal profession to 
signify an act that requires legal authority to 
perform. 
Table 1.1: Terms and definitions from Macquarie Dictionary (2017) and Dictionary of Civil Society, 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Context of the study 
 
Australia’s first charity, founded in 1813, was the NSW Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge and Benevolence (renamed The Benevolent Society in 1818). Its theistic origins 
were reflective of the influence of religious organisations in delivering charitable services 
(Dalton & Butcher, 2014). Essential social services within Australia, such as denominational 
schooling were provided by religious groups until the late 19th century, when all but the 
Catholic Church allowed their schooling systems to be harmonised into a single, non-
denominational government system (Lyons, 2001). This need for religious group involvement 
was due to the nascent colonial governments across Australia, as in much of the world at that 
time, being unable to meet essential social service demands, and therefore relied on charitable 
organisations to act on their behalf (Casey, 2016). 
Leading into the 20th century, many of Australia’s religious-based NPOs expanded 
their existing community-based services into new areas such as housing and hospitals, while 
there was also a significant increase in secular (i.e. non-religious) charitable organisations 
(Murphy, 2006). The growth of secular charities has continued to increase, such that by 2014 
approximately 57,000 charitable organisations were operating in Australia, with revenue of 
AUS$142 billion and employing over one million (Dalton & Butcher, 2014). 
It has been suggested that such charitable organisations are often established to act as 
the primary provider of governmental social services and state welfare, such as in “education, 
health care, housing services, aged care, disability services, and child care …” (Lyons, 1993, 
p. 310). 
From the beginning of the 19th century, the for-profit (i.e. business) sector has also 
been involved in providing charitable services in parallel with non-profit organisations 
(NPOs). This is where individual firms direct some of their profits towards community-
related services at the time period for their employees only, such as housing and child care. 
However, some equity owners of such firms internationally and in Australia challenged the 
legality of them ‘giving’ some of their profits to social causes, which was upheld by court 
rulings which found that the use of corporate funds for philanthropic purposes (i.e. giving 
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with no expectation of a return) did not expressly result in a direct benefit to the firm and was 
therefore illegal (Sharfman, 1994). 
In effect, such charitable corporate giving was deemed to be in breach of ultra vires, 
defined as an act beyond the authority of the corporation’s charter (Sharfman, 1994). The 
scope and rules by which governments generally regulate companies today is, however, more 
relaxed than regulations of the 19th century (Brudney & Ferrell, 2002). 
The act of charitable giving as a legitimate business practice continued to be contested 
internationally in the courts through the 19th century, as many firms sought ways to broaden 
their support of employees within local communities. In a pivotal 1883 UK common law case 
of Hutton vs. West Cork Railway (Chesters & Lawrence, 2008), the court broadened its 
interpretation of ultra vires and how a firm was obliged to involve itself in matters that 
“directly benefited corporate goals” (Sharfman, 1994, p. 245). The ruling’s implication 
broadened the restrictive interpretation of for-profit enterprise ultra vires, by expanding the 
authority and obligation of businesses to improving their broader commercial situation. Two 
further cases, Steinway v. Steinway & Sons in 1896 and Main v. C. B. & Q. Railroad 
Company in 1899, built on this precedent, confirming that charitable services provided to the 
firm’s employees and their families were a legitimate use of shareholder funds (Blair, 1998). 
Focusing on the early 20th century towards the end of World War I, US-based 
corporations were encouraged by NPOs and governments to fund charitable services 
supporting returning servicemen. For example, the YMCA and Red Cross post-war drives 
focused on corporate giving, and were even championed by US President Woodrow Wilson. 
Such initiatives led to the US Government legalising the acceptability of forms of corporate 
philanthropy that had once been considered ultra vires (Sharfman, 1994). This resulted in 
corporate philanthropy progressing into a socially legitimised and legally accepted business 
activity in the USA. Establishing this practice beyond doubt was the 1953 US Supreme Court 
ruling of A. P. Smith v. Barlow (Chen, 2005), whereby corporations were seen as having a 
right to make contributions “remote from the company’s visible business needs” (Brudney & 
Ferrell, 2002, p. 1193). This meant managers had broad discretion in how such philanthropy 
was conducted, with no direct influence by equity owners. 
While the legality of corporate philanthropy was argued inside courtrooms across 
centuries (see Appendix 1 for chronology of significant events), academia did not research 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) until Bowen’s (1953) book entitled ‘Social 
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responsibilities of the businessman’, often considered a pivotal exploration of the question of 
the role of business for the betterment of society (Ghobadian, Money & Hillenbrand, 2015). 
This work highlighted the increasing social expectation that the corporate sector should 
conduct itself in a ‘responsible’ manner (Cronin, 2001). In response the business community 
have in the preceding decades embedded CSR practices into their business models, with 
corporate philanthropy a sub-set that has been focused on in this research. 
Most of today’s corporations operationalise their philanthropic activities via various 
direct giving activities, and are increasingly using corporate foundations as a vehicle for such 
activities. These foundations have been defined as a “non-governmental, non-profit 
organization having a principle fund of its own, managed by its own trustees and directors, 
and established to maintain or aid charitable, educational, religious, or other activities serving 
the public good, primarily by making grants to other non-profit organizations” (Renz, 1994, 
p. 57). As discussed further in Section 2.2, corporate foundations are a distinct form of 
philanthropic activity, which are typically integrated, to varying levels, into the social 
objectives of the parent for-profit firm, yet operated separately from core business activities 
(Seifert, Morris & Bartkus, 2003). 
The use of corporate foundations is common practice among large US firms, used to 
“institutionalise their charitable giving” through a single philanthropic mechanism (Werbel & 
Carter, 2002, p. 47). A recent review of the philanthropic programs of 271 large US-based 
firms found that 79% of them had a corporate foundation, which contributed to 34% of 
overall US corporate giving (Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose, 2015). Corporate 
foundations are far less common in Australia, with this study’s review of the ACNC database 
identifying approximately 40 registered corporate foundations. 
After examining the historical context of corporate philanthropy, the question arises 
on why only some Australian firms choose to establish corporate foundations, which are 
legally separate entities designed for funding other non-profits. Section 1.2 will therefore 
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1.2 Problem statement (motivation for study) 
 
In the context of business history, corporations are relatively new, having been formally 
enacted by the UK Parliament via the Companies Act of 1862, which essentially continues as 
the same design today (Cassidy, 2008). However, while the earlier corporations were 
intentionally designed to be subservient to existing power structures (i.e. royal court of the 
day), they have developed into leading non-state powers (Spiro, 2013). 
Many corporations exert control of national economies, which in most countries has 
accelerated relative to the diminishing influence of the public and non-profit sectors (Spiro, 
2013). Such corporate power continues to extend into sections of the economy that were 
traditionally serviced by governments and non-profit actors, including charitable services 
(Benshalom, 2008). As corporations increase their involvement in services that were once 
exclusive to the non-profit sector, corporate foundations have increasingly been used to 
advance their social responsibility agenda (Tracey, Phillips & Haugh, 2005). 
A range of determinates of such corporate philanthropy have been covered within the 
literature, including a form of advertising (Navarro, 1988), taxation benefits (Bernholz, 2000; 
Park, 1996), slack resources (i.e. available cash flow) (Buchholtz, Amason & Rutherford, 
1999), reputation building (Cowan, Huang, Padmanabhan & Wang, 2013; Gautier & Pache, 
2013; Logsdon, Reiner & Burke, 1990), employee engagement (Block, Glavas, Mannor & 
Erskine, 2017), board size and composition (Chen & Lin, 2015; Hogan, Olson & Sharma, 
2014; Liket & Simaens, 2015), and CEO involvement (Werbel & Carter, 2002). Despite such 
former research, there has been minimal examination of how firms operationalise their 
philanthropic activities via corporate foundations, such as whether they use these exclusively 
or in combination with other giving mechanisms (Herlin & Pedersen, 2013; Minciullo & 
Pedrini, 2015; Srivastava & Oh, 2010; Walker, 2013). 
Additionally, there has been limited focus within the literature in relation to which 
forms of corporate philanthropy (e.g. foundations or direct giving) are most likely to help 
firms meet their corporate objectives, as well as the “circumstances under which 
organizations opt for one form over another” (Muller, Pfarrer & Little, 2014, p. 3). Webb 
(1994) is one of the few that has provided corporations with insights when deciding on 
whether to establish a corporate foundation, although these were not based on empirical 
research. This author (p. 47) proposed four main considerations in relation to such decisions: 
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1) “taxation and other benefits; 2) foundation suitability to corporate giving program; 3) 
efficiency in corporate giving; and 4) start-up and running costs of a foundation.” 
Within the general business literature, Weeden (2011) echoes and expands on these 
earlier recommendations by offering several reasons why a firm should create a foundation, 
including claiming tax concessions for gifting assets, potential simplification of contributions 
recordkeeping, and improved executive focus on corporate giving. However, this author (p. 
88) also highlighted that “maintaining a foundation just to have it around isn’t the best 
decision a company can make.” 
In 2003, UK-based NPO Business in the Community explored why organisations 
choose to establish a foundation, commissioning research that was conducted by philanthropy 
practitioners that interviewed 12 corporate foundation managers for this purpose (Varcoe & 
Sloane, 2003). Outside of this study, this researcher was not able to find any others within the 
literature that have empirically examined ‘why’ an organisation would choose to establish a 
foundation. This is despite corporate foundation scholars suggesting that research is needed 
to “empirically test why foundations are established” (Minefee, Neuman, Isserman & 
Leblebici, 2015, p. 69). In line with this study’s findings, Herlin and Pedersen (2013, p. 59) 
also verified that “empirical studies of corporate foundations are rare”. Thus, this research 
has sought to address this knowledge gap and provide an opportunity for further 
understanding of the establishment and practice of corporate foundations.  
Furthermore, the literature has largely ignored how firms operationalise their 
philanthropy. This is despite it being recognised that “retrospective accounts of [corporate 
giving] participants to the decision” with respect to which giving strategy is pursued would 
strengthen the field of study (Gautier & Pache, 2013, p. 363). In addition, among the limited 
research in this stream of work, Srivastava and Oh (2010, p. 468) identified a 
“preponderance” of literature directly sponsored and published by corporate foundations, 
“with very little peer-reviewed academic literature”. This is an issue, as the lack of academic 
literature limits the progression of understanding corporate foundations (Herlin & Pedersen, 
2013), as there are simply too few empirical studies on which to develop and advance 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
Corporate and foundation managers will no doubt benefit from a deeper 
understanding of the motivations that drive foundation creation. Within the relevant literature 
it has commonly been recognised that corporate managers are prone to acts of self-serving 
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through the misappropriation of charitable support towards their favoured causes (Masulis & 
Reza, 2015). The ‘CEO effect’ is also a well described phenomenon within the academic 
literature (Gautier & Pache, 2013; Morris & Biederman, 1985; Werbel & Carter, 2002), 
where a lack of accountability in relation to corporate giving results in executives using 
corporate funds for indirect personal gain rather than to benefit society (Prewitt, 2004). With 
such potential issues in mind, it has previously been highlighted that corporate foundations 
operating within a formal trust structure involving regulations and stricter governance are less 
likely to behave in such ways (Ward, 2012). There is limited guidance for executives in the 
extant literature, as to how to make giving decisions, demonstrating that in this area of 
“academic research can be decoupled from practice” (Liket & Simaens, 2015, p. 303). Thus, 
how firms chose to operationalise their giving through a foundation remains largely a 
mystery. 
 
1.21 Research question 
 
The primary aim of this study was to answer the following research question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
 
1.3 Research scope 
 
As specified above, this research has focused on understanding why firms choose to establish 
corporate foundations. It has also examined the motivations for the establishment or practice 
of other types of corporate giving, which have also been included in the framing of the CSR 
and corporate philanthropy strategy (see sections 2.1 and 2.1.1). The scope of this research is 
summarised below: 
• The research is focused on corporate foundations within the Australian 
context. These are usually established as ancillary funds, governed by a trust 
prescribed within the relevant state and territory (i.e. Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), 
Trustee Act 1936 (SA), Trustee Act 1958 (VIC), Trustees Act 1962 (WA), 
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Trusts Act 1973 (QLD), Trustee Act 1898 (TAS), Trustee Act 1925 (ACT), 
and Trustee Act 1907 (NT)). 
• In the study, participants were limited to corporate foundation managers that 
were involved or had knowledge of their firm’s decision to establish a 
corporate foundation. 
• A qualitative study was conducted over a five-month period between June and 
September 2016. Limited resources and time constraints precluded travel, so 
in-depth interviews conducted outside of Melbourne were undertaken via 
telephone or video-conferencing.  
• It was identified in this research that some Australia organisations have giving 
strategies they perceive as foundations that have not been established via an 
ancillary fund or other formal legal structures. Thus, such foundations with no 
legal obligations stemming from a trust structure have been defined as 
unstructured corporate foundations. A single respondent from such an 
unstructured foundation (P4) was included in this research. 
 
1.4 Significance of this research 
 
This thesis will provide fresh insights into the largely neglected academic area in relation to 
the establishment and operationalisation of corporate foundations (Gautier & Pache, 2013). 
This empirical study has sought to determine the core motivational factors that drive 
corporate foundation establishment in Australia, and provides four primary benefits: 1) the 
academic field of corporate philanthropy will be enriched with additional empirical data on 
corporate foundations; 2) corporate philanthropy practitioners will gain practical insights into 
the operational aspects and practices of Australian-based corporate foundations; c)  trustees 
that manage corporate foundations will have clearer information regarding foundation 
practices and whether these comply with legislative obligations; and d) Australia-based 
insights will be provided to policymakers and regulators regarding corporate foundation 
practices, particularly the often close association between external trustees and the 
establishing firm, and how the corporate foundation provides direct commercial benefits to 
the establishing firm. 
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1.41 Overview of this thesis 
 
This thesis has been structured around five chapters: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which has commenced by establishing the context of this 
study, familiarising the reader with the topic and historical background that led to the need to 
undertake this research. The problem statement and research question have then been 
described, followed by the scope and significance of this research. 
Chapter 2 explores the academic literature within several interrelated fields, including the 
theoretical underpinnings of agency theory to help explain why firms undertake philanthropy 
via a corporate foundation, CSR, corporate philanthropy, the history and legitimacy of 
foundations. The advantages of corporate foundations over other forms of corporate 
philanthropy were also explored within this literature review, as well as the level of the 
corporate foundation’s independence from the establishing firm, which may influence why 
these foundations are established by some firms. The following six motivational themes as 
identified within the literature are then discussed: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) Public 
Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation; 3) Isomorphic Influences; 4) Lawyer Influence; 5) 
Taxation Benefits; and 6) Increasing Employee Engagement. Three of these motivational 
factors are grouped under one overarching theme of Stakeholder Influences (i.e. Public 
Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation, Isomorphic Influences, and Lawyer Influence), while 
the remaining three are discussed separately. 
Chapter 3 explains the research design and methodology used in this study. In order to 
explore the motivational factors that drive firms to establish corporate foundations, an 
interpretive paradigm was chosen. This is an exploratory study that required a qualitative 
method to better understand individual perceptions. The sampling technique is then 
described, followed by the process used to select and interview participants, as approved by 
the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee. Overcoming researcher bias is 
then discussed, followed by a description of how the transcribed interviews were examined 
via thematic analysis, followed by an open and axial coding process. 
Chapter 4 presents analysis of the qualitative data collected from the 16 participants. It 
begins by providing detail on the respondents as well as their firms and corporate 
foundations, and then presents the process for establishing the data analysis codebook. The 
motivational themes are then focused on, based on them being summarised across the 
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participants via a quantitising technique. An assessment of the extent of the commonality of 
these themes is then provided, which includes a comparison of the interview data with the 
literature review (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
Chapter 5 provides the key findings of this research, to help address the primary research 
problem. The four motivational themes and sub-themes are discussed, with respect to their 
influence on the firm establishing a corporate foundation. This is followed by a discussion in 
relation to corporate foundation independence, which examines whether there is firm-
foundation independence or integration. The implications of these findings are then provided 
with relevance to theory, industry and policymakers/regulators, followed by detail on the 
limitations of this research, as well as opportunities for further research. The conclusion 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.0 Chapter 2 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the academic literature that has primarily been focused on 
understanding the underlying factors related to this study’s research question:  
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
The academic literature was reviewed across six interrelated topics, as per the 
following chapter sections: 
Section 2.1 is an overview of the  most common CSR frameworks used by firms to direct 
their socially responsible activities. The four core CSR elements as popularised by Carroll 
(1998) – economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic – are discussed, including a brief history 
of each one. As corporate foundations have been recognised as one of the mechanisms used 
by firms to implement parts of their CSR agendas (McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006), it 
was deemed important in this study to examine how firms’ CSR obligations motivate some to 
establish a corporate foundation.  
Section 2.1.1 is focused on corporate philanthropy, as per the fourth element of Carroll’s 
CSR model, which has been defined as “the voluntary giving and receiving of time and 
money aimed (however imperfectly) toward the needs of charity and the interests of all in a 
better quality of life” (VanTil, 1990, p. 34). Despite this common definition, some firms have 
been recognised as strategically using philanthropy to maximise corporate benefits (Bruch & 
Walter, 2005), which is at odds with the traditional practice of giving with no expectation of a 
financial or reputational benefit (Gautier & Pache, 2013). It has even been argued that such 
strategic philanthropy is in no way philanthropic (Porter & Kramer, 2002), which is an 
important distinction for understating why some firms establish corporate foundations. The 
Australian corporate foundations focused on in this study are bound to strict conditions of 
non-self-serving behaviour as part of their relevant State charity/charitable trust legislation 
(Ward 2012), making it particularly important to understand Australian firms’ philanthropic 
intents. 
Section 2.1.2 discusses the origins of foundations generally, which originally started as an 
ancient philanthropic organisation that served as a wealth redistribution mechanism (Prewitt, 
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2006). Within the academic literature, traditional foundations have been discussed more 
extensively than corporate foundations (Alberg-Seberich, 2009), which has been drawn on 
within this study. Foundations have gained legitimacy, ensuring their entrenchment within 
legal and government frameworks, particularly within Western liberal societies (Coing, 
1981). Understanding the unique position they hold in society is helpful in understanding 
why they have also been established by some large commercial firms (Rietzler, 2013). 
Section 2.2 defines the types of corporate foundations that exist in an Australian commercial 
context. Most of the academic literature has focused on corporate foundations within the 
USA and other Western countries, with minimal previous research in an Australian context 
(Leat, 2004). The focus of this research was on Australian corporate foundations established 
as a legal trust structure, despite there being other forms also in use. For example, a firm can 
establish a team or department to manage its charitable giving, and call this a ‘foundation’. 
Describing the alternative types of foundations will help to eliminate any confusion. 
Furthermore, there is no legal definition for the word ‘foundation’ in Australia, meaning this 
term (and the associated structure) could be used for any purpose by individuals, groups or 
businesses (Freehills, 2012). For example, the Medibank Private Foundation was created by 
Medibank Private Ltd in 2013 to fund research into treatment for musculoskeletal conditions. 
It is not registered as a charitable organisation but as a legal entity that operates as an internal 
unit within Medibank Private, with the foundation allocating funds to any groups (and 
activities) that it sees fit. In contrast, more structured foundations formed as a legal trust have 
clear specifications on how funds can be used, as well as legal governance obligations of the 
foundation and its trustees (Petrovits, 2006; Ward, 2012). 
There two main types of trust structures used to form a corporate foundation in 
Australia – private ancillary fund (PAF) and public ancillary fund (PuAF) – and each has 
marginally different legal specifications (Bryan & Vann, 2012). These alternative structures 
often provide different benefits to firms using them, which may contribute to their choice of 
one structure over the other. The attributes of the trust structure covered in Australian 
legislation relate to: 1) rules on tax deductibility and tax exemption; 2) requirements for 
independent trustees with no affiliations to the establishing firm; 3) public fundraising 
requirements; 4) support of individual grantees; 5) types of charities eligible for foundation 
grants; and 6) minimum amounts to be granted to NPOs annually (Ward, 2012). 
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Section 2.2.1 explores the benefits that a structured corporate foundation (i.e. a trust) has 
over other forms of corporate philanthropy. For example, a firm can be ‘philanthropic’ by 
informally donating money to unregistered community groups, but this would not be 
classified as giving for corporate foundations structured as a trust (Freehills, 2012). Porter 
and Kramer’s (1999) work was used in this study to explore the following four main benefits 
they associated with corporate foundations: 1) highly formal selection of grant recipients; 2) 
transfer of grantor skills to other grantors, improving overall professionalism of the general 
philanthropic community; 3) enhanced electiveness of non-profit grant recipients through 
capacity building; and 4) the funding of research that helps address social problems.  
Section 2.3 discusses the degree of integration between foundations and their establishing 
firms. The level of independence within this study was determined based on five core 
variables identified by UK-based Corporate Citizenship (2013): 1) the nature of relationships 
between foundation trustees and the establishing firm; 2) involvement of senior management 
of the establishing firm in foundation activities; 3) how the establishing firm funds the 
foundation; 4) the extent of focus on foundation giving being aligned with the markets in 
which the establishing firm operates; and 5) the establishing firm’s staff volunteering and 
employee giving via the foundation. These five variables assisted in understanding corporate 
foundation operations. 
Section 2.4 discusses the motivational factors that often determine whether firms establish a 
corporate foundation. The concept of ‘motivation’ with regards to corporate philanthropy 
activities is first defined (Locke, 1997), with the following sections then examining the six 
specific motivational factors identified in the academic literature. While Australian corporate 
foundations structured as trusts are legally obligated to operate at arms-length to the 
establishing firm, and not provide direct financial benefits (Ward, 2012), it has been 
suggested that many still do so (Boesso, Hinna & Monteduro, 2013). In light of this being 
reflected in the motivational factors for firms establishing corporate foundations via trusts, 
the following four main themes are also discussed: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) 
Stakeholder Influences; 3) Taxation Benefits; and 4) Increasing Employee Engagement.  
Section 2.4.1 covers the Centralising Corporate Giving theme, which explores the benefits of 
the corporate foundation in centralising a firm’s philanthropic activities, rather than 
undertaking these through separate divisions and/or via multiple executives from within the 
firm in an ad-hoc manner. This section also discusses agency theory, which has been 
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commonly identified within the academic literature as the predominant model for explaining 
manager philanthropic activity choices (Jensen, 1986). Agency theory seeks to understand the 
nature of relationships between the owners (principals) of a firm and the managers (agents) 
hired to run their firm. 
Activities conducted by agents that do not return financial value to the principals are 
known as agency costs (Minefee et al., 2015). In this context, agency theory underpins the 
motivation for firms to reduce agency costs by centralising their corporate giving via a 
corporate foundation (Masulis & Reza, 2015). Centralising such corporate giving actions 
under the supervision of a single foundation manager or team of corporate giving officers 
rather than with many individual managers within the establishing firm may also be an 
attempt to reduce agency costs (Boesso et al., 2013). 
Section 2.4.2 examines the Stakeholder Influences theme, including how the influence of 
both internal and external stakeholders can serve as a motivational factor in the establishment 
of a corporate foundation. the Stakeholder Influences theme has the following three sub-
themes: 
• Section 2.4.2.1 covers Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation, which focuses on 
firm motivation to establish a corporate foundation to increase goodwill and corporate 
reputation, primarily among its stakeholders. The section starts by defining ‘goodwill’ 
and ‘reputation’, and then discusses the ‘halo effect’ including how this phenomenon 
can be leveraged by firms to infer a positive association from one business activity 
(e.g. corporate foundations) to another, such as the reputation of the establishing firm 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2006). For example, some firms market the pro-social activities 
of their corporate foundations to self-promote (Chernev & Blair, 2015). 
• Section 2.4.2.2 discusses Isomorphic Influences in the context of their motivation on 
firms setting up corporate foundations. This phenomenon describes how some 
organisations within the same industry evolve to resemble one another over time, with 
the main three types of isomorphic influences having been identified in DiMaggio and 
Powell, (1983) as: 1) coercive – forced change based on legal or regulatory 
influences; 2) normative – imitation of others based on acceptable behaviours within 
an industry, such as best practice; and 3) mimetic – the desire to imitate a leading 
industry firm or revered institutional actor. Understanding such variation in 
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isomorphic influences has been deemed important, as each may have a different 
impact on firms’ motivations (Harrow, 2011). 
• Section 2.4.2.3 covers the influence of lawyers in the firm’s establishment of a 
structured corporate foundation over other forms of corporate giving. The 
increasingly complex regulatory environment that most firms now operate in has 
meant hat corporate lawyers have become highly influential on such corporate 
decision-making (Bainbridge, 2012). Thus, the lawyer’s advocacy of a firm 
establishing a structured or unstructured corporate foundation is likely to be a primary 
motivational factor for such corporate decisions (Abzug & Webb, 1996). 
Section 2.4.3 explores the Taxation Benefits of Foundation Structure over other forms of 
corporate philanthropy, and how these influence the establishment of a corporate foundation. 
Such financial advantages include taxation benefits that may be available to the establishing 
firm by channelling philanthropic funding via a corporate foundation (Peterson & Su, 2017). 
Corporate foundations often have unique tax advantages over other forms of philanthropy, 
such as shifting pre-tax revenue into a foundation’s corpus of funds to make an immediate tax 
deduction on those funds, even before the foundation grants them (i.e. allocated the funds), 
which would not occur for other philanthropic activities without such a trust structure 
(Minefee et al., 2015). These and other types of financial tax benefits that are possible 
motivations for the establishment of a corporate foundation are discussed in this section. 
Section 2.4.4 discusses the Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm, including increased 
staff engagement through corporate foundation activities or events. The seminal work of 
Kahn (1990) previously described three antecedents of such workplace engagement: 1) 
meaningfulness – a personal sense of return for investing oneself in their work; 2) safety – a 
sense of being able to express oneself without fear, retribution or judgement; and 3) 
availability – a sense of being able to invest physical, emotional and psychological energy 
into work. It has also been recognised that some firms strategically use their corporate 
foundations to increase staff productivity and morale, including via reduced staff absenteeism 
and turnover (Buchholtz et al., 1999).  
It has been reported that Australian corporate foundations commonly involve the establishing 
firm’s staff including with relevant volunteering programs (Cronin, 2001). Such programs are 
where staff of the establishing firm are allocated paid leave to participate in volunteering 
(Navarro, 1988), which has been credited as enhancing staff moral (Buchholtz et al., 1999). 
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Establishing firms’ volunteering activities within corporate foundations are also often used to 
attract new employees (Bruch & Walter, 2005). 
Section 2.5 provides a brief concluding summary of this chapter, before the thesis then 
moves onto Chapter 3, which discusses the research design and methodology that was used. 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
This section explores the broad CSR concept, beginning with its common definition and then 
discussing why many firms practise CSR. According to Carroll (1998), CSR is comprised of 
the four main elements of economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic obligations that firms 
have to the societies where they operate. A brief discussion of each of these elements will 
also be covered in this section, however Section 2.1.1 provides a more detailed discussion of 
the fourth element of corporate philanthropy, as corporate foundations generally fall within 
this domain.  
CSR has been defined as firm activities that exceed the minimum legal and social 
obligations (McWilliams et al., 2006). It has gained acceptance globally as an essential 
voluntary act within the private sector, and is “increasingly seen as an imperative for 
sustainable businesses" (Truscott, Bartlett & Tywoniak, 2009, p. 89). Most CSR activities are 
conducted by firms based on the perception they owe a societal debt to their stakeholders in 
exchange for operational legitimacy (Cornelius, Todres, Janjuha-Jivraj, Woods & Wallace, 
2008; Kemper & Martin, 2010). Such stakeholders include a broad range of actors such as the 
firm’s customers, shareholders, employees, regulatory and industry bodies, governments, 
environmental groups, and community groups (Yunis, 2009). As such, large firms can have 
an extensive range of stakeholders, particularly those with national and/or multinational 
reach. 
There appears to be debate within the academic literature with respect to whether 
some of these stakeholder groups should hold priority over others, in regards to the purpose 
and use of corporate resources, particularly when they have divergent interests (e.g. Backer, 
Smith & Barbell, 2005). An example of such conflicting interests is within the mining 
industry with respect to hydraulic fracturing (i.e. fracking), the practice of extracting oil and 
gas from rocks. While this practice can generate significant profits for shareholders and 
suppliers, while also stabilising energy costs for industry and consumers, it has been 
suggested that fracking increases the risk of groundwater contamination and reduced soil 
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quality for local farming communities (McDermott-Levy, Kaktins & Sattler, 2013). In 2017, 
Australia’s Victorian Government banned fracking due to environmental and community 
concerns (Hopkins, 2017), which effectively prioritised the rights of the community over the 
rights of firms and other stakeholders. There are often many competing interests across a 
wide array of causes, and firms are obligated to balance the divergent requirements of their 
stakeholders within the CSR framework (Kemper & Martin, 2010). 
With respect to such corporate citizenship, Carroll’s (1998) four core CSR elements are 
defined as follows:    
• Economic: The firm should be well governed, pay taxes on profits, and provide 
employment opportunities. 
• Legal. At a minimum, the firm should obey the law of the land. 
• Ethical. The firm should operate to a higher ethical standard as those prescribed in 
law. 
• Corporate Philanthropy. The firm should voluntarily contribute to the wellbeing of 
individuals and civic society. 
 
The first three elements are further discussed below, with the fourth most relevant 
element of corporate philanthropy discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
Economic. Firms that are unable to operate profitably over long-term business cycles cannot 
reward equity owners via dividends and increasing stock value. Such unprofitable firms are 
also often unable to hire and retain staff, or to reliably settle debts with suppliers. Sustained 
unprofitability generally leads to a firm’s insolvency (Broomhill, 2007). Thus, the CSR 
framework often recognises economic sustainability as the most important obligation faced 
by business managers. Ensuring business solvency is a key governance concern for corporate 
directors as well as associated regulators and other stakeholders, as the firm’s failure can also 
result in negative social disruption (Wray, 2012). 
The priority of a firm’s economic obligations over the other three main CSR elements 
has often been debated among academics (Broomhill, 2007). As discussed in Section 1.2, 
firms could originally only extend their pro-social activities when they were in the immediate 
economic interests of the owners, such as building temporary housing for their remote 
workers (i.e. which allowed their employees to stay in the field longer). Over time such 
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restrictions were relaxed or overturned through the courts (Cronin, 2001; Sharfman, 1994), 
allowing firms to increasingly recognise and integrate the needs of multiple stakeholders into 
their CSR activities. 
Businesses’ attitudes towards CSR have also been advanced via government 
regulations (Carroll, 2008), such as the US environmental protection rulings established in 
the late 1960s, which arose in response to high-profile environmental accidents (Cronin, 
2001). For example, Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River had been a ‘dumping ground’ for heavy 
industrial waste for decades, with firms having little concern for the environmental impacts 
(Stradling & Stradling, 2008). The levels of river pollution meant that fish and bird life could 
not survive, and the water was unfit for human consumption. In 1969, a large unnatural fire 
on the surface of the river that was fuelled by waste oil and other contaminants received 
national media attention, which helped to influence how people generally viewed the 
environmental actions of business. It consequently became generally socially unacceptable 
for businesses to consider economic wellbeing without also factoring in the legal, ethical and 
philanthropic standards of their behaviour (Avetisyan & Ferrary, 2013). The Cuyahoga River 
incident influenced a range of new US environmental legislation, including the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, as well as the US Clean Water Act 1972. 
Such regulatory activities deepened social attitudes towards businesses’ obligations outside of 
their own economic benefits. 
Despite such societal shifts in the USA, economic authors such as Friedman (1970) 
continued to argue that the core responsibility of businesses was to operate self-sufficiently 
and to return a profit to their owners, based on the logic that increasing shareholder wealth 
leads to the redistribution or reinvestment of profits. This author also contended that business 
managers, as the agents acting on behalf of the owners, should not have the authority to be 
the social conscience of for-profit businesses, because it then denied the owners the chance to 
make such CSR decisions for themselves. 
Although since these pro-economic arguments were put forward, there has been a 
common perception across the literature in the context of CSR that only focusing on 
economic obligations actually hurts shareholders in the long term (e.g. Baron, 2001; Brown, 
Helland & Smith, 2006; Kemper & Martin, 2010; Ohreen & Petry, 2012; Porter & Kramer, 
2002; Sacconi, 2007). For example, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) arose from the 
mismanagement and subsequent collapse of US-based mortgage securities, where financial 
Page 27 of 217 
institutions bundled highly leveraged, risky loans into ‘new’ financial instruments (Wray, 
2012). These individual firms did not consider the cumulative effects of their actions and 
focused only on short-term profits, and the resulting failure in the market caused the GFC, 
which led to a decade-long deterioration of global equity markets, and the largest disruption 
to the world economy since the 1930s (Emeseh, Ako, Okonmah & Ogechukwu, 2010). 
Legal. As individuals are required to abide by societal laws, so too are firms compelled to 
adhere to laws as prescribed by legislative and regulatory bodies in the countries where they 
operate. Although it should be highlighted that Carroll (1998) suggested that firms only need 
to meet their minimum legal obligations to fulfil this CSR element. The common lack of 
resourcing among regulators often means that industries self-regulate, with legal or regulatory 
actions only arising when they fail to comply with the acceptable norms (Kemper & Martin, 
2010). For example, in 2016 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
successfully sued Woolworths and Colgate Palmolive for cartel behaviour between a 
supermarket retailer and laundry detergent supplier, with fines totalling AU$27 million, and 
litigation continuing into 2017 (Raitt, 2019). According to the ACCC, this cartel was 
established to reduce market competition via price fixing, which was deemed illegal under 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Following this Federal Court ruling, the ACCC 
Chairman stated: “By imposing these penalties, the Court has acknowledged that Woolworths 
was knowingly concerned in an anti-competitive understanding which they admitted was 
reached between laundry detergent manufacturers” (ACCC, 2016, para. 4). 
Such deceptive market practices by firms is counterproductive to the minimum legal 
obligations that Carroll (1998) specified should be adhered to within the CSR framework, due 
to them causing reputational damage to the offending firms as well as increased scrutiny by 
regulators (Walker, 2013). In the context of the above Woolworths example, the business’s 
reputation rating dropped from 17th to 40th on an Australian consumer-based reputational 
index after this incident (Thomson, 2016). 
Ethical. A business exceeding its minimal legal requirements has been determined as an 
indicator of its ethical/social concern (Collier & Esteban, 2007). Many organisations 
invariably signal their level of ethical standards to consumers, investors and employees via 
their actions and decision-making processes. For example, the actions of James Hardie (Hills, 
2005) have been perceived as unethical when the firm relocated its headquarters to another 
country (out of Australia) to avoid establishing the necessary levels of funding to compensate 
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Australian victims of asbestos-related cancers. Although James Hardie had not broken any 
laws, society expected that firms act appropriately in “issues for which a law or legal standard 
does not effectively address” (Carroll, 1998, p. 4). 
Ethics have been deemed as an important CSR consideration for firms, because many 
have to deal with issues that occur in the absence of clear laws (and are therefore not illegal), 
where questionable actions are likely to be judged negatively by consumers – perceived as 
actions that fail to meet unwritten societal expectations (Chalmers, 2013). This is particularly 
relevant to James Hardy example, where the firm did not break any laws yet incurred 
substantial negative government, shareholder and public scrutiny for its actions that were 
largely deemed as unethical. 
Such potential perceptions of unethical behaviour is particularly relevant for emerging 
technologies, where new laws have not yet come into effect to account for them as well as 
corresponding business practices (Moor, 2005). In the context of the fracking example 
discussed previously, relevant firms were forced to make decisions on new technology with 
few precedents defining expected ethical behaviour. These firms involved in fracking were 
judged mostly on their ethical decisions, as the environmental consequences of the practice, 
particularly for landowners and local communities, were not well understood. Hence, the 
Victorian Government’s state-wide ban of fracking was in response to some mining firms 
failing to meet ethical standards as determined by the local communities. 
In the context of such ethical behaviour, Collier and Esteban (2007) contended that 
firms often struggle to deliver effective or sincere CSR programs that satisfy all stakeholder 
expectations, particularly where there is a diversity of stakeholder groups. Again using the 
fracking example, a CSR program may have satisfied the firm’s expectations, such as 
meeting legal obligations in evaluating environmental impacts of a new shale extraction site, 
yet failed to satisfy local residents concerned about water pollution risks. Thus, in some 
situations, different stakeholder groups may consider the firm to be in breach of their specific 
societal obligations (Collier & Esteban, 2007; Dees & Anderson, 2003). 
Section 2.1.1 below provides further detail on Carroll’s (1998) fourth most relevant 
CSR element of corporate philanthropy, which then leads into a more detailed discussion of 
corporate foundations within Section 2.2. 
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2.1.1 Corporate philanthropy 
 
This section explores corporate philanthropy, beginning with its definition and then 
examining why some firms practice it. As a primary way for firms to deliver on their CSR 
obligations, it is important to understand the link between CSR and such philanthropic 
activities. The relationships between philanthropy and the other three main CSR elements are 
then discussed, followed by the defining of strategic philanthropy including how some firms 
practice non-altruistic philanthropy. An understanding of the distinction between 
philanthropy and strategic philanthropy is beneficial when examining why some firms choose 
to establish corporate foundations. In the context of this study, the corporate foundations in 
Australia were formed as trusts, which are bound to strict legal conditions of behaviour that 
prohibit self-servicing actions. 
Philanthropy has been defined as “the voluntary giving and receiving of time and 
money aimed (however imperfectly) toward the needs of charity and the interests of all in a 
better quality of life” (VanTil, 1990, p. 34), and corporate philanthropy as “… an active, 
purposeful dedication of corporate profits to fund organizations or institutions that make a 
beneficial contribution to society” (Olson-Buchanan, Bryan & Thompson, 2013, p. 148) and 
“… as voluntary and unconditional transfers of cash or other assets by private firms for 
public purposes” (Gautier & Pache, 2013, p. 343). Philanthropy and corporate philanthropy 
share many of the same characteristics including: 1) voluntary and unconditional nature of 
giving, making it an altruistic action; 2) desire to give funds and other assets for the 
improvement of society; and 3) flow of funds from private sources to public charitable 
institutions (Amato & Amato, 2007) 
It has been determined that most firms ‘operationalise’ their corporate philanthropy 
(Liket & Simaens, 2015, p. 285) through two distinct channels: 1) indirectly via a corporate 
foundation; or 2) directly giving via their own departments and managers, where ‘direct 
giving’ describes any type of pro-social giving made by the firm directly to a non-profit 
organisation, individual or community group (Chen, 2005). Direct giving can be separated 
into cash and non-cash or in-kind giving (Lev, Petrovits & Radhakrishnan, 2009), with cash 
giving including any liquid asset transfers such as legal tenders, listed shares, artwork or gifts 
that can be quickly sold (e.g. donations at a charity dinner) (Chief Executives for Corporate 
Purpose, 2015), and non-cash or in-kind giving including transfers of property or the use of 
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the firm’s resources, such as “complimentary use of corporate facilities, services, employee 
volunteerism” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 860).  
While corporate foundations are required to annually report to regulators their 
financial contributions to charities (cash and non-cash), most direct giving activities do not 
have any such legal requirements, as these are generally considered a business expense 
(Bartkus & Morris, 2015; Chen, 2005). In many firms, direct giving is a sporadic practice that 
is rarely centralised through a single manager or department, making its examination in the 
context of corporate philanthropy difficult (Masulis & Reza, 2015). Firms also often differ in 
what they consider ‘charitable’ giving, which also makes it difficult to compare across 
companies (Hennings, 2014; Werbel & Wortman, 2000). For example, one firm may consider 
purchasing calendars from a charity to give to their staff an act of philanthropy, while others 
would consider this a standard commercial purchase. In addition, some firms conduct their 
philanthropy both directly as well as through a corporate foundation (Petrovits, 2006). 
Furthermore, some firms practice corporate philanthropy so that the needs of external 
stakeholders may also benefit from the firm achieving its corporate objectives (Bruch & 
Walter, 2005). Thus, the corporate philanthropy practised in some firms has been described 
as strategic philanthropy, which is the “synergistic use of a firm’s resources to achieve both 
organisational and social benefits” (Thorne, Ferrell & Ferrell, 2003, p. 360). Although the 
term ‘strategic philanthropy’ may be in fact a misnomer, as this practice does not align with 
the traditional definition of philanthropy, which is altruistic in intent; strategic philanthropy 
has a firm-based motivation (Liket & Simaens, 2015). 
Despite its divergence from the more traditional corporate philanthropy, the notion of 
strategically implementing philanthropic activity appears to have some support within the 
academic literature (e.g. Bernholz, 2000; Carroll, 2008; Logsdon et al., 1990). Most notably, 
Porter and Kramer (2002, p. 6), proposed that “corporations can use their charitable efforts to 
improve their competitive context …”, indicating that the goal is not to be philanthropic 
unless it directly benefits the firm. 
Porter and Kramer (2011) further argued that the commercialisation of charitable 
services though the capitalistic for-profit business model is essential for resolving entrenched 
social ills: “Businesses acting as businesses, not as charitable donors, are the most powerful 
force for addressing the pressing issues we face” (p. 4). However, this concept of shared 
value is potentially at odds with how most firms currently practice corporate philanthropy, 
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such as providing grants to NPOs that deliver charitable services (Beschorner, 2014). 
Furthermore, Porter and Kramer described shared value as “… not social responsibility, 
philanthropy, or even sustainability, but a new way to achieve economic success” (2011, p. 
4). It was therefore determined in this study that shared value as a form of strategic 
philanthropy should not be classified as philanthropic. 
The Australian corporate foundations that were examined in this research were bound 
by strict legal requirements with regards to being registered as charitable trusts, including the 
specification they avoid self-serving behaviour. Thus, a depth of understanding of the 
distinction between ‘philanthropy’ and ‘strategic philanthropy’ was important in this study, 
where the corporate foundation managers have used both terms to describe their foundation 
activities (see chapters 4 and 5). 
Section 2.1.2 next discusses the conceptualisation of foundations generally, and how 
its social legitimacy has been adopted by some firms to pursue a philanthropic agenda. 
2.1.2 History and legitimacy of foundations 
 
This section provides a definition of the term ‘foundation’, as well as the term ‘trust’ which is 
the legal structure many foundations are based on (including all those examined in this 
thesis). It also touches on the historical origins of foundations, and how they have gained a 
position of legitimacy in many societies. Such legitimacy may help to understand why some 
commercial firms establish foundations, as part of their CSR framework. There is an 
extensive body of knowledge within the academic literature on foundations in general, unlike 
corporate foundations, which means that the more traditional foundation has been extensively 
drawn on in this thesis. 
A foundation has been defined as a perpetual trust structured organisation “not profit 
oriented; not part of the public sector; use their own financial resources; led by an 
independent Board of Trustees; aim to face issues for the common good” (Srivastava & Oh, 
2010, p. 460). However, in the USA and Australia there are no specific legal definitions for a 
foundation, which means they are often “indistinguishable from all other types of non-profit 
institutions” (Heydemann & Toepler, 2006, p. 10). Although there are some distinctions in 
Australia with regards to the main type of foundation, which are generally established as 
legal trusts with specific legal requirements. A legal trust is a long-standing mechanism for 
managing wealth, with its current form having been created over 700 years ago to help 
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manage the commercial use of land (Bryan & Vann, 2012). It has been defined as “an 
obligation enforceable in equity which rests on a person (the trustee) as owner of some 
specific property (the trust property) to deal with that property for the benefit of another 
person (the beneficiary) or for advancement of certain purposes” (Ford & Lee, 1990, p. 101). 
Australian-based foundations are operated via a variety of such legal trust structures, as 
further discussed in Section 2.2. 
Foundations were in existence long before the development of the corporate entity 
(Prewitt, 2006). The original foundations were in pre-Christian Europe, and were used to 
manage inheritances and other conditions on how property was to be used after the death of 
the owners (Bryan & Vann, 2012). One of the beliefs of the early Christian Church was that 
bequeathing personal property for charitable purposes was beneficial to the immortal soul 
(Coing, 1981). Acts of benevolence were subsequently facilitated through foundations that 
held assets for charitable purposes, and managed the transfer of wealth as a form of welfare 
(Prewitt, 2006). These foundations were often managed under the supervision of the Christian 
Church, an arrangement which remained for a thousand years under the legal code 
established by the 6th century Eastern Roman Emperor, Justinian I. These Roman era 
regulations established the concept of an independent legal entity, which was a precedent 
used to establish private for-profit corporations (Bryan & Vann, 2012). 
Coinciding with the 18th century period Age of Enlightenment, the supervision of 
foundations shifted from the Christian Church to the growing-in-power state and its 
accompanying governmental bureaucracy for managing increasingly complex societies 
(Coing, 1981). The corresponding emergence of national social policies meant the state 
subsumed greater control from the Church in how charitable services were to be delivered. 
For example, the UK’s Charitable Uses Act of 1601, also known as the Statute of Elizabeth, 
was introduced to stop corruption in the charitable sector (Bryan & Vann, 2012), including 
listing activities considered to be charitable and/or those in the spirit of being charitable; 
principles that are still referenced in many UK influenced legal systems today. In the 18th 
century, charitable trusts also increased their scope into new and emerging areas of public 
interest, such as the arts, education and promotion of scientific advancements (Coing, 1981). 
Foundations subsequently became imbedded in the increasingly complex and broad-reaching 
state bureaucracies, where they were recognised as providing welfare and cultural enrichment 
for the public, while remaining privately owned (Prewitt, 2006). 
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The USA leads in terms of the number of registered foundations, recorded at 86,000+ 
in 2015 (Mckeever, 2018). US foundations became particularly prominent during the 
industrial revolution of the 19th century, as wealthy capitalists such as Rockefeller and 
Carnegie established them to initiate philanthropy (Prewitt, 2006). Such American liberalism, 
which preferers to solve social issues without state involvement, used non-government actors 
such as foundations to fulfil the role of welfare provider (Coing, 1981; Toepler, 1998).  
In the context of legitimacy, foundations are often seen as important to liberal 
societies: “For foundations, the challenge of legitimacy is pervasive and enduring. It exists in 
every setting in which private assets receive privileged treatment by governments in 
exchange for an obligation – often very loosely defined – to use those assets for the public 
good” (Heydemann & Toepler, 2006, p. 4). These authors also suggested that “foundations 
benefit from deep public and official support for charitable giving, volunteering, and self-
help” (p. 5). For example, most foundations are provided “fiscal and legal privileges” (e.g. 
tax relief, expropriation of investor funds, accumulation of assets in perpetuity) as an 
endorsement of legitimacy extended by governmental authorities (Leat, 2004, p. 97). 
In line with this, Prewitt (2004) argued that liberal societies accept and support 
foundations partly because of their role as a wealth re-distributer (i.e. moving money from the 
wealthy to the poor), without endangering the status quo of any individual’s political and 
economic freedoms. This was validated by Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, p. 293) who 
suggested that: “Philanthropy is a better means of redistributing the nation’s wealth than 
higher taxes on the rich”. This is because foundations fund philanthropic activities separate to 
the public sector, without coercing others to contribute; in contrast, when the government 
funds charitable work, it is subsidised by all taxpayers. 
Many foundations now maintain positions of authority as well as legitimacy within 
society (Heydemann & Toepler, 2006). Weber (1978) first proposed three sources of 
legitimate authority that are necessary for any social institution to ‘dominate’ other structures 
within a society: 1) legal (bureaucratic rationality); 2) traditional; and 3) charismatic 
leadership. Legal authority is how the societal ethics are codified into laws that are then 
applied to all society members, as enacted by state-run bureaucracies. Traditional authority is 
imposed by the acceptance of bureaucratic institutions in the “established belief in the 
sanctimony of the legitimacy of those exercising authority over them” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). 
Charismatic authority is derived by individuals or organisations that through their position 
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within that society (e.g. emperor, hereditary title) are considered extraordinary in ways that 
are “unobtainable to the ordinary person” (p. 241). 
Heydemann and Toepler (2006, p. 19) used Weber’s model of legitimate authority to 
understand why foundations are so entrenched in modern society, suggesting they have all 
three elements of authority required of an institution to be perceived as legitimate: “The 
privilege accorded to foundation assets derives in part from law … from deeply held and 
near-universal traditions that view charitable giving as an expression of individual and 
collective virtue … foundations often rely on their standing as the organizational means 
through which the authority of a charismatic leader, the founding donor …”. 
Legitimacy within society is important, as it enables foundations to operate with 
relative discretion in how their philanthropy activities are practised. As explained by Roelofs 
(2003, p. 12): “Foundations have the unique advantage of being somewhat insulated from 
public opinion and political constituencies … grant makers can take pride in their ability to 
fund innovative programs and work on the frontlines of social problems without concern for 
popular opinion”. 
As part of this legitimacy to strengthen oversight of foundation actions, although the 
attitudes of such regulators as well as the general public regarding foundations’ philanthropic 
activities are generally perceived as lax (Heydemann & Toepler, 2006). In their examination 
of all forms of foundations including corporate, Anheier and Toepler (2009, p. 704) observed: 
“Occasional scandals reported in the media suggest that government oversight of foundations 
is weak … Actual data on the scale of abuses … are quite limited”.  
It would also appear that the accountability of foundations is rarely questioned by the 
Australian public and regulators (Leat, 2004), even when breaches of trust or legitimacy are 
made public. For example, the Shane Warne Foundation (a traditional non-profit foundation) 
faced negative publicity in 2015 due to operational irregularities, including accusations of 
nepotism, as well as an operating expense ratio of 86 cents for every dollar raised that left 
only 14 cents for donations. Despite numerous claims of financial neglect by the Shane 
Warne Foundation’s board, a 2016 investigation by the Australian Department of Consumer 
Affairs cleared the foundation of any wrongdoing, other than being late in submitting an 
annual report (Cooper, 2017), and it was voluntarily closed in 2017. Overall, there has been 
scant public commentary on the role of foundations within the Australian non-profit sector, 
Page 35 of 217 
nor interest from that sector to improve externally facing reporting mechanisms to improve 
accountability (Gilchrist & Pilcher, 2018). 
While this section has provided the context in which corporate foundations exist, the 
next section discusses corporate foundations as a specific type of charitable structure. 
 
2.2 Corporate foundations 
 
This section discusses corporate foundations, which are those established by firms that are 
either structured as legal trusts or unstructured and run internally within the firm. This section 
begins by providing a definition of corporate foundations, and then discusses these within the 
context of Australian legal trust structures. Then the advantages of corporate foundations 
over other forms of corporate philanthropy are briefly discussed in Section 2.2.1, followed by 
Section 2.3 that provides a description of the five dimensions that are often used to determine 
the level of independence (or integration) a corporate foundation has from the establishing 
firm. 
A corporate foundation is commonly defined as a non-profit entity providing 
philanthropic services, which has been established and funded by a for-profit corporate 
organisation, but operates separately from the establishing firm (Bernholz, 2000; Payton, 
1988; Rietzler, 2013). Adding to this, Petrovits (2006, p. 337) has described a corporate 
foundation as a “company-sponsored private foundation” bound by legal frameworks that 
define its governance and funding mechanisms, disbursements, asset management, conflicts 
of interest to the establishing firm, as well as operational reach. It has also been noted that 
there are no legal requirements for using the term ‘foundation’, which means it can be used 
by any firm for a variety of corporate purposes (Freehills, 2012). In light of this, while this 
study’s focus has been on Australian organisations registered as trusts, there was one 
corporate foundation included that operated ‘internally’ to a firm and was not structured this 
way. Further discussion on these more informal structures is provided in Section 5.12 under 
limitations of thesis and opportunities for further research. 
Internationally, there are a variety of corporate foundation structures, which are 
mostly determined by the legal requirements of the jurisdictions they operate in (Corporate 
Citizenship 2013). In Australia, most corporate foundations are established as charitable 
trusts that are only permitted to operate if they align with at least one of the following 
Page 36 of 217 
purposes: 1) relief of poverty; 2) advancement of education; 3) advancement of religion; and 
4) other beneficial community purposes not falling under any of the preceding divisions 
(Bryan & Vann, 2012).  
The two primary forms of legal charitable trusts in Australia are PAF and PuAF, and 
Table 2.1 below outlines the minimum legal requirements that must be met to be recognised 
as either (Bryan & Vann, 2012). These two forms of charitable trust are similar in most areas 
(key attributes), only really differing with respect to: 1) Requirement for responsible person; 
2) whether they must undertake public fundraising; and 3) minimum financial contributions 
required to support individual grantees each year. According to Ward’s (2012) trustee 
guidelines, there are seven main criteria that Australian trusts must comply with: 
1) Donations tax deductible: Donations made by individuals and firms into the 
foundation that can be tax deductible, if the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
recognises the charitable trust as a DGR, an entity entitled to receive income tax 
deductible gifts. 
2) Income tax exempt: The foundation is exempt from paying tax and is able to reclaim 
any franking credits received on dividends from Australian companies. 
3) Requirement for responsible person (RP): Tax law requires that a majority of the 
foundation’s trustees for a PuAF and at least one trustee for a PAF are deemed to be 
‘responsible persons’. This means the RP is not associated with the establishing firm 
or any major donor, and they must have good community standing. 
4) Public fundraising: Unlike a PAF, a PuAF must invite the public to contribute to the 
public fund this, such as via a donation link on the foundation’s website.  
5) Support individual grantees: The foundation cannot make grants to individuals or to 
other corporate foundations, only to charitable organisations. 
6) Grants to non-DGR charities: Foundations can only grant funds to DGR Item 1 
institutions, including public benevolent, health promotion and some general charities. 
7) Annual granting minimum: A PAF must grant a minimum of 5% of its valuated 
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Key attributes  PAF PuAF 
Donations tax deductible Yes Yes 
Income tax exempt Yes Yes 
Requirement for (RP) 
One independent active RP 
director 
Majority RP, including 
extended definition of who 
qualifies 
Public fundraising No, soliciting from public Yes, must invite donations 
Support individual grantees No No 
Grants to non-DGR charities No No 
Annual granting minimum 
Minimum 5% or 
AU$11,000; zero first year 
Minimum 4% or AU$8,800; 
zero for first four years 
Table 2.1: Legal structures underpinning corporate foundations in Australia (Ward, 2012) 
 
Given the range of alternative structures for corporate giving as shown in Table 2.1, it 
is important to understand why firms might select foundations over other less structured 
options. The advantages of establishing formal foundations is relevant to many large firms, 
especially in countries with similar regulatory environments such as the USA, UK, Canada 
and Australia (Altuntas & Turker, 2015). The next section discusses some of these potential 
advantages of firms using corporate foundations over other forms of philanthropy, while 
Section 2.3 discusses levels of integration between the corporate foundation and their 
establishing firm. 
 
2.2.1 Advantages of corporate foundations  
 
As identified in the literature, the likely benefits are most probably the reason why most large 
firms would choose to establish a corporate foundation. In discussing such benefits, this 
section firstly describes the four main types of philanthropy that firms practise (as discussed 
in Section 2.1.1): 1) structured corporate foundations; 2) unstructured corporate foundations; 
3) direct giving; and 4) staff volunteering and grant matching. 
While corporate foundations are primarily considered a charitable organisation, it has 
been recognised that they can be used for other non-philanthropic purposes, such as operating 
as innovation centres (Vaidyanathan, 2008). Knott and McCarthy (2007, p. 322) defined the 
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role of such an innovation centre as follows: “… foundations provide seed funding, fund 
demonstration projects, and provide funds to other organizations to experiment and 
innovate”; equating to an outsourced research and development (R&D) function. In addition, 
foundation activities are often aligned with the establishing firm’s marketing and public 
relations (PR) activities (Marquardt, 2001; Navarro, 1988), which are aimed at improving the 
establishing firm’s reputation (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). Thus, it was contended by 
Brown et al. (2006, p. 875) that “charitable giving may be a way for firms to enhance their 
public reputations and to create goodwill with customers, employees, and regulators”. 
Although it is important to highlight that such actions are often more strategic philanthropy 
than purely altruistic (as discussed in Section 2.1.1). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that corporate foundations have the potential to 
provide consistent philanthropic activity on behalf of the establishing firm based on a ‘corpus 
of funds’, which is the principal investment (funded by establishing firm) to be used by the 
foundation (Ward, 2012). When such a corpus investment is many times larger than the 
establishing firm’s annual granting amounts, this allows that firm to use a foundation 
structure to “smooth corporate gifts and maintain a steady level of goodwill” (Webb, 1994, p. 
41), as further discussed in Section 2.4.3. However, most corporate direct giving programs 
lack consistency in the financial amounts disbursed year on year, due to the firm lacking a 
specific pool of enabling funds and operating in an ad-hoc or unfocused fashion (Altuntas & 
Turker, 2015; Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). For example, NPOs that operate large-scale, 
multi-year charitable programs require long-term funding commitments to be made by 
grantors to enable certainty in their charitable operation (Cloutier, 2009). It has been 
therefore been recognised that corporate foundations help to centralise and focus corporate 
giving (Bernholz, 2000). 
In addition, the benefits of long-term, consistent giving via a corporate foundation has 
been recognised as more positive compared with less structured forms of corporate 
philanthropy. This is because “foundations have evolved into unique organisational forms 
that provide credible and sustained procedures for the facilitation of CSR in line with 
corporate business strategies and values” (Altuntas & Turker, 2015, p. 2). For example, 
multi-year contracts provided by foundations are often seen by grantees as enabling capacity-
building, where such capital investments are made to improve the delivery and sustainability 
of grantees’ charitable services (Delfin & Tang, 2008; Grønbjerg, Martell & Paarlberg, 
2000). 
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Further, Porter and Kramer (1999, pp. 123-125) categorised four primary advantages 
that corporate foundations have over other forms of philanthropy: 
1. They typically apply more stringent controls in their selection of grantees, by 
analysing which non-profit will provide the greatest social return. 
2. Their skill in evaluating and selecting grantees can be transferred to other 
philanthropic funders, enabling a higher standard of grantee/grantor relationships overall. 
3. They may be able to enhance the effectiveness of their non-profit grantees by 
providing them with enhanced reporting systems and operational best practices, which makes 
them more likely to become a recipient of additional philanthropic funding. 
4. They are able to fund research which assists in delivering more effective methods 
of solving social problems among the general philanthropic community, thereby greatly 
influencing the actions of large groups of charity and welfare advocates. 
Yet despite the many benefits of corporate foundations as recognised in the academic 
literature, it has also been suggested that there are negative aspects, such as their governance 
and administrative costs relative to other forms of philanthropy. Although it has been argued 
that “the time and cost of dealing with the legal, reporting and compliance requirements for 
corporate foundations are not factors to be dismissed lightly, nor is the fact that private 
foundations are subject to stricter requirements than public charities” (Faucette, 2001, p. 
422). 
After discussing some of the advantages of corporate foundations over other forms of 
corporate philanthropy, the section explores the degree of integration (or separation) between 
the corporate foundation and the establishing firm. It is important to understand this 
relationship because this may be a motivational factor for a firm to establish a corporate 
foundation, and this could also be an issue post-establishment with respect to the corporate 
foundation’s compliance with legislative requirements. 
  
2.3 Level of foundation’s integration with establishing firm 
 
This section is focused on the levels of integration between foundations and their establishing 
firms across the five Corporate Citizen (2013) dimensions. It was recognised in this study 
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that understanding how closely the foundation is controlled by the establishing firm is 
important in examining motivations for creating the foundation. For example, the 
establishment of a structured foundation that allows the firm to leverage its legitimising 
effects in society is likely a motivation, as discussed in Section 2.1.2. Less structured 
foundations are not required to comply with the independence specifications of legal trusts, 
and are most often fully controlled and contained within the establishing firm. 
The degree that a corporate foundation is independent of, or integrated into the 
establishing firm is assessed by the five variables: 1) the strength of relationships between 
foundation trustees and the establishing firm; 2) involvement of senior management of 
establishing firm in foundation activities; 3) how the establishing firm funds the foundation; 
4) the focus on foundation giving being aligned with the markets where the establishing firm 
operates; and 5) establishing firm’s staff volunteering and giving through the foundation. The 
Corporate Citizenship (2013 p. 8) found that in the UK “… most corporate foundations are 
somewhat integrated with the founding company”, which is why they proposed these criteria 
to assess the degree of foundation independence, as further detailed below. 
1) Strength of trustee relationships. The degree that the foundation’s trustees are 
independent of the establishing firm is based on their previous or ongoing association 
(i.e. employee or director) with the establishing firm. For example, foundation 
independence would be high if all the trustees had no previous employment history 
with the establishing firm or its employees, while a high level of integration would 
apply if all the trustees previously (or currently) served as executives of the 
establishing firm. 
2) Senior management involvement. The degree that senior management of the 
establishing firm are involved with the giving programs or operations of the 
foundation. For example, the level of foundation independence would be high if 
foundation managers are not employed directly or located within the premises of the 
establishing firm, or if they rarely interacted with senior managers of the establishing 
firm for granting or operational direction. In contrast, a high level of integration 
would apply if the senior managers of the establishing firm also held foundation 
manager positions, thereby making it difficult to establish whether the foundation’s 
activities are undertaken on behalf of the establishing firm or the foundation. 
3) Funding formula. The degree that the foundation is reliant on the establishing firm 
for funding its granting program and its other operational activities. For example, the 
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level of foundation independence would be high if its corpus of funds did not require 
ongoing or yearly support from the establishing firm, such as when the latter provided 
a large initial bequest to support the foundation. In contrast, a high level of integration 
would apply if the foundation was dependent on annual funding from the establishing 
firm. 
4) Focus of giving. The degree the foundation can make granting decisions without 
consideration of their impacts on the establishing firm. For example, the level of 
foundation independence would be high if it makes grants to a charity that supports 
causes that the establishing firm is publicly against. In contrast, a high level of 
integration would likely apply if the foundation rejected such grants solely based on 
the reputational impacts to the establishing firm or only granted funds to charities 
‘approved’ by the establishing firm. 
5) Staff volunteering. The degree that the foundation can make use of the staff of the 
establishing firm for volunteering activities, fundraising and workplace giving. For 
example, the level of foundation independence would be high if it did not facilitate 
the establishing firms for such voluntary activity. In contrast, a high level of 
integration would apply if the foundation manager had a performance measure related 
to how many employees of the establishing firm volunteered for it. 
Table 2.2 below further illustrates these five main variables that determine whether a 
foundation is more integrated or independent. 
Independent from firm                  <<<<<>>>>>                         Integrated into firm 
Strength of Trustee relationships 
Non-employees of firm - no 
prior history of employment 
with supporting firms  
 Employees of firm 
Senior management involvement 
Minimal involvement with 
foundation activities 
 Extensive involvement with 
foundation activities 
Funding formula 
Corpus of funds  Not in place – varies from 
year to year 
Focus of giving 
Not linked to the business  Linked to the business 
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Independent from firm                  <<<<<>>>>>                         Integrated into firm 
strategy of establishing firm strategy of establishing firm 
Staff volunteering 
Not offered  Offered as a core part of 
foundation activity 
Table 2.2: Spectrum of corporate foundation independence 
  
As the above table suggests, interdependence can potentially blur the independence 
boundaries of the two ‘separate’ organisations (i.e. establishing firm and corporate 
foundation). This lack of separation is important. First, there are strict regulatory conditions 
on how corporate foundations that are structured as trusts should operate, and their activities 
should avoid establishing firm focused self-serving behaviours. Second, the ability for a firm 
to establish a corporate foundation and exert control over all aspects of its operations may be 
a motivating factor as to why those firms establish specific foundation structures. In terms of 
other motivational drivers, an integrated foundation can allow the establishing firm to realise 
the same benefits of an independent corporate foundation while retaining the same control as 
if it were an internal department. While this type of relationship breaches Australian 
guidelines with respect to charitable trusts (corporate foundations), this phenomena has been 
found elsewhere. For example, in a study of Brazilian corporate foundations, Mindlin (2012, 
p. 468) found that 5 of the 8 foundations had trustee boards wholly comprised of the 
establishing firm’s executives, and that these foundations operated “as a functional area of 
their founding companies”. 
The establishing firm’s influence over the corporate foundation has commonly been 
highlighted as concern within the academic literature (e.g. Boris, Elias, Hager, Renz & 
Somashekhar, 2008; Minefee et al., 2015). Hennings (2014, p. 13) contended that 
“foundations largely reflect the interests of the executives of the corporation”. In a study of 
323 large, US-based corporate foundations, Petrovits (2006, p. 337) also found blurred links 
between the two entities, including the following: 
• Employees of foundations were also typically senior members of the establishing 
company. 
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• The establishing company or subsidiaries are the singular source of funding of the 
foundation. Therefore, the foundations existence is dependent on continual 
establishing firm contributions into the trust’s corpus. 
• Corporate giving is often channelled through the foundation as the flagship of 
corporate giving strategy. For example, volunteer recruiting is facilitated by 
foundation employees rather than human resources (HR) or marketing departments. 
 
As will be further discussed in Section 2.4.4 some corporate foundations have also 
been more focused on the establishing firm’s staff engagement rather than with supporting 
charitable purposes, which is also in conflict with the independent nature of a trust’s 
mandated purpose. 
This section has illustrated the spectrum of separation versus integration of corporate 
foundations from their establishing firms. Understanding such independence/integration is 
helpful in understanding motivations for creating corporate foundations. For example, 
establishing a structured foundation will enable the firm to leverage inherent legitimisation 
and financial advantages of an independent structure (as discussed in Section 2.1.2), while at 
the same time retaining their control over the foundation. 
In summary, Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 of this academic literature review chapter 
have defined corporate foundations, and discussed the differences between formal and 
informal foundations as well as the legal requirements for structured foundations within the 
context of a legal trust. Section 2.2.1 discussed why structured corporate foundations (those 
established within trusts) offer advantages over other forms of philanthropy. Section 2.3 
discussed the levels of integration that exist between corporate foundations and their 
establishing firms, and explored causes from the literature as to why this integration may 
occur. The key points identified were: 1) that there are two forms of Australian charitable 
trusts used to establish structured corporate foundations - PAF or PuAF – that place similar 
requirements on trustees; and 2) the level of independence or integration of a corporate 
foundation can be assessed via five variables. 
2.4 Motivational factors in corporate foundation establishment  
 
This section explores the motivational factors that often determine a firm’s decision to 
establish a corporate foundation. It begins with a definition of the general concept of 
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motivation, and then discusses the various motivational factors that lead to corporate 
foundation establishment, as identified in the literature.  
Motivation has been defined as: “A reason or reasons for acting or behaving in a 
particular way” (Kitjaroonchai, 2012, p. 22), and as “the energizing force that induces action” 
(Locke, 1997). That is, the core reason/s that lead an individual or organisation towards a 
specific action is known as the motivating factor that also explains their behaviour. 
In the context of this study, there are a wide range of motivational factors that drive 
corporate decision-making with regards to establishing a corporate foundation. This research 
has focused on identifying these primary motivational factors with respect to Australian 
corporate foundations; thereby addressing the research question: Why do corporate firms 
voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all of their philanthropic 
activities? 
The literature review undertaken in this study identified the following six primary 
motivational factors, which highlight why some Australian firms choose to establish 
corporate foundations: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) Public Goodwill and Stakeholder 
Reputation; 3) Isomorphic Influences; 4) Lawyer Influence; 5) Taxation Benefits; and 6) 
Increasing Employee Engagement. Three of these have been grouped under a broader theme 
of Stakeholder Influences – a) Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation; b) Isomorphic 
Influences; and c) Lawyer Influence – while the others are categorised separately, as depicted 
in Table 2.3 below and then further discussed in the following sections. 
Theme Motivational factors 
 2.4.1 Centralising Corporate Giving 
2.4.2 Stakeholder Influences 2.4.2.1 Public Goodwill and Stakeholder 
Reputation 
2.4.2.2 Isomorphic Influences 
2.4.2.3 Lawyer Influence 
 2.4.3 Taxation Benefits 
 2.4.4 Increasing Employee Engagement 
Table 2.3: Motivational factors categorised within theme 
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2.4.1 Centralising Corporate Giving 
 
This theme is focused on actions that seek to shift or consolidate corporate philanthropic 
activity into a single channel of corporate giving, rather than it being conducted by separate 
divisions involving multiple executives in an ad-hoc manner. This approach has been 
recognised as a way to reduce agency costs, which is an issue within agency theory. 
Agency theory is a field of study that explores the dynamics in behaviour between the 
owners of a firm (principals) and the managers hired to run the firm (agents) (Jensen, 1986; 
Wang & Coffey, 1992). Any actions undertaken by the agent that do not specifically return 
value to the principal is known as an agency cost – meaning there is an opportunity cost (i.e. 
a reduction in some owner profits) associated with an owner having different interests to the 
firm’s managers (Minefee et al., 2015). 
Within the academic literature, agency theory is a concept that has been provided as a 
primary reason why corporate managers conduct philanthropic activity (Jensen, 1986). This 
section therefore begins with a definition and discussion of this theory, which underpins 
several motivational factors on why firms choose to conduct philanthropy via a corporate 
foundation. Some firms attempt to reduce their agency costs by centralising their corporate 
giving via a foundation, where professional corporate giving officers manage their 
philanthropy rather than multiple individual business managers (Iatridis, 2015. In light of 
this, in a longitudinal study of 406 US Fortune 500 firms between 1996 and 2006, Masulis 
and Reza (2015, p. 593) found “weak support for the conventional idea that corporate giving 
is profit enhancing”, and instead found substantial evidence supporting agency motives. 
Specifically, 62% of those firms contributed to charities where the CEO had existing 
affiliations, and the CEOs were more likely to support charities affiliated with independent 
directors of the firm. In line with this, in another quantitative longitudinal study of 687 NY 
Stock Exchange listed companies between 2008 and 2012, Iatridis (2015) found that 
corporate managers made cash contributions to charitable causes primarily to further their 
own personal and professional interests, rather than benefit the donor firm. Similar use of 
corporate philanthropic funds by firm managers for their own personal gain has been 
commonly highlighted in the academic literature as a regulatory concern (Gautier & Pache, 
2013). As with CEOs, such actions among managers can reduce corporate profits in the same 
way as other involuntary expenses.  
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As listed in the previous paragraph, these studies show how CEO and managers can 
be self-serving when they are practising philanthropy on behalf of their firms. For example, 
the issue with a CEO or manager giving corporate funds “to gain approval and respect from 
local business elites” (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988, p. 82) is that this does not necessarily 
reflect the needs of the firm or ultimately the charity recipients within the local community. 
When external regulatory controls are placed on firms to better conduct their corporate giving 
(e.g. transparent reporting on philanthropic contributions made to shareholders), firms often 
respond by formalising their existing philanthropic practices (Brudney & Ferrell, 2002). As 
suggested by Brown et al. (2006, p. 867), “fiduciary responsibility laws are associated with 
the greater likelihood of having a foundation”, suggesting this type of philanthropy may 
better control agency costs than when individual managers and CEOs undertake direct giving. 
Therefore, a firm may establish a corporate foundation to reduce such regulatory 
control risks (i.e. government enforcement of legislation), effectively minimising or shifting 
agency costs from internal or ad-hoc philanthropy to a corporate foundation. Risk reduction is 
thereby achieved, as the foundation legally separates the charitable giving from the firm (as 
discussed in Section 2.2). However, in the case of direct giving, corporate funds are 
distributed via multiple channels (i.e. individuals and departments) of the firm in an ad-hoc 
manner (Bruch & Walter, 2005). For example, the CEO and shareholders may prefer 
different charities from each other, while the HR department may want to fund yet another 
charity (Marquis & Lee, 2013). The use of a foundation reduces the influence of the giving 
preferences of such individuals, meaning that agents lose the ability to directly give due to 
more objective controls (Minefee et al., 2015). 
Of particular focus within the academic literature is how the establishing firm’s CEO 
and other executives exacerbate agency costs within corporate foundations (Masulis & Reza 
2015; Werbel & Carter, 2002). This group of executive managers are typically afforded 
greater discretion with respect to business decision-making, including philanthropic (Haley, 
1991). A study conducted on a sample of 160 US-based corporate foundations found that 
CEOs serving on the foundation’s board generally aligned its charitable giving according to 
their own interests, demonstrating the agency problem (Werbel & Carter, 2002). In line with 
this, Morris and Biederman (1985) recommended that the CEO be separated from the 
foundation’s grant making process, including their removal from its board, to reduce conflicts 
of interest. 
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Furthermore, Buchholtz et al. (1999, p. 180) highlighted that “the effects of resource 
levels on corporate philanthropy are mediated by CEO discretion”, meaning that 
organisational performance and corresponding available cash (i.e. slack) is often a driver of 
corporate philanthropy. Such slack is often used as an indicator of firm performance to 
investors, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, including those displayed via philanthropic giving, 
to better understand the firm’s surplus cash position. CEOs may consequently use such 
positive performance signalling to boost their own short-term financial rewards resulting 
from increased share price and boosted reputation (Marquis & Lee, 2013). 
To overcome such leadership bias, Gautier and Pache (2013, p. 7) suggested that the 
effect of CEO influence on corporate foundations can be reduced by recruiting an 
independent manager to run the corporate foundation, to “put some distance between the 
CEO and the gifts.” It has also been highlighted that such separation of the CEO from the 
foundation decision-making process is particularly important if the executive is also the 
foundation’s founder that would have determined the initial purpose of the foundation, 
philanthropic activities and structure (Silberer, 2007). 
In summary, this section has discussed how agency theory is an important model for 
explaining philanthropic decision-making within firms. This theory defines the relationship 
between owners of the firm (principals) and managers of the firm (agents). Avoiding agency 
costs has been identified as a motivation in the academic literature for firms to establish a 
corporate foundation. The following section will now discuss the Stakeholder Influences that 
has also been recognised in this study as a primary motivator for establishing a firm. 
 
2.4.2 Stakeholder Influences 
 
This section discusses the motivational factors within the broad Stakeholder Influences 
theme, which represents the influence of internal and/or external stakeholder forces on firms 
establishing a corporate foundation. This theme is comprised of three motivational factors 
covered in the following sections: 1) 2.4.2.1 Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation 
which largely explores external stakeholders to the firm; 2) 2.4.2.2 Isomorphic Influences 
which relates to how organisations generally resemble one another over time; and 3) 2.4.2.3 
Lawyers Influence, which as a stakeholder has a unique position of influence within most 
large firms. 
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2.4.2.1 Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation 
 
This section begins by defining the terms ‘goodwill’ and ‘reputation’, followed by a 
discussion of the halo effect (i.e. promoting positive associations) including how firms 
exploit this phenomenon to improve their goodwill and reputation benefits associated with 
strategic philanthropy. Irrespective of whether the firm’s intentions are altruistic, there is a 
halo effect from such actions as well as potential social benefits. This section will also 
demonstrate how goodwill and reputation can be enhanced via a corporate foundation 
structure, where the halo effect promotes positive associations between the corporate 
foundation and other unrelated firm activities. Such enhancement ties in with the former 
discussion of the legitimising effects of corporate foundations (see Section 2.1.2), as 
legitimacy, goodwill and reputation are interrelated concepts (King & Whetten, 2008). 
Goodwill has been defined as “an intangible, saleable asset arising from the reputation 
of a business and its relations with its customers, distinct from the value of its stock” 
(Samuel, 2007, p. 78). A positive enabler of goodwill is reputation, which has been defined as 
“the estimation in which a person or thing is held, especially by the community or the public 
generally” (Macquarie Dictionary, 2017). That is, a firm can expect to obtain a premium in 
goodwill when their reputation exceeds those of their competitors or when their reputation is 
above those of societal or regulatory standards (Shenkar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997). 
The halo effect has been described as a phenomenon whereby a consumer’s 
awareness of one positive action of a firm is then attributed to other unrelated actions 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2006), and has often been credited as a driver of a firm’s CSR 
adoption (e.g. Smith, Read & Lopez-Rodriguez, 2010; Wells, 1907). That is, firms that are 
seen to do good in CSR activities are then often perceived as performing better in other 
functional and operational areas. As such, the halo effect has been deemed a driver of 
corporate philanthropy (Brudney & Ferrell, 2002), which is one of the core CSR components 
(Carroll, 1998). There are several specific benefits that have been attributed to firms known 
to be socially responsible, including improved financial performance and market leader 
attribution by important stakeholders (Baron, 2001). A better financial performance stems 
from the firm displaying actions that are benevolent in nature (e.g. corporate philanthropy), 
which has been known to “alter product perceptions, such that products of companies 
engaged in pro-social activities are perceived as performing better” (Chernev & Blair, 2015, 
p. 1412), leading to increased brand value, and in turn higher revenues. 
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In the context of CSR, the halo effect often influences consumer choices, which has 
led some firms to use philanthropy to protect themselves from reputational damage when 
breaches of ethical or legal standards occur (Smith et al., 2010). In line with this, Coombs and 
Holladay (2006, p. 125) described the halo effect as a ‘shield’ to “prevent reputational 
damage from a crisis”. Those customers with a positive view of a firm are more likely to 
discount and resist subsequent negative publicity, as this new negative information runs 
counter to their pre-established views (Dean, 2004). 
Furthermore, some firms have been known to use the halo effect for the practice of 
‘greenwashing’, which is a mechanism that exaggerates a firm’s environmental (or CSR) 
credentials for self-promotion (Smith et al., 2010; Traies, 2005). Examples include an 
advertising claim that washing detergent without sulphur is more environmentally-friendly, 
which while legitimate, neglects to point out that sulphur has been excluded from detergents 
for decades (Johansen, 2015). In his topic-relevant study, Miller (2017, p. 16) uncovered a 
link between greenwashing and corporate philanthropy: “Via foundation donations, corporate 
sponsorship, and executive largesse, multinationals have become bigger sources of global aid 
than states – and they remorselessly promote the fact …” Although it has also been suggested 
that some firms that use greenwashing may be doing so for strategic philanthropy purposes; 
that is, corporate giving for the primary purpose of benefiting the firm (Porter & Kramer, 
1999). As previously discussed (see Section 2.1.1), most strategic philanthropy has a non-
altruistic intent where social good is a secondary focus. Therefore, firms that are motivated to 
establish a corporate foundation may do so to also benefit from the goodwill and reputational 
benefits that it provides. 
It has been recognised that the purposeful combined promotion of CSR within 
commercial marketing programs (i.e. strategic philanthropy) is understandable in highly 
competitive sectors where firms are seeking to differentiate themselves (McWilliams et al., 
2006; Werther & Chandler, 2005). Yet while such firms may be aiming for positive social 
outcomes based on their combined CSR activities, these are often ancillary to achieving 
commercially focused marketing objectives as with greenwashing. Many consumers consider 
firms negligent if they are not engaged in some form of corporate philanthropy, which 
suggests CSR is an important market signal (Gautier & Pache, 2013). 
In line with this, Fombrun and Shanley’s (1990) study of 292 large US firms, the 
results indicated that corporate philanthropy programs were used by many of these firms as 
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displays of social benevolence to generate public goodwill with consumers and the wider 
community; thereby aligning them with corporate strategy that allowed these firms to 
compete “for reputational status” (p. 233). In an earlier study by Holmes (1976, p. 37) 
focused on executive perceptions of charitable giving, it was also found that executives often 
engage in socially responsible activities in the belief that “corporate reputation and goodwill 
would be enhanced”. 
Furthermore, in a more recent study of 100 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed 
firms, Hogarth, Hutchinson and Scaife (2018) found that shareholder value increased via 
corporate philanthropy when the firm was invested in leveraging this as part of its 
reputational management strategy. These former research results suggest that such charitable 
activity has more impact when showcased to key stakeholders, such as via the promotion of 
corporate foundations that highlight the founding firm’s philanthropic giving while also 
communicating their good deeds to employees and other stakeholders (Altuntas & Turker, 
2015; Marquardt, 2001; Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). It has been suggested that this makes 
the foundation another PR instrument (i.e. strategic philanthropy), which is not really 
consistent with the definition of philanthropy as “voluntary and unconditional transfers of 
cash” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1993, p. 2). 
In a survey of 72 Fortune 500 companies Hutton, Goodman, Alexander and Genest 
(2001) found that 43% of their philanthropy budgets were part of corporate communications, 
and that “the greater an organization’s charitable foundation giving, the stronger its 
reputation tended to be” (p. 252). Their study also identified that the allocated amount of 
these company budgets for corporate foundations (excluding other philanthropy) was ranked 
second only to general advertising (USD$11.37 million and USD$8.14 million respectively), 
with other social responsibility and direct giving activities next at USD$4.6 million (p. 253). 
Like Hogarth et al. (2018), Hutton et al. (2001) similarly found that charitable foundation 
giving had a high correlation with consumer attributed reputation. 
In line with the above, Morris, Bartkus, Glassman and Rhiel (2013) found that 
American consumers have more favourable attitudes toward companies that enact their 
philanthropy via profit-based mechanisms, such as when funds are passed to the foundation 
via yearly profit, rather than cause-related purchase programs (i.e. $1 donated to a cause with 
every purchase). This is because consumers perceived that the establishment and support of a 
foundation via normal operating revenue implies a higher level of firm commitment towards 
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a cause, while a dependence on consumer sales (i.e. cause-related marketing) was seen as 
slightly coercive. 
In fact, some researchers have found that simply using the word ‘foundation’ can 
trigger positive associations by the general public towards the firm, resulting in reputational 
benefits (Silberer, 2007). In line with this, it has also been uncovered that many organisations 
that establish a foundation will typically name it ‘[Corporation] Foundation’ (i.e. IAG 
Foundation, BHP Foundation, Westpac Foundation), so that from a strategic philanthropy 
perspective, there will be an increase in brand recognition (Schrader, Halbes & Hansen, 
2005), maximising any positive halo effect. 
The reputational benefits of a firm establishing a foundation include an increase in 
outwards signalling of its pro-social behaviour (i.e. promoting the good works), such that 
“Corporate social responsibility should be highly salient and noticed by a broad range of 
stakeholders. Anonymous actions do nothing to enhance the reputation of a company” 
(Sjovall & Talk, 2004, p. 278). However, Chernev and Blair (2015) demonstrated through a 
series of experiments that consumers are more attuned to a firm’s self-aggrandisement of 
CSR if they don’t perceive it as altruistic in intent. In one of their experiments, these 
researchers asked two consumer groups to rate a series of fictitious firms’ products, 
proposing to one group that firms conduct CSR for benevolence and to the other that they do 
it more out of self-interest. Each group then rated the same set of products, with those in the 
benevolence group rating them higher than those in the self-interest group. These researchers 
also found a similar influence if the firm’s pro-social behaviour was promoted by a trusted 
external source rather than directly by the firm which was seen as self-promotion. These 
results indicate that the firm achieves limited reputational benefit if consumers cynically 
perceive the promotion of CSR activities. 
Furthermore, other research has indicated that corporate giving can signal financial 
strength and enhance the reputation of a firm to investors, suggesting that surplus cash (i.e. 
slack) are accrued beyond those required to meet their essential capital requirements to 
maintain solvency and continued growth (Shapira, 2012, p. 1892). Chang, Jo and Li (2016) 
undertook a quantitative study of US public companies and found that a firm’s corporate 
giving (including via foundations) delivers a form of ‘insider information’ regarding its cash 
flow position; a positive indication of the founding firm’s future financial performance. 
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As discussed in Section 2.2, such positive consumer associations between foundation 
giving and the establishing firm’s branding can raise conflicts of interest based on CSR 
having more self-serving goals associated with strategic philanthropy. A corporate foundation 
created within a trust structure is, according to Australian legal requirements, intended to be 
independent and not contribute to the PR function of the establishing firm (Westhues & 
Einwiller, 2006). This potential conflict was highlighted in a longitudinal cross-sectional 
study of 384 US-based firms, where Chen, Patten and Roberts (2008) found that those that 
performed poorly on environmental and product safety areas were more likely to make 
charitable contributions. These authors subsequently concluded that “corporate philanthropy 
may be more a tool of legitimization than a measure of corporate social responsibility” (p. 
131). It could also be that corporate foundations are used by some firms to increase funding 
activities following controversies or where it has been seen as have acted unethically or 
illegally (Jenkins, 2005; Szőcs, Schlegelmilch, Rusch & Shamma, 2014). This would suggest 
the potential to legitimise a firm’s former actions can be the motivation for establishing a 
foundation, which again relates more to strategic philanthropy. 
This section has focused on the Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation theme, 
with respect to motivational factors for establishing a corporate foundation. It has discussed 
how some firms exploit the halo effect to attribute positive associations to themselves based 
on their pro-social actions. The academic literature has validated that corporate foundations 
are an ideal mechanism for building goodwill and reputation among stakeholders including 
the general public, including providing a way to legitimise the firm’s actions (see Section 
2.1.2). The next section is focused on the first Stakeholder Influences theme relating to 
Isomorphic Influences that can drive a firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation. 
 
2.4.2.2 Isomorphic Influences 
 
This section explores the effects of isomorphism on corporate foundation establishment, and 
begins with a definition of isomorphism (i.e. organisations becoming similar to others), 
followed by a description of the three main forms of isomorphic influences (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
Isomorphism has been defined as the process where organisations in similar sectors 
(e.g. finance, health, energy) experience comparable market conditions and stressors, which 
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over time result in these organisations acting similarly (Anheier & Toepler, 2009). Such 
similarities reflected across the industry can lead to a homogeneity of products and services, 
as well as workplace cultures and business strategies, etc (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
In this context, organisations adopt similar structures to one another due to a variety 
of institutional and societal factors, including regulations, shared workplace cultures and peer 
emulation (Sharfman, 1994). Personal relational factors such as industry associations or 
common director linkages may also inform companies across the sector about perceived best-
practice, business successful behaviours, which they then strive to emulate via isomorphism 
(Deephouse, 1996). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) categorised such isomorphic influences 
into three main types: 1) coercive; 2) normative; and 3) mimetic. 
Coercive isomorphism is a change forced on organisations due to external legal or 
regulatory requirements. An example of coercive isomorphism is when the Victorian 
government passed legislation in 1970 for the compulsory wearing of seatbelts in 
automobiles. Seatbelts were originally supplied as after-market options in the mid-1950s, and 
were not considered essential by road safety groups until the mid-1960s. Thus, automotive 
manufacturers did not include them as standard equipment until government legislation was 
introduced for all new vehicles sold in Australia from 1964 (Milne, 1985). Seatbelts had 
become standard equipment by the early-1970s, by which time regulations made it 
compulsory for vehicle occupants to wear them (McDermott & Hough, 1979). 
Normative isomorphism is the imitation of others within the industry, based on acceptable 
behaviours or a desire to adopt ‘best practice’. An example of this is how some professional 
service firms require their accountants to have a Certified Professional Accounting (CPA) 
certificate as a minimum standard for employment (Myers, Kooti & Kooti, 2016). As the 
practice to increase the number of CPA qualified accountants became normalised within the 
industry, so did pressure on individual firms to mandate employees with this accreditation. 
Thus, a CPA became essential to be considered for a role across the industry, where 
accreditation is considered best practice, via the imitation of other firms (Deephouse, 1996). 
Mimetic isomorphism is the desire to imitate a leading firm within the industry, rather than 
an entire industry as in the normative form. An example of this is when a football team 
poaches the coaching staff or most valuable players from a higher ranked competitor, in the 
belief that by doing so they can replicate the same level of success. The firms therefore make 
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rational choices to imitate their more successful or dominate competitors, to attempt to 
replicate their success or reputation within an industry (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 
The remainder of this section focuses on the influence of isomorphism within the field 
of philanthropy. However, due to limited case studies within the academic literature 
specifically relating to isomorphism and corporate foundations, the corresponding literature 
review drew on more general philanthropy. 
It was Sharfman (1994) that first suggested that normative and mimetic forms of 
isomorphism are largely responsible for the institutionalisation of US corporate philanthropy 
since the mid-20th century. This author contended that were three primary reasons for this: 1) 
the US Government sanctioning the tax deductibility of corporate philanthropy, stemming 
from societal pressure on firms to use philanthropy to help solve social issues the government 
was unable or unwilling to address – a non-coercive legislation that fostered the practice of 
philanthropy voluntarily; 2) leading firms of their time, such as the US based conglomerate 
AT&T implementing corporate philanthropy programs, prompting imitation by other firms; 
and 3) inter-business associations beginning to promote philanthropy as best practice, 
normalising the behaviour among the wider business community. 
In line with this, a quantitative study of 620 US-based corporate foundations found 
that foundation managers are significantly influenced in their giving amounts by the actions 
of other corporate foundations where the establishing firms are competitors (Walker, 2013). 
This suggested that as envied foundations within an industry increased their giving, others 
within their ‘peer group’ followed their actions, thus normalising the behaviour of increased 
giving (mimetic leading to normative isomorphism). 
It has also been suggested that some corporate foundations are influenced by non-
corporate foundations (i.e. community and family foundations). Walker (2013) uncovered 
that the US-based corporate foundations in his study often looked for signs among the 
broader foundation and philanthropic community that conveyed best practice giving. Such 
sharing of best practice influences corporate foundation managers to make internal 
improvements to their own foundation’s operations (Galaskiewicz, 1985). It has also been 
highlighted that some foundation managers are influenced by the giving expectations of the 
community groups where they operate; including influencing the foundation’s funding and 
the causes they choose to promote (Useem, 1988). 
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Furthermore, in an empirical study of commercial banks in the USA between 1985 
and 1992, Deephouse (1996, p. 1033) concluded that “organisations that conform to the 
strategies used by other organisations are recognised by regulators and the general public as 
being more legitimate than those that deviate from normal behaviour”. This suggests that 
imitating successful firms’ pro-social behaviours, including via the establishment of a 
corporate foundation, can improve a firm’s stakeholder legitimacy. 
However, it has been suggested that corporate foundations are unlikely to champion 
controversial social positions if they are not first supported by the establishing firm. For 
example, most relevant Australian corporations supported the same-sex marriage plebiscite of 
2017, which preceded the same support among their foundations (Copland, 2018). 
This section has examined the three main types of isomorphism – coercive, normative 
and mimetic – in the context of motivational factors for establishing a corporate foundation. 
Among these, the normative and mimetic forms of isomorphism appear to be the most 
common explanations on why organisations generally come to resemble one another over 
time (Sharfman, 1994). In addition, the literature review has highlighted that corporate 
foundation and philanthropy managers are often influenced by their corporate and non-
corporate counterparts (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Walker, 2013), often leading to foundations 
resembling one another. It has also shown that isomorphism among corporate foundations 
can also be driven by the establishing firm. The next section continues to focus on the 
Stakeholder Influences theme, with respect to how Lawyer Influence can directly impact on a 
firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation. 
 
2.4.2.3 Lawyer Influence 
 
This section explores the influence of lawyers in determining the establishment of a 
structured foundation over other forms of corporate giving. Corporate lawyers stand apart 
from other professional services (i.e. accountants) in their impact on corporate actions 
(Bainbridge, 2012); thus, they often have some responsibility for firms establishing corporate 
foundations. An overview of the role of lawyers within the context of corporate philanthropy 
and CSR is first discussed in this section, including potential legal risks within CSR 
activities. Lawyers often take conservative positions in managing organisational risks. This 
section then focuses on suggestions within the literature that risk avoidance within the legal 
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community with respect to CSR may be a motivation for the establishment of structured 
corporate foundations, which have been known to lower philanthropy risks (Abzug & Webb, 
1996). As there is scant information within the academic literature regarding the specific 
influence of lawyers on the establishment of corporate foundations, literature has been 
sourced relating to their involvement in CSR and philanthropy in a more general context.  
Lawyers have often been involved in the structuring of philanthropic activities prior to 
the existence of modern commercial firms (see Jones, 1969). As discussed in Section 2.1.2, 
the ‘trust’ structure has been a commonplace legal instrument since medieval times, where 
the use of trusts were encouraged by the church and government of the day, for the relief of 
suffering for the poor (Bryan & Vann, 2012). The development of civil law expertise for the 
creation and management of charitable trusts occurred centuries prior to formation of what is 
commonly considered modern corporate philanthropy (Prewitt, 2006). 
In the 1960s, the social responsibility activities of more modern business expanded 
and grew into the field of CSR, which raised the complexity of firms’ legal needs (Webb, 
1994). This led to the development of specialist corporate lawyers to deal with the legal, 
regulatory and ethical considerations required to ensure CSR compliance (Wilkins, 2012). 
This is also why many foundation trustees need high-level legal representation and advice to 
navigate the complexity of legal and accountability standards (Bernholz, 2000; Leat, 2004). 
In-house corporate lawyers have, over the previous four decades, increased their 
scope and authority, and as a function hold substantive influence over corporate managers, 
often acting as arbitrators for executives and the board (Heinz, 1982; Powell, 1993). For 
example, the complexity in corporate law associated with corporate governance is influenced 
by various external factors such as shareholder activism, whistle-blower and regulatory 
auditing regimes, and mergers and acquisitions, as well as internal factors such as enterprise 
risk and compliance, employee enterprise bargaining agreements, and CSR (Bainbridge, 
2012). 
In light of this, legal professionals are uniquely placed to influence corporate CSR 
agendas, including philanthropic giving. It has been suggested that corporate lawyers can 
even prevent CSR initiatives: “Unfortunately, many lawyers still hinder the application of 
CSR principles and rob their companies of significant value by favouring the negative, risk 
management side of this dynamic” (Pitts III, 2008, p. 495), which is relevant as CSR 
initiatives require a degree of risk tolerance in their implementation (Broomhill, 2007). A 
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report published by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) cited six legal risk categories that 
need to be satisfied prior to commencing CSR activities: 1) reputation of the firm; 2) 
compliance with regulatory requirements or laws; 3) operational considerations; 4) 
shareholder impacts; 5) employment market impacts; and 6) external business relationships. 
Failure to factor in these risk categories to meet stakeholder expectations can result in 
financial or reputational damage to the firm (Beddewela & Fairbrass, 2015). 
Furthermore, given the complexities of implementing CSR within large firms 
(Blackwelder, Coleman, Colunga-Santoyo, Harrison & Wozniak, 2016), lawyers may seek to 
minimise risks by making conservative choices, which might include selecting structures for 
their philanthropy. The influence of corporate lawyers in such decision-making would 
suggest that their decisions on how to structure a foundation often lean towards conservative 
and low-risk options (Pitts III, 2008). One such option is a structured corporate foundation, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.1. It has been recognised that foundations formed as trusts rarely 
have a negative impact on the founding firm (Leat, 2004), which is why they often suit the 
needs of risk adverse and influential corporate lawyers. 
This section has discussed how the influence of lawyers can shape a firm’s decision 
with respect to the establishment of a corporate foundation over other forms of corporate 
giving. Lawyers have long held an association with trust structures and philanthropy before 
the creation of corporate firms, which has continued with their involvement in CSR activities. 
In an attempt to limit corporate risk, these lawyers may choose to take conservative positions 
in terms of philanthropy and how it is delivered (Pitts III, 2008). 
This concludes the three motivational factors under the theme of Stakeholder 
Influences – Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation, Isomorphic Influences and Lawyer 
Influence – and the next section will discuss the next main theme of Taxation Benefits. 
 
2.4.3 Taxation Benefits 
 
This section focuses on the theme of Taxation Benefits that are often available to firms that 
choose to conduct philanthropy via a corporate foundation, which may be one of the primary 
motivators for this activity. The tax benefits available to firms that establish a structured 
foundation are commonly understood across the academic literature (e.g. Bertrand, 
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Bombardini, Fisman & Trebbi, 2018; Brown et al., 2006; Himmelstein. 1997; McDowell et 
al., 2003; Morris & Biederman, 1985; Peterson & Su, 2017; Webb, 1994). The review of 
academic literature has uncovered four main types of tax benefits that occur when 
establishing a corporate foundation, as further explored below. 
A corporate foundation often allows a firm to promote its philanthropic activities and 
strengthen its brand via a form of subsidised advertising (Abzug & Webb, 1996; Navarro, 
1988), while recouping some of those expenses from taxation benefits associated with the 
foundation’s charitable activities. As discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, many corporate 
foundations are named after their establishing firm, primarily to boost its public image 
(Schrader et al., 2005). In contrast, non-philanthropic advertising expenses are treated as a 
corporate expense that has no tax deductibility options (Chen & Lin, 2015. By using such a 
foundation, establishing firms can direct funds into a trust structure to reduce tax expenses 
while potentially having full or partial control of the foundation (as discussed in Section 2.3). 
Despite such benefits, Webb (1994) proposed that fluctuations in a firm’s profits can 
cause variable levels of corporate giving to their foundations, meaning more money flows 
into foundations in highly profitable years. Petrovits (2006, p. 335) expanded on this finding 
via a longitudinal study of US-based firms with corporate foundations, which highlighted that 
by prudently managing their earnings “firms [can] use their charitable foundations as off-
balance sheet reserves”. In the context of Australia, establishing firm can shift profits into 
their foundation under the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, and within the same 
financial year in which the shift occurred, register the transaction as a general business 
deduction (Freehills, 2012). Furthermore, these foundations are not required to spend those 
funds within the same financial year, provided their minimum disbursement levels are met (4-
5% per annum, zero in the first year for a PAF and zero in the first four years for a PuAF), 
which means they can retain them long after the establishing firm has realised the tax benefits 
(Ward, 2012). 
It has been acknowledged that the tax advantages associated with funding a corporate 
foundation are different from other forms of philanthropy (Minefee et al., 2015). For 
example, while a firm’s direct giving program allows for similar tax benefits as a charitable 
contribution, it does not provide the timing benefits achieved by expanding a foundation’s 
corpus for future expenditure (Peterson & Su, 2017). Thus, the foundation “can accumulate 
capital in a tax-free environment subject to some distributions” (Freehills, 2012, p. 4). In the 
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USA, corporations can deduct up to 10% of their taxable income via charitable contributions, 
including donations to their foundations (Chen, 2005). In Australia, there are no taxable 
income limits for charitable contributions made by corporations, meaning they could deduct 
all of their income if this was donated to their foundation (Freehills, 2012). 
Furthermore, Australian-listed firms that offer franking credits can avoid their 
shareholders paying tax on the dividends they receive, whereas normal distributions do not 
receive this benefit. Thus, “corporate dividends are subject to double taxation – one round on 
corporate income and the other on individual income earned in dividends – It is cost-effective 
for the firm to make contributions. The firm avoids taxes on profits donated, making the 
value of the contributions larger” (Abzug & Webb, 1996, p. 3). Thus, in the context of 
philanthropy the funds are distributed to benefit society rather than shareholders, wherein 
such donations redistribute wealth (Heydemann & Toepler, 2006). 
This section has discussed the theme of Taxation Benefits as a motivational factor for 
firms to establish a corporate foundation. The four main taxation benefits as identified in the 
academic literature are: 1) foundation is used by the firm as a form of subsidised advertising 
(Abzug & Webb, 1996); 2) firms shift profits into the foundation corpus in good years, 
allowing them to continue giving in years with little or no profit (Webb, 1994; Wymer & 
Samu, 2003); 3) the firm takes an immediate tax deduction from funds shifted into the 
foundation, which can keep the money invested in the corpus tax free almost indefinitely 
(Petrovits, 2006); and 4) firms are incentivised to perform the function of wealth 
redistribution to benefit society, by moving shareholder profits directly to charities (Abzug & 
Webb, 1996). The next section will discuss the theme of Increasing Employee Engagement. 
 
2.4.4 Increasing Employee Engagement 
 
This theme relates to Increasing Employee Engagement being a motivational factor for firms 
to establish a corporate foundation. As there was limited information within the academic 
literature specifically in relation to the role of employee engagement on firms establishing 
corporate foundations, the broader philanthropy research on employee engagement and 
CSR/philanthropy has been focused on for the theme of Increasing Employee Engagement. It 
should be noted that when referring to employees this refers to employees of the establishing 
firm. 
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This section begins with a discussion of the definition of the term ‘engagement’, 
followed by a summary of the seminal work of Kahn (1990) who developed a framework to 
describe the three main antecedents of workplace engagement. This section then focuses on 
how philanthropy, practised directly within the firm including via a foundation can increase 
employee engagement and subsequently reduce absenteeism and turnover (Buchholtz et al., 
1999). One of the main forms of staff philanthropy, volunteering programs facilitated via 
such corporate foundations is then discussed (Bruch & Walter, 2005), followed by foundation 
involvement in grant matching programs with the firm’s staff (i.e. employee giving) (Stead, 
1985). 
Engagement has been defined as “A formal promise, agreement, undertaking, 
covenant” and a “Moral or legal obligation; a tie of duty or gratitude” (Teerikangas & 
Valikangas, 2009, p. 6). In the context of workplaces, Kahn (1990 p. 694) described 
individual engagement “as the harnessing of organisation members’ selves to their work 
roles; in engagement, people employee and express themselves physically, cognitively and 
emotionally during role performances”. In this author’s model of workplace engagement are 
the following three antecedents that have been used to explain the individual level of 
engagement: 1) meaningfulness, a sense of personal return for investing oneself in their work; 
2) safety, a sense of being able to express oneself without fear of retribution or judgment; and 
3) availability, a sense of being able to invest physical, emotional and physiological energy 
into work. May, Gilson and Harter (2004, p. 12) expanded on Kahn’s research and showed 
that employees that had meaningful workplace experiences generally were more likely to be 
positively engaged with their firm.  
Most firms want to engender employee engagement, and those that conduct 
philanthropy often experience higher levels of employee engagement (Brown et al., 2006; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Based on their UK-based survey of 200 corporate giving 
professionals, Brammer, Millington and Pavelin (2006, p. 235) confirmed that philanthropic 
giving is used in part for “managing the relationship between the firm and its employees”. 
Such firms may therefore be practising strategic philanthropy, as discussed in Section 2.1.1, 
to primarily “enhance employee morale” (Buchholtz et al., 1999, p. 167) and as a “quasi-
fringe benefit to firm employees” (Navarro 1988 p. 90) by exchanging higher personal 
remuneration for visible displays of social benevolence. Such visible support of charitable 
causes may also appeal to potential recruits, thereby enabling firms to attract more employees 
(Bruch & Walter, 2005; Turban & Greening, 1997). 
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There is a large body of academic literature on the relationship between a firm’s 
philanthropy practices and employee engagement. This includes Lewin and Sabater’s (1996) 
survey of 156 large US firms that found a positive link between companies’ community 
involvement and employee engagement, as well as Bruch and Walter’s (2005, p. 52)  study 
involving in-depth interviews and surveys with managers primarily from US and European 
based multinational firms, that highlighted how linking philanthropic and business activities 
boosts staff motivation and improves their shared sense of community. Porter and Kramer 
(2002, p. 6) also contended that employee engagement is improved through corporate 
philanthropy, although they also suggested that “the same effect might be gained from an 
equal increase in wages that employees could then choose to donate to charity”. 
Furthermore, Muller et al. (2014, p. 4) contended that the types of philanthropy 
undertaken by a firm are not always based on the rational consideration of corporate officers; 
self-driven emotional factors can instead “play a key role in [philanthropic] decision-
making”. In many instances, these philanthropic actions are based on the convergence of the 
collective empathy of a firm’s employees that is signalled to senior decision-makers, 
triggering their corporate philanthropy. That is, the desire for employees to help others is 
transferred bottom-up to influence the form and scope of philanthropy decided by corporate 
officers (Muller et al., 2014). 
Another CSR-related opportunity to engage employees is when firms provide 
employees with volunteer programs, which allow them to spend time in the service of non-
profits while being paid their normal salary (Grant, 2012; Jones, 2010). Staff volunteering 
programs have been known to reduce staff turnover and absenteeism, and increase feelings of 
company and broader community engagement (De Gilder, Schuyt & Breedijk, 2005). Such 
programs are either managed directly by the firm, through its corporate foundation or via 
outsource agencies (Harris, 2012), and those more closely integrated with their corporate 
foundations are more likely to have their staff participating in foundation directed 
volunteering programs (Corporate Citizenship, 2013).  
While there is a large amount of literature on employee volunteering, there is limited 
information specifically linking corporate foundations to their establishing firm’s volunteer 
programs. For example, Heydemann and Toepler (2006) indirectly referred to such 
volunteering when discussing legitimacy aspects of corporate foundations, while a study of 
the 50 largest, US-based corporate foundations by Minefee et al. (2015, p. 67) mentioned that 
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“charitable giving and volunteerism are an integral part” of these firms’ giving strategies. In 
contrast, a study by Shachar and Hustinx (2019) specifically credited corporate foundations 
as a funding source for establishing regional office volunteer programs among some 
multinational corporations.  
Employee volunteering was one of the variables listed in Section 2.3 with respect to 
measuring the level of independence or integration between a foundation and the establishing 
firm. In line with this, the former Corporate Citizenship (2013) study suggested a lack of 
separation when these foundations are managing employee volunteering for the establishing 
firm. There is anecdotal evidence that many Australian-based corporate foundations facilitate 
their establishing firm’s volunteering programs and promote this activity to the public 
(Cronin, 2001). For example, Origin’s, Macquarie Group’s and CGU’s foundation websites 
all specifically mention founding firm employee volunteering as a core foundation-led 
activity, which suggests a lack of separation as per the variable introduced in Section 2.3. 
Another common way that firms involve their staff in their philanthropy activity is via 
the facilitation of employee grant matching contributions, also known as payroll or employee 
giving (Minefee et al., 2015). The practice of employee grant matching has been well covered 
in the academic literature, highlighted as a way for firms to lift employee engagement, 
including those that do not have foundations but still practice philanthropy (e.g. Brammer & 
Millington, 2003). In this context, an employee makes a charitable contribution to a charity 
and the corporate foundation (or establishing firm) directly matches it (Stead, 1985). In some 
cases, the foundation’s giving platform is integrated into the establishing firm’s payroll 
system, enabling seamlessly financial contributions to be made by employees (Romney-
Alexander, 2002). 
Moreover, in their study of 12 UK-based corporate foundations, Varcoe and Sloane 
(2003) found that some of the relevant establishing firms were using external payroll giving 
agencies for their employees to make contributions. Interestingly, in another study involving 
approximately 14,000 staff at one large US-based professional services firm (Block et al., 
2017), payroll giving was not found to lift employee engagement. Although these authors 
suggested this may be due to the use of automated pay cycles, where it becomes just another 
expense to employees, with no tangible link to the benefits to charities receiving those funds. 
This section has discussed how the Increased Employee Engagement theme can be a 
motivating factor for firms establishing a corporate foundation, including using those 
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foundations to give employees’ roles more meaning. Such engagement can be facilitated via 
philanthropic activities such as the foundation’s managing employee volunteering programs 
or employee giving programs (Jones, 2010), which can also be used to attract new employees 
(Bruch & Walter, 2005). The next section provides a concluding summary of this chapter, 
which leads in into Chapter 3 focused on the research design and methodology. 
 
2.5 Summary to the literature review 
 
This chapter has reviewed several interrelated topics as part of this study’s literature review. 
Section 2.1 overviewed CSR and focused on philanthropy within the broader context of the 
four elements of CSR, before investigating the origins and legitimacy of foundations 
generally. Section 2.2 then explored corporate foundations specifically, including their 
advantages over other forms of philanthropy as discussed within the academic literature. 
Section 2.3 next examined the extent of separation between corporate foundations and 
establishing firms, while Section 2.4 discussed the six motivational factors that influence 
firms in establishing corporate foundations to help address this study’s primary research 
question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
 
 
The following six motivational factors, identified as the most common themes within the 
academic literature, are summarised in Table 2.4 below: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) 
Public Goodwill and Stakeholder Reputation; 3) Isomorphic Influences; 4) Lawyer Influence; 
5) Taxation Benefits; and 6) Increasing Employee Engagement. The broader theme of 
Stakeholder Influences incorporated three of these motivational factors – 1) Public Goodwill 
and Stakeholder Reputation, 2) Isomorphic Influences and 3) Lawyer Influence – while the 
remaining three were determined as stand-alone themes. 
 
 
Page 64 of 217 
Theme Motivational factor Description 
 2.4.1 Centralising 
Corporate Giving  
Agency theory describes the relationship between 
the firm’s owners (principals) and their managers 
(agents) (Werbel & Carter, 2002). In this context, 
some firms establish a structured foundation to 
reduce agency costs, as strict rules ensure 
accountability of trustee actions. Alternatively, 
these costs may be shifted from existing ad-hoc 








Goodwill is an intangible value assigned to the 
firm, which is enhanced by the firm’s positive 
reputation (Shenkar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997). For 
example, firms may strategically exploit the halo 
effect (phenomenon that creates a perceived value 
from one unrelated action of the firm to another) to 
create positive associations with their visibly pro-
social actions, such as those conducted by a 




Isomorphism is a phenomenon where related 
organisations begin to resemble one another in 
process and structure over time (Anheier & 
Toepler, 2009). Normative (acceptable behaviours 
within an industry) and mimetic (desire to imitate 
industry leader) forms of isomorphic influence are 
seen as the primary drivers of corporate 
philanthropy (Sharfman, 1994), which may also 




Lawyers are influential within large commercial 
firms (Bainbridge, 2012), and arbitrate on most 
issues relating to the firm’s CSR (Wilkins, 2012), 
including establishment of a corporate foundation. 
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Theme Motivational factor Description 
Lawyers may favour low-risk options (Pitts III, 
2008), leading the establishing firm to consider a 
structured corporate foundation as their preferred 
philanthropic option (Leat, 2004). Although there 
is scant information within the academic literature 
on which to base this judgement. 
 2.4.3 Taxation 
Benefits  
The benefits to firms of favourable tax treatments 
have commonly been examined in the academic 
literature. Such benefits that may motivate firms to 
establish a corporate foundation include: 1) use of 
foundation as a form of subsidised advertising 
(Abzug & Webb, 1996); 2) shifting profits into the 
foundation corpus to minimise taxes (Webb, 
1994); 3) firm investment in the corpus being tax-
free, almost indefinitely (Petrovits, 2006); and 4) 
use as a societal function of wealth redistribution 
(Abzug & Webb, 1996). 
 2.4.4 Increasing 
Employee 
Engagement  
Some firms establish a foundation to practise 
strategic philanthropy, and to increase staff 
engagement and morale, often resulting in higher 
productivity via reduced absenteeism and turnover 
(Buchholtz et al., 1999). Corporate foundations 
have been shown to facilitate their establishing 
firm’s staff volunteering and workplace giving 
programs, which the academic literature suggests 
are engagement enhancements (Jones, 2010) that 
can also attract new employees (Bruch & Walter, 
2005). 
Table 2.4:  Motivational factor descriptors 
  
The thesis now continues with Chapter 3, which will discuss the research design and 
methodology that was used in this study. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.0 Chapter 3 Introduction 
 
This chapter describe the research design and methodology used in this study to address the 
research question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
Chapter 3 contains 10 sections. 
Section 3.1 describes the research paradigm chosen for this research – an interpretivist 
paradigm – including the justifications for using it, and then briefly discusses potential 
alternatives. 
Section 3.2 covers the research method that was used, which was qualitative to be able to 
explore human feelings and experiences, and because the limited research population (37) 
meant that a quantitative method was not viable (see Table 3.1). 
Section 3.3 discusses the sampling technique that was used in this study – purposive 
sampling – including the justifications for it, and then discusses potential alternatives (see 
Table 3.2). 
Section 3.4 describes the selection and interview process, involving 37 foundation managers 
that were invited via email to participate in this research and the 17 that participated (a 
response rate of 43%). The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. 
Section 3.5 discusses the ethical considerations of this research, which includes details of the 
formal ethics review that was conducted, as well as the obtaining of informed concept from 
participants, and the data capture and review approval process. 
Section 3.6 covers the potential issue of researcher bias, including how this can be 
minimised. For example, researcher awareness of the source of their personal bias can be 
useful in minimising its effects. 
Section 3.7 briefly discusses how the confidentiality of participant identities was maintained 
by the researcher, mainly via a data anonymising process. 
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Section 3.8 describes the analysis and coding process within this thesis, including thematic 
analysis which was used to compare transcribed interview data with emergent themes. The 
study’s open and axial coding process is then discussed, which assisted in better defining 
codes including their strength of participant support and their relationships to one another. A 
codebook was created during this analysis process, which is further discussed in Section 4.2. 
Section 3.9 briefly covers how the researcher applied sentiment analysis to the coded 
interview data, resulting in a classification across themes based on participant positivity, 
negativity or when the theme was not mentioned. 
Section 3.10 provides a concluding summary of the research design and methodology used in 
this chapter.  
Chapter 4 then presents and analyses data collected from the 16 participants in this study.  
  
3.1 Research paradigm and justification for approach 
 
A research paradigm is an interpretation of a reality that the researcher brings to their project 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Paradigms act as philosophical frameworks shared by like-minded 
researchers that comprise of an ontology – a theory of reality, an epistemology – a theory of 
knowledge and methods – a derived set of research processes and instruments that are applied 
in a qualitative, quantitative or mixed combination (Angen, 2000). The following is a brief 
description of the most common paradigms, including justifications for this researcher’s 
chosen approach. 
This researcher used an interpretive paradigm, which in epistemological terms is 
subjective and of a relativist ontology. Essentially, adherents to the interpretive framework 
accept there are many ways to observe reality, which are largely shaped by human 
interactions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). An interpretivist paradigm is particularly well suited 
for exploring “the meanings and experiences of human beings” (Williamson & Johanson, 
2017), which was important in this research due to the broad range of motivating factors 
uncovered from the literature review. Multiple perspectives of a shared reality, including via 
inductive reasoning (i.e. generalisations from observations) and iterative analysis (see Section 
3.8) are all emphasised by interpretivist enquiry (Yin, 2011); thus most relevant to respond to 
this study’s research problem. 
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The positivist paradigm derives from the scientific method relating to the Age of 
Enlightenment, where Galileo stated that “whatever cannot be measured and quantified is not 
scientific” (Capra, 1989, p. 133, cited in Angen, 2000). Such positivism is built on a realist 
ontology, in that reality can be observed objectively, and that information within that reality 
exists regardless of human existence (Scotland, 2012). An epistemological basis of 
objectivism defines the positivist’s view of the nature of knowledge, whereby they “go forth 
into the world impartially, discovering absolute knowledge about an objective reality” 
(Scotland, 2012, p. 10). Positivism and interpretivism are therefore diametric philosophies. 
Positivists accept there to be one objective of independently observable truth, while 
interpretivists accept multiple truths that are amorphic, subjective and constructed by human 
consciousness (Given, 2008). 
In contrast with the above paradigm, post-positivism aligns with elements of both the 
positivist and interpretivist paradigms (Yin, 2011). This is where an ontology of critical 
realism describes reality as objectively observable, yet too complex for human 
comprehension to be understood in its entirety. An epistemological basis of relative 
objectivism is used, where truth is conjectural until disproven (Patomäki & Wight, 2000). 
 
3.2 Research method 
 
A qualitative research method assists researchers to understand the feelings that individuals 
experience when considering a brand, identity or cause, such as how it makes them feel about 
themselves, their perceptions of what others think of them, and their overall level of 
satisfaction once the decision to commit has been made (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Corbin 
& Strauss, 2014). Thus, exploring a broad field of potential variables is assisted via 
exploratory research, where non-mathematical interpretation is employed during data 
analysis, based on its design for discovering concepts and relationships (Malhotra, 2012). 
These are some of the reasons why a qualitative method was used for this study. 
There are numerous examples within the academic literature of a qualitative method 
advancing corporate foundation research (e.g. Bolduc, Buchanan & Huang, 2004; McElroy, 
2012; Scaife, Williamson, McDonald & Smyllie, 2012), particularly when exploring 
neglected or underdeveloped themes within a field of study (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). 
For example, Bolduc et al (2004) used in-depth interviewing of corporate foundation grantees 
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to explore their feelings of doing business with foundations, while McElroy (2012) used 
interviews to research corporate foundations within the mining industry, to better understand 
the feelings of establishing firms’ employees. Scaife et al. (2012, p. 3) also used in-depth 
interviews to explore corporate foundation motivations for giving, and noted: “The richness 
of the research is in these direct quotes, which are thick with detail, analysis and often 
emotion”. 
In addition to adequately exploring the feelings and experiences of this study’s 
research population (i.e. corporate foundation managers), a qualitative method was deemed 
ideal due to the limited sample size (see Table 3.1 below), which made a quantitative method 
unviable (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970). The overall population of corporate foundations in 
Australia was at 37 (as further detailed in Section 3.3), which is an “insufficient sample size 
to identify a statistically significant difference if a difference truly exists” (Burmeister & 
Aitken, 2012). Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001) advocated the benefits of quantitative 
research methods: “One of the real advantages of quantitative methods is their ability to use 
smaller groups of people to make inferences about larger groups that would be prohibitively 
expensive to study”. However, it has also been highlighted that quantitative analysis of 
smaller sample sizes suffers from a lack of validity due to statistical differentiation (Holton & 
Burnett, 1997), which means limitations in validating the researcher’s data even with full 
participation. 
Foundation managers – 
variables 
Description 
Population of 37 The total number of participants available within the target group.  
Margin of error 5% 
 
How accurately the sample represents opinions of the entire 
population. Smaller sample sizes result in a larger margin of error, 
as variability has a greater impact on statistical outcomes. 
Confidence level 95% How confident the researcher is on how frequently participants are 
likely to reply in similar ways to other respondents. 
Minimum sample size = 35 The minimum sample required for the given population. 
 Based on the above, the minimum sample size to ensure validity 
of this study would be 35 participants from a population of 37 (or 
94.5%). 
Table 3.1: Sample size required for this study to include quantitative research 
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While this research was conducted via a qualitative method, there are examples within 
the corporate foundation literature that show mixed-method or quantitative approaches can be 
effective, if there is a broader research population (Van Fleet, 2012; Westhues & Einwiller, 
2006). Thus, there is an opportunity to incorporate mixed or quantitative methods in future 
research, which has been highlighted as a future research opportunity in Section 5.12. 
 
3.3 Sampling technique 
 
At the time of this study, there was a limited number of corporate foundations operating in 
Australia – this researcher was only able to identify 37 from a 2nd March 2016 search of the 
ACNC register that contains approximately 53,000 Australian NPOs. This involved 
downloading a copy of the register into a spreadsheet format and cross-referencing it against 
ASX-listed companies. To account for instances where the foundation name may not have 
contained all or part of the founding firm’s name, two search filters were applied: 1) to 
capture entries that included ‘The Trustee for’ in their foundation name, as commonly used 
for the legal naming of corporate foundations; and 2) to seek out where the main activity was 
categorised as ‘grant-making activities’, as often selected by foundations. These search filters 
were helpful in confirming that none of the corporate foundations had been missed 
previously. 
The chosen sampling technique was purposive; that is, drawing on a known sample of 
corporate foundation managers that were asked to participate via an email invitation. 
Purposive sampling is ideally suited for capturing a broad representation of a known 
population (Williamson & Johanson, 2017). As identified by Yin (2011), purposive sampling 
avoids many of the weaknesses, particularly selection biases, inherent in other sampling 
methods that include (also see summary in Table 3.3 below): 
• Convenience sampling is a technique where the researcher targets specific 
individuals or groups based on a physical appearance, behaviours or other 
traits that the researcher requires to achieve the research objectives (Yin, 
2011). For example, Gabbidon, Craig, Okafo, Marzette and Peterson (2008) 
used a convenience sample to explore incidents of predominately African-
American university students experiencing discrimination by retail outlet staff, 
by selecting students that visibly appeared to them to be African-American. 
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• Random sampling is where researchers target a generalised sample of a given 
population, with no inclination of pre-selecting that sample (Creswell, 2012). 
However, this technique is rarely used in qualitative research, as one rarely 
knows the population of participants from which to randomly select. 
• Snowball sampling is a technique where the researcher selects a sample based 
on an interaction with an existing participant or participants, such as one 
interviewee recommending someone else as a potential interviewee. 
Snowballing is most effective when the resulting sample has been purposively 
selected (i.e. relevant to the study), rather than by convenience where an 
interviewee may have limited knowledge of the subject matter (Yin, 2011). 
Sampling type Positives Negatives 
Purposive sampling Highly representative of a 
known population; 
able to target a specific group. 
Limited to selected sample 
unless additional 
participants are identified. 
Convenience sampling Identifying representatives of a 
population based on 
subjectively or stereotypically 
assessed characteristics of that 
population, such as racial 
ethnicity or behaviours. 
In some situations, seen as a 
form of racial profiling or 
other biased selection (e.g. 
only picking those that look 
visibly sick to ask about flu 
medicine); more subjective 
than other types as relies on 
researcher selection. 
Random sampling Results in a fast selection of 
representatives across a 
population; no pre-selection 
required. 
Can be difficult to have a 
representative sample of any 
population unless conducted 
in large volumes relative to 
the sample population size. 
Snowball sampling Identifying representatives of a 
population based on 
recommendations of previously 
vetted members of that same 
population. 
Can be time-consuming in 
identifying representatives 
of a population. 
Table 3.2: Summary of sampling techniques  
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This researcher considered convenience and random sampling techniques to be impractical 
for this study, as the interviewees needed to have specific in-depth knowledge of corporate 
foundations. Hence, the limited availability of relevant knowledge within the general 
population or among employees of an organisation that operates a corporate foundation (Leat, 
2004) were unlikely to be informative (Yin, 2011). 
3.4 Selection and interview process 
 
This researcher invited 37 potential participants (listed as foundation manager) via email (see 
Appendix 2), to a one-on-one, in-depth interview that used a semi-structured format. Email 
addresses for these participants were sourced either directly from the ACNC register or via a 
search on LinkedIn to identify the relevant manager of the foundation. These Invitations were 
followed-up via email after a week. Overall, 17 foundation managers expressed interest in 
participating (a response rate of 43%).  
The data collection involved a semi-structured interview (see Appendix 4 for 
questions), where follow-up questions were asked as required. Emergent lines of questioning 
are often a feature of semi-structured interviews, where inductive probing of interviewee 
responses may yield new insights not originally considered by the researcher (Bailey & 
Burch, 2002; Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Inductive research methods are typical of 
interpretivist paradigms due to a reliance of in-depth and spontaneous exploration in 
achieving the research objectives (Williamson & Johanson, 2017) (see Section 3.1). 
There are numerous examples within the academic literature of researchers applying 
qualitative research in studies involving CSR practitioners and corporate foundation 
managers (e.g. Berger, Cunningham & Drumwright, 2004; Petrovits, 2006; Westhues & 
Einwiller, 2006). Such studies also collected their data via semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews to examine their research issues. In broader terms, in-depth semi-structured 
interviews have been known to draw out participants’ motivations and influences on 
decision-making, including how these motivating factors are influenced by external factors 
(Creswell, 2012). 
This study’s interviews were expected to run for approximately 50 minutes, as 
determined by an earlier pilot study using a similar qualitative method of in-depth interviews 
with foundation managers that asked a similar number of questions. In addition, as the 
potential participants all worked in corporate environments and were typically time-poor, 
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keeping the appointment to less than one hour was considered to be important (Evans, Gruba 
& Zobel, 2014). The average time for the 17 interviews was approximately 49 minutes. 
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
 
Researchers “remain ethically culpable” (Angen, 2000, p. 380) for both the outcomes of their 
subject material and for the individuals and groups they engage to complete their project. The 
Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC) governs its institution’s 
adherence to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 (National 
Statement), a set of guidelines listed within the National Health and Medical Research 
Council Act 1992 (Halse & Honey, 2007). This includes the specification that research 
considered to be of negligible risk – i.e. defined as causing “no foreseeable risk of harm or 
discomfort; and any foreseeable risk is no more than inconvenience” (National Statement 
2.1.7) – is eligible for a lower risk review. This research was deemed as lower risk work, as 
approved by the Business and Law Faculty Human Ethics Advisory Group (HEAG). 
Obtaining informed consent from participants and then maintaining the confidentiality 
of their identities are important ethical considerations for researchers (Yin, 2011). Informed 
consent indicates that the participant authorised their voluntary involvement in the research, 
including acceptance that the researcher will conduct their actions in line with the stated 
research plan (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Maintaining confidentiality “is an established 
principle in research ethics codes” as a protection mechanism for participants, which may 
also assist in building a level of trust that may result in them being more “forthcoming with 
the information that they share with researchers” (Given, 2008, p. 111). 
In this study, a Plain Language Statement and Consent form (PLSC) was provided to 
participants (see Appendix 3), which included information on the research purpose and 
methods, possible risks and benefits, privacy and confidentiality, as well as participant 
complaint and withdrawal processes. The PLSCs were signed by participants prior to the 
interviews commencing. The interviews were captured on a digital voice recorder and 
professionally transcribed into an open text-based format. Participant approval was also 
obtained for the audio recording and transcribing of their interviews, with the option to 
review their transcriptions; although none took this option. 
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3.6 Researcher bias 
 
The existence of bias has been defined as a human predilection for preferring one option over 
others, consciously or otherwise (Given, 2008). Researchers aligning to a subjectivist 
epistemology may have a greater chance of introducing bias, as it welcomes an ambiguously 
defined multi-reality concept, meaning there is limited objectivity to remain impartial 
(Heshusius, 1994), and that “an [ethical] sense is pivotal because of the numerous 
discretionary choices made by researchers and especially by qualitative researchers” (Yin, 
2011, p. 38). In the context of this study, Given (2008, p. 60) suggested that “bias involves 
influences that compromise accurate sampling, data collection, data interpretation and the 
reporting of findings [in qualitative research]”, which obligates the researcher to understand 
their own inherent biases, thereby “acknowledging them as inseparable from the research 
process.” 
Maintaining ethical standards via the procedures listed in Section 3.5 above helped to 
minimise researcher bias in this study. In particular, it reduced instances of interview or 
analysis data being ignored, where the data does not align with the beliefs of the researcher 
(Given, 2008). Such interviewer bias is more prevalent when, for example, an interviewee 
states beliefs contrary to the researcher’s beliefs, or their statements lead towards a research 
outcome that differs from the researcher’s initial intentions (Yin, 2011). 
Positivists are generally more likely to support the existence of a value-free enquiry, 
where the researcher considers it possible to remain detached from the study object; although 
this is frequently rejected in the academic literature (Given, 2008). For example, Scotland 
(2012, p. 11) argued that “positivists self-delude themselves into thinking that their research 
is value free”. Conversely, interpretive researchers are more inclined to accept that to observe 
is to assign at least some of the meanings of the observer (Polonsky & Waller, 2014). 
This researcher’s potential personal biases were identified when constructing the 
question set (see Appendix 4), with revisions made to avoid some questions being 
“preordained to elicit biased responses” (Given, 2008, p. 60). As an aspiring academic 
examining non-profit studies and corporate philanthropy, this researcher found the 
reinforcement of their biases in regards to identifying the leading determinates of corporate 
foundation establishment, especially when undertaking the literature review. These potential 
biases had developed through the researcher’s lived experience, meaning the unique 
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perspective gained through one’s immersion in a reality (Ellis & Flaherty, 1992), such as 
previous exposure to lawyer influence when participating in a corporate philanthropy project. 
This previous lawyer influence involved a proposed modification to employment 
contracts at the researcher’s employer firm, which would have enabled staff to have an 
automatic 1% deduction made from their salaries into the corporate foundation. This 
proposition was rejected by the firm’s in-house legal team, at which point no further perusal 
of the initiative was made, even though some of the firm’s management still considered this a 
good idea. The influence of these lawyers on such proposals by the firm left an impression 
with the researcher that lawyers held sway on corporate actions. Consequently, in early drafts 
of the interview questions the researcher had unintentionally written leading questions, 
exhibiting bias in wanting to receive the desired answer from participants (King 1994). These 
leading questions were identified and replaced prior to the final draft and well before 
interviews were conducted. 
Another form of potential bias, as defined by Evans et al. (2014), is the ‘95% 
syndrome’ where doctoral candidates, having gained a single-issue speciality, are unaware 
that at some point their expertise could surpass that of other researchers in related fields, their 
research supervisor or expert practitioners. Researcher awareness that their status as an 
emerging expert within a field of study may serve as an effective counter-balance. Thus, in 
this study questions were written as generally accessible for the foundations managers to 
answer as possible. For example, understanding the specific legal criteria for establishing a 
charitable trust was not a prerequisite. 
Insider/outsider status relating to how closely the researcher is positioned to the topic 
as perceived by participants is another potential researcher bias. Researchers should be aware 
of their insider/outsider status as perceived by participants, and how this may influence their 
responses (Given, 2008, p. 433). For example, paid members of UK’s Manchester United 
soccer team may consider their cohorts as close insiders, whereas members of competing 
teams are likely to be seen as outsiders. 
Furthermore, as an advocate of corporate philanthropy, this researcher has developed 
ties with a community of regulatory bodies and NPOs that promote corporate giving and staff 
volunteering. The establishment of such networks and relationships meant there was a chance 
that some of the participants would be known to the researcher, if only by reputation. 
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Additionally, 19 of the 37 corporate foundations identified in the ACNC registrar 
search were established by firms within the financial services (FS) industry. As this 
researcher has been involved in the FS industry for 15+ years, as a technology manager with 
a large general insurer, there was the potential for observable commonalities to emerge based 
on the language styles, demonstrated behaviours and work practices developed within this 
specific industry (Robbins, Judge, Millett & Boyle, 2013). Long-term exposure to this highly 
relevant industry could have also predisposed the researcher to converse with industry 
acronyms or jargon without being consciously aware of such behaviour. Thus, additional care 
was taken to speak with participants in consistent and industry-free generic language 
wherever possible.  
Lastly, the researcher always remained mindful of the adage that “a good interviewer 




As stated in the PLSC, interviewees were sent a copy of their anonymised transcript for 
review, with an opportunity to provide feedback and to edit sections where they felt 
misrepresented, or to withdraw entirely from the project including the deletion of their 
transcripts and related material. None of the participants provided or made any required edits. 
To further ensure that participant information remained confidential, the researcher 
conducted a second review of transcripts to anonymise quotes selected for inclusion in this 
thesis. All participants were also assigned a code prior to being interviewed, such as P1, P2, 
to ensure confidentiality. 
Lastly, in-line with Deakin data storage standards, all data collected (recordings and 
transcripts) during the course of this research project will be stored securely at Deakin 
University for a period of at least five years after the final publication of this study’s results. 
The next section will describe the data analysis and coding approach taken by the researcher. 
3.8 Analysis and coding 
 
The collected data was analysed via an iterative thematic analysis approach, where patterns of 
meaning and emergent themes are drawn between interviewed participant transcripts and the 
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literature (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic analysis is the most common technique used for 
qualitative data analysis, having been shown to be effective in uncovering emergent themes 
that are then built into findings within a conclusive context (Bailey & Burch, 2002). 
Specifically, the first two transcripts were compared with each other and the literature 
to identify similarities in themes. A third transcript was then compared against these 
similarities, in an attempt to establish generalisations and/or to establish additional 
similarities. This process continued for the fourth transcript and so on, until all similarities 
among participants were identified, in addition to identifying unique perspectives (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Kepore & Imbun, 2011). 
A qualitative coding process was then conducted from the transcribed interviews. 
Qualitative coding is a process used to compress the meanings of text, behavioural or visual 
data into smaller representative words or phrases, typically created post-data collection (Yin, 
2011). Coding also helps the researcher to conceptualise masses of data into more readily 
accessible themes, and to draw emerging patterns which may help to address the research 
problem (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
In light of this, an open coding approach was undertaken to identify key themes and 
relationships between coding schemes, and axial coding to examine variables such as positive 
and negative responses (Yin, 2011). Axial coding is an extension of open coding, where the 
previously identified categories (e.g. lawyer influence) are expanded via the inclusion of a 
specific focus to include sub-categories, such as inadequate trust law training in the context 
of this study. This is where the structure, process and outcomes of each sub-category are 
considered, including the relationship between the primary and secondary codes (Creswell, 
2012). In this study, primary codes were derived from determinants as identified in the 
literature review (e.g. Lawyer Influence, Employee Engagement), rather than in vivo, 
meaning to be used verbatim as found within the transcripts (Cloutier, 2009). An additional 
number of emergent codes also emerged as the transcripts were examined, which also 
contributed to the overall project codebook (see Section 4.2). 
The specialist qualitative research software package NVivo version 11 was used to 
record codes from datasets (i.e. transcriptions). These codes were created manually by this 
researcher, as the version of NVivo did not have automatic coding functionality. 
The researcher anticipated for this study that a minimum of 10 interviews would be 
required to reach saturation, which represents a breakpoint in the data analysis where no 
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additional concepts or relationships among concepts are likely to emerge (Guest, Bunce & 
Johnson, 2006; Mason, 2010). However, it eventuated that the point at which no additional 
codes needed to be added occurred after the 15th interview, with no additional codes being 
added from within the final stage interview. 
Following on from this section’s focus on data analysis, the next section discusses the 
process of determining positive or negative comments that was used in this study. 
 
3.9 Sentiment analysis 
 
Categorical variables are a feature of qualitative analysis and are regularly used to order 
interview data into response type clusters (Malhotra, 2012). In this study, participant 
comments within the coded groups were categorised as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ by a process 
of sentiment classification, or as ‘not raised’ if the group was not mentioned during the 
interview. Sentiment classification allows the researcher to search within “individual 
sentences to determine whether a sentence expresses an opinion or not, and if so, whether a 
sentence is positive or negative” (Liu, 2012, p. 2). The ability to assign a positive or negative 
attribution required a thorough understanding of the words used by the participants, including 
the context in which they were given. For example, in the following response the researcher 
was able to determine that the participant felt negatively that the degree of lawyer influence 
was a motivating factor on firms establishing corporate foundations: 
P14: “Not particularly influential. I think it didn’t change anything, it just 
confirmed that we were on the right track I guess.” 
These comments indicate a negative sentiment with respect to lawyer influence, based on the 
phrases “not particularly”, “it didn’t change anything”, and “it just confirmed”. 
In contrast, the following response was classified by this researcher as indicating positive 
sentiment with respect to lawyer influence, particularly based on the phrases “quite 
influential” and “would definitely have taken their advice”: 
P9: “They’re pro bono lawyers, which is probably quite influential. So that 
would have been, [establishing firm] would definitely have taken their 
advice on that.” 
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Once this sentiment analysis was completed, the scoring of theme support by participants for 
each of the motivational themes was deemed feasible via a quantitising process (i.e. 
numerical translation of qualitative data), which is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. 
Now that the process of determining positive and negative participant comments (i.e. 
sentiment analysis) has been discussed, the next section provides a conclusion to this chapter. 
 
3.10 Summary to the research design and method 
 
This chapter has presented the research design and methodology of this research. An 
interpretivist paradigm was selected to best explore human feelings and experiences in 
regards to the motivational factors raised during the literature review. A qualitative research 
method was also selected due to the need for in-depth experimental types of information, and 
partially due to the limited number of Australian-based corporate foundations (37). 
Furthermore, a purposive sampling technique was used to invite participants identified in the 
ACNC register of NPOs, with ethical conduct considerations approved by Deakin’s HEAG. 
An email invitation to the 37 potential participants resulted in 17 corporate foundation 
managers agreeing to participate (a response rate of 43%). 
 Researcher bias was considered prior to and during the consequent interview process. 
Audio interview data was subsequently transcribed and reviewed via a process of thematic 
analysis to identify motivational themes that influenced the establishment of corporate 
foundations. An open coding approach was applied to these transcribed interviews to 
establish general themes, followed by axial coding to further develop and consolidate sub-
themes and their relationship to other themes. Participant sentiments for each theme were also 
evaluated via a process of sentiment classification, and their comments then aggregated into 
scores for strength of support for each of the motivational themes and sub-themes, as further 
discussed in Section 4.3.  
Now that the research design and methodology has been covered in this chapter, the 
next Chapter 4 discusses this study’s data analysis results. 
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Chapter 4 – Data Analysis Results 
 
4.0 Chapter 4 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data that was collected from the 16 participants in this 
study. As stated in various chapters, the core research objective was to better understand the 
underlying factors related to this study’s research question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the data, while the next Chapter 5 will 
discuss the analysis in more detail, including linking it to the literature presented in Chapter 2 
to identify how it advances theory and practice (Perry, 2012). 
 
Chapter 4 contains the following nine sections:  
Section 4.1 describes the demographic characteristics of the participants as well as detail on 
the corporate foundations they represent. It also includes their previous general industry and 
philanthropic experience, and staffing levels of the corporate foundations they manage. 
Section 4.2 covers the codebook that was developed based on the qualitative coding process 
outlined in Section 3.8. As contained within the codebook, five themes were identified with 
15 sub-themes, which are listed in Table 4.1 below that includes the section numbers where 
these are further discussed within this chapter. 
Theme 1- Centralising Corporate Giving 
Focus and formalisation of corporate giving practices (4.4.1) 
Separation from business activities (4.4.2) 
Theme 2 - Stakeholder Influences 
Board and executives of establishing firm (4.5.1) 
Lawyer influence and other advisors (4.5.2) 
Isomorphic influences from other firms (4.5.3) 
Theme 3 - Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure 
Foundation corpus (4.6.1) 
Taxation benefits (4.6.2) 
Theme 4 - Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm 
Reputational benefits (4.7.1) 
Staff engagement and participation (4.7.2) 
Shared value strategy (4.7.3) 
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Theme 5 – Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence 
Strength of relationships between foundation trustees and the firm (4.8.1) 
Involvement of senior management of establishing firm in foundation 
activities (4.8.1) 
How the establishing firm funds and supports the foundation (4.8.2) 
Shared objectives of the foundation and establishing firm (4.8.3) 
Establishing firm staff volunteering and giving through foundation (4.8.4) 
Table 4.1: List of motivational themes and sub-themes 
 
Section 4.3 presents the four main motivational themes, based on the synthesis of the data 
and the literature review: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) Stakeholder Influences; 3) 
Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure; and 4) Strategic Benefits to the Establishing 
Firm. There was also a fifth theme identified – Level of Corporate Foundation Independence 
– which arose based on the participants’ responses when asked about the foundation’s level 
of independence from the establishing firm. This fifth theme is further discussed in Section 
4.8. 
Section 4.4 covers the Centralising Corporate Giving theme, which explores the potential 
benefits (i.e. motivation) of the corporate foundation in centralising a firm’s philanthropic 
activities, rather than firms undertaking these expenditures through separate divisions and/or 
by multiple executives in an ad-hoc manner. This theme has two sub-themes: 1) focus and 
formalisation of corporate giving practices; and 2) separation from business activities. 
Section 4.5 covers the theme of Stakeholder Influences with respect to motivation for firms 
to establish a corporate foundation. There are three sub-themes here: 1) board and executives 
of establishing firm; 2) isomorphic influences from other firms; and 3) the role of other 
commercial firms, also known as isomorphic influences. 
Section 4.6 covers the theme of Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure over other 
forms of corporate philanthropy, and how these may have motivated the establishment of the 
foundation. Within this theme are two sub-themes: 1) foundation corpus, or invested funds 
establishing the foundation; and 2) taxation benefits. 
Section 4.7 covers the theme of Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm in having a 
corporate foundation, and how these may have motivated it to establish a corporate 
foundation. Here there are three sub-themes: 1) reputational benefits; 2) staff engagement and 
participation; and 3) shared value strategy. 
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Section 4.8 covers the theme of Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence, which 
assesses the degree that the establishing firm controls the activities of the foundation. Within 
this theme are four sub-themes: 1) strength of relationships between foundation trustees and 
the firm; 2) how the establishing firm funds and supports the foundation; 3) shared objectives 
of the foundation and establishing firm; and 4) establishing staff volunteering and giving 
through the foundation. These sub-themes are adapted from Corporate Citizenship’s (2013) 
framework, where the formerly separate dimensions of strength of relationships between 
foundation trustees and the firm, and involvement of senior management of establishing firm 
in foundation activities were condensed into one sub-theme: association of foundation 
trustees to the firm including executives of the firm. This was based on this study’s data 
analysis where overlapping comments were identified (i.e. senior management of the firm 
serving on the board of the corporate foundation). 
Section 4.9 concludes with a summary of the analysis that has been presented within this 
chapter. This is followed by Chapter 5 that covers discussion of the results, implications for 
theory and practices, limitations and future research directions, and a final conclusion in 
relation to this study. 
 
4.1 Background information about participants and their corporate foundations 
 
This section provides a detailed description of the characteristics and demographics of this 
study’s participants as well as the corporate foundations they manage, as summarised in 
Table 4.2 below where the following characteristics are described: 
Foundation size: Based on the ACNC size definitions, 10 of the foundations in this sample 
were ‘large’ with a total annual revenue of $1M or above, while the other six were classified 
as ‘medium’ with revenue above $100K and below $1M. 
Foundation staff (other than manager): Among the foundations in this sample, 11 had 
other staff, with five that were full-time and six that were part-time. The mean staff numbers 
for all the foundations, including the manager was 1.76, where are levels similar to those 
found within the academic literature. For example, Boris et al. (2008) used a sample of 183 
US-based corporate foundations with annual giving of less than USD$5M, and found that 
31% had one staff member, 50% had between two and three, and 17% had more than three 
staff members. 
Page 83 of 217 
Extent that foundation’s giving outcomes are measured: Five of the corporate foundations 
had formal mechanisms to measure the outcomes of their giving programs. 
Foundation name same as establishing firm: In all cases, the foundation used the common 
trading or ASX-listed name of the firm. For example, a firm named XYZ Trading Company 
had an XYZ Foundation. 
Establishing firm industry: Of the industries represented among this study’s corporate 
foundations, based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC) (2006), eight were within the FS sector, three were in information, media and 
telecommunications (including one of the industry foundations), two from electricity, gas, 
water and waste services, two from health care and social assistance, one from professional, 
scientific and technical services, and the other industry foundation was in a general industry 
classification. 
Foundation manager helped to establish foundation: Ten of the 16 participants were 
involved in the establishment of the firm’s foundation, which was important to this study 
because these individuals were more likely to have a clear understanding of the motivational 
factors. 
Foundation manager time allocated to role: Eleven of the participants were employed full-
time as foundation managers, and the other five were part-time. Among the six corporate 
foundations categorised as medium-sized, all managers were part-time, and two of these also 
had the lowest amount of hours allocated to the role – one of .1FTE (one day a fortnight) and 
one of .2FTE (one day a week). 
Manager role specialisation before the foundation: The foundation managers in this 
sample had a range of previous experiences/specialisations. These were five from marketing 
(one from non-profit sector), two from within CSR, three from executive management (two 
from non-profit sector), and one each from finance, stockbroking, legal, project management, 
accounting, and information technology. 
Years of philanthropic experience including foundation: Most corporate foundation 
managers did not previously have roles in the non-profit or philanthropy space before this 
role. Only two had prior experience within the non-profit sector, and two others had prior 
CSR managerial roles. 
 






































P1 Large .5 FTE No Yes FS Yes .5 FTE Marketing 2 




Yes 1 FTE CSR 10 
P3 Large 5 FTE No Yes FS Yes 1 FTE Finance 5 




N/A N/A Marketing 5 
P5 Medium 0 No Yes FS Yes 0.2 FTE Stockbroking 15 




Yes 1 FTE Legal 12 
P7 Large .6 FTE No Yes FS No 1 FTE Executive 
management 
15 
P8 Large .6 FTE Yes Yes General Yes .6 FTE CSR 7 
P9 Large .5 FTE No Yes Health care 
and social 
assistance 
No 1 FTE Project 
management 
6 





P11 Medium 0 Yes Yes FS No .1 FTE Accounting 3 










































Yes 1 FTE Non-profit 
sector 
7 
P13 Large .5 FTE Yes Yes Health care 
and social 
assistance 
No 1 FTE Executive 
management 
3 




Yes 1 FTE Marketing 6 








No 1 FTE Information 
technology 
2 
Table 4.2: Participants’ previous industry and philanthropic experience (n=16)
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4.2 The codebook 
 
A codebook is a working collection of researcher-defined codes, assembled via the analysing 
and interpreting data (DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall & McCulloch, 2011). In this study, this 
researcher established and then continually added to a codebook during the analysis and 
coding process as described in Section 3.8, to ensure that new concepts were reflected as 
soon as they were encountered (Stake, 1995). 
The codebook for this research was initially populated with the six motivational 
themes as identified in the literature review (as listed in Table 2.4). Emergent codes collected 
from the participant interviews were also then added, as the theoretical codes from Chapter 2 
did not adequately capture the sentiment being expressed on the subject matter within the 
transcripts. 
The final version of this study’s codebook is presented in Table 4.3 below, with 
descriptions and an example as recommended in DeCuir-Gunby (et al. 2011) provided for 
each theme and codename. Multiple revisions were made to this codebook during the 
analysis, with approximately 80 codes generated through the transcripts that were then 
reduced to the final structure of 15 codes (or sub-themes) under five main themes. The 
themes and sub-themes contained within this codebook are further discussed throughout this 
chapter. 
During the coding process, the researcher identified four main motivational themes 
that explained why firms choose to establish corporate foundations: 1) Centralising Corporate 
Giving; 2) Stakeholder Influences; 3) Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure; and 4) 
Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm. Another fifth theme was also identified which 
relates to the Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence from the establishing firm. Each 
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Theme and codename Description Example 
Motivational theme 1: 
Motivational theme 1: 
Centralising Corporate 
Giving 
This theme explores the potential benefits of the corporate foundation in 
Centralising a firm’s philanthropic activity, rather than through separate 





Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with their need to formalise the firm’s 
philanthropic practices through the use of a 
foundation, or to concentrate on giving to a 
smaller number of grant recipients. 
P15: “… so we just felt 
that if we were going to 
make this the regular 
event, then we needed to 





Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with the establishment of a foundation having 
stopped certain philanthropic practices from 
being conducted within the business proper. 
P2: “They were chosen by 
the CEO, I think primarily 
because they were … the 
executives with the largest, 
greatest number of people 
working for them … and so 
[the CEO’s] logic was ‘if I 
get those general 
managers, then they can 
spread the word to the 
bigger teams and we can 
have more staff get to hear 
the story’.” 
 
Motivational theme 2: 
Stakeholder Influence 
This theme explores the influence of various internal and external 





Participants state or allude to their experiences of 
board members and/or executives of the 
establishing firm having been involved in the 
decision-making process which led to the 
establishment of a corporate foundation. 
P12: “It came from the 
board, so the then chair 
and a couple of members 
of the board were keen to 






Participants state or allude to their experiences of 
the advice and recommendations given to them 
by their in-house or externally retained lawyers, 
relating to the establishment and structure of a 
corporate foundation.  
P2: “Hard to put a scale on 






Participants state or allude to their experiences of 
the influence of how other commercial firms 
practise philanthropy or established corporate 
foundations, and under which types of legal 
structures. 
 
P14: “So I guess started 
looking around at different 
corporate foundations 
[and] I spoke to a lot of 
corporate foundations 
around how they were 
structured and what 
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Theme and codename Description Example 
worked and what didn’t 
work for them.” 
Motivational theme 3: 
Financial Advantages of 
Foundation Structure 
This theme explores the potential financial benefits of the foundation 
structure over other forms of corporate philanthropy, and how these may 
have influenced the establishment of the foundation 
Foundation 
corpus   
(4.6.1) 
Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with how the opportunity to create a large and 
enduring corpus of funds influenced the decision 
of the establishing firm in establishing a corporate 
foundation.  
P2: “That money has to be 
in a separate bank 
account. It's quarantined 
or protected, and some 
people think that can be a 
positive thing because if 
the establishing firm goes 
through tough times you 





Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with how the tax benefits provided through the 
PAF or PuAF structure influenced the decision of 
the establishing firm in establishing a corporate 
foundation. 
P1: “… you could probably 
cut in half the overhead 
effort required if you didn’t 
have that [foundation] 
structure. But then if you 
don’t have the structure, 
you don’t get the tax 
benefit.” 
Motivational theme 4: 
Strategic Benefits to 
the Establishing Firm 
This theme explores the potential strategic benefits to the establishing firm 
which were considered in establishing a corporate foundation, and how 




Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with how the potential reputational benefits 
inherent within the corporate foundation 
structure influenced the establishing firm’s 
decision to establish a foundation. 
P16: “I certainly think it 
enhances it [establishing 
firm reputation], and yeah, 






Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with how the potential positive benefits to the 
establishing firm’s staff influenced the decision to 
establish a corporate foundation. 
P11: “Oh, I think it’s very 
beneficial. It’s beneficial 
for the company, but staff 
love it … from feedback 
I’m getting, on the last few 
that I’ve done, is people 
like to know that the 
company they’re working 
for are giving back to 
society. Most wouldn’t 
even realise. So staff value 
[the foundation] because 
they know we’re giving 
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Participants state or allude to their experiences 
with how the corporate foundation structure 
aligns to the broader establishing firm’s CSR 
implementation of a shared value strategy. 
P7: “It’s nice to do good 
things, but people are now 
asking that there should be 
some sort of alignment. 
That’s what shared value is 
all about. There’s a shared 
reason why things are 
being done by that 
organisation. Why are they 
putting their time and 
resources into it? Why are 
they supporting it?” 
Theme 5: Levels of 
Corporate Foundation 
Independence 
This theme explores operational issues focused on the running of the 
corporate foundation as well as some background information of the 
foundation managers. While these sub-themes may not all directly relate to 
the motivation to establish the corporate foundation, they provide useful 
background information into the relationship between the establishing firm 





trustees and the 
firm (4.8.1) 
Participants state or allude to their experiences of 
the selection of foundation directors or trustees, 
and their possible current conflict of interest in 
being an establishing firm executive and corporate 
foundation board member, including how those 
conflicts may influence the degree of separation 
between the establishing firm and the foundation. 
P13: “… the governance of 
the foundation certainly 
alludes to the fact that the 
chair has to be a director of 
[establishing firm] and that 
we have to have a majority 
of [establishing firm] 
directors on the board of 
the foundation, and indeed 
the corium has to be a 
corium comprised of a 
majority of [establishing 




establishing firm in 
foundation 
activities (4.8.1) 
Participants state or allude to their experiences of 
involvement in the corporate foundation by 
executives of the establishing firm. This may 
include their involvement on the foundation 
board or in other foundation activities, such as 
promoting their staff to participate in 
volunteering or workplace giving. 
P2: “They [foundation 
board] were chosen by the 
CEO I think primarily 
because they were, see 
again this comes back to 
the objectives, because 
they were the executives 
with the largest, greatest 
number of people working 
for them … And so [the 
CEO’s] logic was if I get 
those general managers, 
then they can spread the 
word to the bigger teams 
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Theme and codename Description Example 
and we can have more 







Participants state or allude to their knowledge of 
how the foundation is funded, if it all, by the 
establishing firm. A foundation may rely on a 
corpus of funds through an initial or intermittent 
injection from the establishing firm, or receive 
funding through a more immediate as needed 
basis without an independent source of funding. 
P3: “Our foundation 
overall reports directly into 
a board, but also … we are 
employed by the 
[establishing firm] and we 
sit within the sustainability 
and community team at 
the [establishing firm].” 
Shared objectives 
of the foundation 
and establishing 
firm (4.8.3) 
Participants state or allude to their knowledge of 
the potential shared objectives between the 
establishing firm and the foundation. 
P9: “Our constitution says 
that we will give money 
and benefits to Australian 
charities in [same areas of 
business conducted by 
establishing firm] of the 
Australian community… So 
the foundation plays a key 
role in delivering on that 




and giving though 
foundation (4.8.4) 
Participants state or allude to their knowledge of 
the existence of a volunteer program for staff of 
the establishing firm and if the foundation 
facilitates this on their behalf. 
P14: “So we’re almost like 
a volunteer facilitator I 
guess in that sense… We 
actually have a big focus 
on the skilled volunteering 
piece and how to free up 
some of the expertise that 
fits within the industry for 
the charity.” 
 
Table 4.3: Codebook with descriptions and examples 
 
4.3 Motivational themes 
 
This section presents and analyses the motivational themes identified from within the data in 
addition to those identified in the literature review. As was suggested earlier, four of the main 
motivational themes are broadly the same as those identified within the literature review: 1) 
Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) Stakeholder Influences; 3) Financial Advantages of 
Foundation Structure; and 4) Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm. An additional main 
Page 91 of 217 
theme of Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence was also identified within the 
literature review. Each participant’s sentiments on the above four motivational themes and 
their corresponding sub-themes are summarised in Table 4.4 below, followed by Table 4.5 
that covers the Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence theme. Using the process of 
sentiment classification as discussed in Section 3.9 participants’ comments were identified as 
expressing positive or negative feelings towards each of the motivational themes, or when the 
theme was not raised. 
The aggregation of scoring of participant comments was achieved through the process 
of quantitising, which is the “numerical translation, transformation or conversion of 
qualitative data” (Sandelowski, Voils & Knafl, 2009). While this is not traditionally done in 
qualitative research, it can be useful for discussing the overall views of participants, ranked 
by their frequency or level of importance (Law, 2004). For example, all participants in this 
study identified that the theme of separation from business activities was an issue for 
establishing a foundation, with 15 suggesting this was a positive motivating factor in the 
firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation and 1 suggesting it was negative (scoring 
+15, -1). In contrast, only 9 of the participants identified the sub-theme of taxation benefits as 
influential on the firm’s decision to establish a foundation, with 7 suggesting it was a key 
driver and 2 suggesting it impeded the decision to set up a foundation, while the remaining 7 
did not raise the issue (scoring +7, NR7, -2). 
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P1 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
P2 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
P3 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Not raised 
P4 Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive 
P5 Positive Positive Positive Positive Not raised Negative Not raised Positive Not raised Not raised 
P6 Positive Positive Positive Positive Not raised Positive Not raised Positive Positive Not raised 
P7 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
P8 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Not raised 
P9 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
P10 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive 
P11 Positive Positive Positive Not raised Positive Not raised Not raised Positive Positive Not raised 
P12 Not raised Positive Positive Not raised Positive Positive Not raised Positive Positive Negative 
P13 Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Positive Not raised Positive Not raised Not raised 
P14 Positive Positive Positive Negative Positive Negative Not raised Positive Positive Negative 
P15 Positive Positive Positive Not raised Positive Not raised Not raised Positive Positive Negative 
P16 Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative 
 +14, NR1 -1 +15, -1 +15, -1 +11, NR3, -2 +12, NR2, -2 +11, NR2, -3 +7, NR7, -2 +14 -2 +14, NR2, -0 +6, NR6, -4 
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4.4 Centralising Corporate Giving 
 
This theme incorporates two sub-themes related to participant comments on how the 
centralising of the firm’s philanthropic activity may have been a motivational factor in it 
establishing a corporate foundation. This section contains two sub-themes: Section 4.4.1) 
discusses how a corporate foundation can convey a giving focus via formalised corporate 
giving practices; and 4.4.2 covers how the foundation is able to separate the practice of 
corporate philanthropy from the firm. 
 
4.4.1 Focus and formalisation of corporate giving practices  
 
This sub-theme focuses on participants’ views with respect to whether they believe the 
establishment of a corporate foundation was motivated by the firm wanting to refocus its 
corporate giving by formalising the giving already being practised. This sub-theme was 
identified as a positive driver of foundation establishment by 14 of the 16 participants, while 
it was seen as a negative consideration by one of the other participants and was not raised by 
another. 
 
Below are examples of participant quotes that conveyed that the establishment of a 
corporate foundation led to an improved focus on corporate philanthropy over what had 
existed among former direct giving programs: 
P1: “Well I guess what it enables [a foundation] is more targeted giving for 
a start, so a bit more rigour and control …” 
P11: “I definitely think it’s good to have a separate organisation, a separate 
foundation or group that wholly look at that [corporate philanthropy] … it’s 
just good to have focus.” 
Such feedback confirms suggestions in the literature that such unfocused giving is 
typically associated with a firm’s direct giving program, which is less prevalent when 
corporate philanthropy is practised via a corporate foundation (e.g. Westhues & Einwiller, 
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2006). In line with this, it has also been highlighted in the literature that many corporate 
foundations serve to centralise and focus corporate giving (McDowell et al., 2003). 
 Some participants used the term ‘impact’ to describe how their foundation was able to 
change overall corporate philanthropy behaviour, such as moving from multiple managers 
making donations to many recipients without coordination or focus on what was being given 
to whom: 
P2: “So if you had, as a hypothetical example, 50 different parts of the 
business making a $500 donation to charity … Now $500 has very little 
impact, so it won't be able to fund the program or support much, so it has a 
very diluted impact. Whereas if you take the 50 donations of $500 and turn it 
into $25,000 as a single donation to a targeted program, you might actually 
save someone's life or completely shift the way a service provision is given 
… If you can have a $25,000 donation and then support and work very 
closely with that organisation on the execution, you'll have a greater 
community or social impact than you would with the diluted $500 
donations.” 
In addition, the following participant highlighted that as formalising corporate giving 
via a foundation required external representation on their foundation board, their inclusion 
created a positive influence on the firm’s giving practices, including make its giving 
programs more socially impactful: 
P2: “One of the advantages would be because you've got this formalised 
requirement within a PAF to have the external responsible person, [and] 
then all PAFs will have a good external view by someone at the table with 
the board contributing their knowledge and expertise about the sector and 
what's happening. That is required to be in place. That's actually quite a 
good thing, and I think sometimes community engagement programs that 
are run internally within a business and don't have that PAF structure, 
sometimes they can be unfocused and not think of ‘how do we gain that 
external view to help shape what we do and make sure that it's relevant and 
impactful’. So just naturally, by having that formalised structure it forces 
them to do [focused giving], which I think is a good thing.” 
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The perspective of a firm having a positive social impact via its foundation was 
formerly identified in the literature, particularly when they make use of experts within the 
philanthropic community (Porter & Kramer, 2002), such as by appointing foundation board 
members and staff with practical understanding of the complexities of dealing with social 
issues (Berger et al., 2004). 
In this study, many participants described how the foundation reduced ‘scattergun’ or 
ad-hoc types of giving, particularly individuals within the firm making giving choices 
without coordinating with others. 
P1: “Okay, so the history was that in [the establishing firm] as it was, then 
we’d had a process of community engagement which was pretty kind of ad-
hoc and pretty ineffective … It was all part-time – there was nobody who 
had real accountability for it, no-one had any time for it. It didn’t have any 
prominence or real support from management.” 
P15: “So, I think in all honesty it was probably being driven by individuals 
and their particular passions and interests … requests would have just been 
coming in, as I said scattergun, ad-hoc, here and there, and they would have 
just been assessed one off on their merits, and probably a lot of them were 
funded or given something … So, [CSR team] also realised then too ‘Well, 
we’re giving to so many people’, but they weren’t co-tracking their giving in 
any way either.” 
 
Such concerns with respect to a lack of organisation when there is not corporate 
foundation are also supported within the literature. For example, Bruch & Walter (2005, p. 
55) suggested that “prior to the formal guidelines [more relevant to a corporate foundation], 
such decisions were made on an ad-hoc basis … corporate charitable activities are now more 
predictable”. Some of this study’s participants also mentioned that some of their firm’s giving 
was being conducted by staff in their spare time, without any formal managerial 
responsibility for managing corporate giving. This view was also supported in the literature 
(Mescon & Tilson 1987) who discussed the ad-hoc nature of direct giving and that any such 
giving was generally managed by part-time staff. Such results indicate that firms that use an 
unstructured approach with respect to giving are not prepared to fund dedicated personnel 
unless there is a formalised corporate philanthropy structure, such as a corporate foundation. 
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In addition, it has been suggested in the literature that ad-hoc giving may be reflective 
of high agency costs, where corporate managers have the discretion to use the firm’s funds 
without any centralised giving such as a formal grant process (Hemingway & Maclagan, 
2004). Many of the participants corresponding comments in this study used terms such as 
‘scattergun’, ‘ad-hoc’ (P15) and ‘unfocused’ (P2) to describe their pre-foundation corporate 
giving, with some suggesting that once their firm established the corporate foundation this 
giving had “more rigour and control” (P1). Such agency cost concerns were discussed in 
Section 4.4.2, where the separation of the corporate foundation from the firm was determined 
as a motivating factor for establishing a foundation. 
 Six of this study’s participants believed that the firm’s giving intentions were clearer 
when it was coordinated through a foundation. This perception is consistent with the 
literature, which suggested that corporate philanthropy is generally practised in an ad-hoc 
fashion until industry or community expectations lead to a more formal implementation of 
philanthropic integration within firms (Tomlinson, 2017). In the sample quote below, the 
participant clarified how they had wanted to make use of the more rigorous corporate 
foundation structure compared to ad-hoc giving, to minimise reputational damage: 
P5: “… so we just felt that if we were going to make this the regular event, 
then we needed to have the proper structures in place, because the last thing 
we wanted was for any of us to be liable or for the [industry] to receive more 
bad press …” 
Another participant made note of the increased professionalism in corporate 
philanthropy via corporate foundations, referring to such structures as “the gold standard”. 
This interpretation was also consistent with the literature, with respect to how professionally 
run programs are more effective at planning and delivering on their giving objectives 
(Mescon & Tilson, 1987): 
P15: “I think [corporate foundations] are an excellent vehicle frankly. I 
think they’re kind of the gold standard really in terms of being able to have 
a most professional and sophisticated structure for community investment 
on grant making. It’s becoming more and more important for businesses not 
to just give back obviously, but to be able to try to measure the value of what 
they’re providing to communities, and so this is where a really professional 
structure such as this does enable you to do that.” 
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This section has reviewed the sub-theme of the focus and formalisation of corporate giving 
practices as a motivating factor for the establishment of the corporate foundation. This sub-
theme was viewed positively by all but one of the participants (as shown in Table 4.4), and 
corporate foundations were seen by most as being effective and impactful in focusing 
corporate philanthropy. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, reducing discretionary giving via a 
corporate foundation may also lead to a reduction of agency costs, particularly as individual 
managers are no longer able to undertake ad-hoc giving. 
 
4.4.2 Separation from business activities 
 
The second sub-theme within Centralising Corporate Giving area relates to the intentional 
separation between philanthropic spending and the firms’ managers in positions of influence. 
This sub-theme was identified by 15 of the 16 participants in this study as a positive influence 
on their firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation, which was the highest number 
with respect to such motivations. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, establishing a separation 
between the corporate foundation and the establishing firm’s senior managers can be a way to 
reduce agency costs (Morris & Biederman, 1985; Werbel & Carter, 2002). That is, this 
removes executives’ influence over the firm’s philanthropic activities, as the corporate 
foundation managers undertake giving within a separate structure (Gautier & Pache, 2013). 
This occurs when philanthropy is channelled via a foundation that has been established as a 
legal trust, where there are strict legal requirements imposed over granting practices (Ward, 
2012), as previously discussed in Section 2.2. 
In this study, one of the participants specifically pointed out how the formal structure 
of the private ancillary fund (i.e. legal trust) was effective in avoiding individual managers 
making personal giving choices: 
P6: “In a lot of ways it’s easy to have something like that [PAF] where the 
rules are quite clear and also that people can’t interfere with. So we don’t 
give to the boss’s favourite charity, those type of things. We have a grant 
policy that is very clear and we have a strategy around that. And while our 
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strategy aligns with the business, it is not influenced by those people in the 
business.” 
This perspective was re-enforced by Gautier and Pache (2013, p. 7) who believed that 
a corporate foundation “puts some distance between the CEO and the gifts”. This practice of 
separating managers from the selection of grantees is reflective of an agency cost reduction, 
as they are no longer able to use their discretion in how the firm allocates philanthropic 
funds. 
The foundation operating independently from the establishing firm was considered by 
many of this study’s participants to be a positive motivator. They felt this would also provide 
more clarity on the mission of charitable activities and that a legally structured foundation 
would be seen more favourably by the community. The following participant comments on 
such reputational benefits also align with what was previously discussed in Section 4.7.1: 
P2: “I think they [foundation board] felt having it as a separate entity gave 
it, in the eyes of those that are stakeholders out there in the community, it 
might give them greater confidence that the foundation was going to be 
operating in the best interests of the community, and not in the best interests 
of the establishing company.” 
P7: “… because the [establishing firm] was wanting to raise funds from 
community generally, they wanted to make sure that if someone was 
donating funds to the foundation at that particular point in time, that it had 
credence as being a proper charity structure, rather than just giving to the 
[establishing firm]. They wanted that differentiation primarily.” 
The above perspectives are supported in the literature by Bartkus and Morris (2015), 
who suggested that corporate foundations have inherent legitimising qualities, which means 
the public is more likely to accept and contribute to the foundation’s causes, and not have 
cynical perceptions of the firm’s motives for establishing such as foundation. Even in the 
case of the firm’s philanthropy providing a community benefit, it would be counterproductive 
from a reputational perspective if it was considered by the community as the firm acting 
cynically (Chernev & Blair, 2015). The legitimising effects of the establishment of a 
corporate foundation were previously discussed in Section 2.1.2, and the above participant 
comments indicate that their firms were mindful of community concerns when establishing 
their foundations. 
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Yet despite such common perceptions, one of the participants felt that the formal 
separation of foundation and establishing firm was not in the best interests of the firm. They 
suggested this removed the firm’s ability to influence its foundation from being aligned with 
its best interests: 
P2: “Often it ends up being removed from the strategic direction and 
opportunities to work very closely with the establishing firm. I do find no 
matter how much the executives and the board say they want to work really 
closely with the establishing firm, you have created a separate entity and 
people will naturally start to think in a separate way. I think that is the 
disadvantage in that sometimes you lose the ability to access the scale, the 
skill, the knowledge of the business in a way … you cannot promote or 
support commercial gain for the establishing firm. So it's limited in how you 
can market, advertise or communicate the work that you're doing and how 
you might communicate that in the context of the establishing firm.” 
This view was also identified in the academic literature where Porter and Kramer 
(1999) considered the foundation to be less effective for corporate benefit. This participant’s 
comments also suggests that they would want to use the corporate foundation for direct 
commercial gain for the establishing firm, which would breach the rules of a legal trust in 
Australia as discussed in Section 2.2. This positive attitude to foundation integration may 
explain why the firm chose to establish a PAF, as it was the prevailing view within the firm 
of how this foundation should operate. 
 Eight participants in this study positively commented on the fact that the foundation 
restricted involvement of the firm’s executives in making ad-hoc granting choices: 
P7: “… if someone knocks on their [firm executives] door and sees them, 
can you give a thousand dollars to the ballet, they can say, ‘Yeah, we’ve got 
a process, we’ve got an application, if you want to apply you go through this 
door, rather than come to me direct’. So it gives an opt-out. So that was one 
of the big drivers. So you didn’t have, people could respond with a process 
rather than saying ‘no’. People didn’t like to say no.” 
P6: “… in these firms, [NPOs] curry favour with those that are in senior 
management, and so they’re always the target of people’s requests and they 
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have their own relationships with charities mostly based on things that have 
nothing to do with the business or with the community in which we work.” 
Requests by NPOs for executive ad-hoc giving have been well recognised in the 
academic literature (e.g. Baron, 2001). For example, corporate foundations technically 
remove this potential pressure, as this more formalised corporate giving takes such decisions 
away from senior managers (Gautier & Pache, 2013). The above quotes are similar to some of 
the views expressed in Section 4.4.1 regarding how corporate foundations focus and 
formalise corporate giving, which reduces ad-hoc giving (Strandberg 2009). 
In addition to separation from the establishing firm’s business activities, one of the 
foundation manager participants in this study described how their corporate foundation has a 
clear separation between philanthropic and other CSR type activities that are performed 
directly by the establishing firm: 
P12: “The foundation is a philanthropic giver and the [establishing firm] 
has its own CSR budgets, so there is no centralising of workin the 
foundation.” 
This ability for corporate foundations to separate philanthropic activities from the 
establishing firm is also supported in the academic literature (McElroy, 2012). However, in 
this study the separation between the corporate foundation and the firm’s CSR programs did 
not seem to be well understood by many of the other participants, indicating many Australian 
corporate foundations are used to deliver the firm’s CSR agenda. This research insight will be 
discussed in further detail in Section 5.6. 
  
In summary, almost of all of this study’s participants (15 of the 16) saw value in the 
separation of the foundation from business activities and felt this was a positive influence on 
the firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation. Additionally, this separation would be 
less likely to be seen by the community as cynically motivated (see Section 2.4.2.1). The 
allocation of funding via trusts makes it difficult for managers to directly fund or reallocate 
for other purposes, and the elimination of such ad-hoc giving also reduces agency costs (as 
discussed in Section 2.4.1). 
Overall, these sections have analysed the Centralising Corporate Giving theme, with 
respect to it being a motivational factor in the firm establishing a corporate foundation. The 
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two corresponding sub-themes were also discussed: 4.4.1 which covered data relating to how 
a corporate foundation provides a focus and formalisation of corporate giving practices; and 
4.4.2 which covered the benefits of the foundation separating the practice of corporate 
philanthropy from business activities. Such centralisation of philanthropic activity via a 
corporate foundation appeared to address participant concerns with respect to the prevalence 
of ad-hoc giving. The next section discusses the theme of Stakeholder Influences with respect 
to its influence on firms establishing a corporate foundation. 
 
4.5 Stakeholder Influences 
 
This section captures participant comments related to the influence of stakeholders in 
motivating the firm to establish a corporate foundation. This includes three Stakeholder 
Influences sub-themes: 1) Section 4.5.1 that covers the influence of the establishing firm’s 
board, executives and CEO; 2) Section 4.5.2 relating to the influence of in-house or external 
lawyers and other advisors; and 3) Section 4.5.3 that discusses the role of other commercial 
firms, also known as isomorphic influences (also see Section 2.4.2.2). In Chapter 2, the 
literature review also proposed public goodwill and stakeholder reputation as part of the 
Stakeholder Influences theme (see Section 2.4.2.1), which was found to be more closely 
related to the Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm theme following the interview and 
coding process and was consequently recoded as reputational benefits (see Section 4.7.1). 
 
4.5.1 Board and executives of establishing firm 
 
Participant responses highlighted the importance of the establishing firm’s board, executives 
and CEO in determining the creation of the foundation. These stakeholders were identified as 
a significant influence on the firm establishing a foundation by 15 of the 16 participants. 
Along with separation from business activities (see Section 4.4.2), this sub-theme had the 
highest amount of participant support. The role of the board and executives is closely related 
to the separation from business activities sub-theme, as it also indicated how CEOs in 
particular often use their firm’s philanthropic activities for their own personal or professional 
interests. 
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That is, many participants agreed that their establishing firm’s board members were 
the stakeholders most interested in the establishment of an independent foundation, and were 
also seen as highly influential in the ultimate decision: 
P12: “It came from the board. So the then chair and a couple of members of 
the board were keen to set up a foundation.” 
P8: “I would say the board of, in terms of the actual decision to establish it, 
it’s the board, the directors of [establishing firm] … So they collectively 
made the decision.” 
P9: “So [establishing firm] who are the founders of our private ancillary 
fund … the executive at [establishing firm] and their board, who made the 
decision to establish the foundation and to raise that $25 million.” 
Such comments are also supported in the literature, where it was identified that boards 
of commercial firms often have a high degree of influence over how they practise their 
philanthropy, including via the establishment of a corporate foundation (Greenfield, 1999). 
This is especially relevant when foundations are established with an initial ‘grant’ from the 
establishing firm to establish the foundation’s corpus (see Section 4.6.1), where such 
decisions are typically made by the firm’s board rather than by executives (Silberer, 2007). 
In the two sample responses below from this study’s participants, the CEO of the 
firms were acknowledged as also being influential in the establishment of the foundation. In 
both cases, the CEO was the founder of the corporate foundation and then served as a 
foundation trustee. The resulting relationship can be considered an agency issue, because 
while the CEO helped to establish a foundation, they then installed themselves as the chair of 
the foundation. It has been suggested in the literature that this joint leadership position could 
allow them to exert their influence on corporate foundation actions, including via an 
advantageous position of power over other foundation board members that are also 
employees of the firm where they are CEO (Morris & Biederman, 1985). 
 P16: “… our CEO at the time, just over 10 years ago, who is quite a 
philanthropic guy in the community, he wanted to do something to give back 
to the community, so the philosophy is to give back to the community in 
which we live and work, and it was his idea to start up the foundation …” 
Page 103 of 217 
P1: “… there were some parameters that the then CEO of [establishing 
firm], who was kind of the stimulator of the whole thing, I don’t know what 
you call that in official speak, but who kicked it off … the CEO had 
influence in that he stimulated [the foundation].”  
 
One of the participants described a situation where their CEO was not an advocate of 
the foundation trust structure being established by the firm, and had wanted to close it to 
repurpose the corpus but was not able to because it was a separate legal entity and under 
control of the foundation board, outside of this control: 
P7: “Yeah, he’d [the CEO] have just gone ‘bang, done, cut, tomorrow gone’. 
Whereas because it was a proper independent structure, he had to at least 
convince a separate group of people from the board, they were one and the 
same in many ways. But at least they put their [foundation] hat on, and said 
‘no, I’m a trustee, I’m a board member of this organisation, and I’ll wind it 
up if there’s a good reason to wind it up. I won’t wind it up because it’s a 
decision of one person, even if they are the CEO’. That’s the benefit of it 
having its own organisation board, even though it can be strongly linked 
and controlled and all those sorts of things. It is linked and controlled, and it 
is perceived as well as being that little bit of independence.” 
 
This section has covered participant comments on the sub-theme of the influence of 
the board and executives of the establishing firm on the decision to establish a corporate 
foundation. Most agreed that they had a positive influence on the foundation’s establishment, 
with only one alluding to a negative influence. With respect to the CEO that had wanted to 
‘close’ the foundation, but was vetoed by the foundation’s board, this highlights the benefit of 
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4.5.2 Lawyer influence and other advisors 
 
This sub-theme relates to the role of legal advice in influencing the firm’s decision to create a 
corporate foundation, such as via a PAF. The literature suggests that lawyers are highly 
influential within firms and that their advice is typically followed, particularly with respect to 
the legal structuring of a firm’s philanthropic activities (Pitts III, 2008). This strong influence 
of legal stakeholders was positively identified by 11 of the 16 participants with respect to the 
firm’s decision to establish its corporate foundation, with another two viewing them as an 
impediment and another three not referring to this sub-theme. Examples of the positive 
sentiments about the influence of legal stakeholders include: 
 P10: “They [the lawyers] talked to us in the philanthropic services area and 
we also used [law firm], so [lawyer name] is a partner at [law firm] who 
actually helped write the private ancillary fund legislation for the ATO, and 
we used them to establish it.” 
 P14: “I kind of developed what I thought was the right structure and then 
bounced it off them [law firm] because they had … well their lawyers had 
clear expertise in this area. So, yeah, there were a few legal conversations 
that were, had for sure.” 
P2: “They might access legal support either internally, or sometimes 
externally. There are legal firms that specialise in this work, or have parts of 
their business that do this work. So they would then contact them and ask, 
‘how might I legally set up this entity?’.” 
Such comments are consistent with the academic literature that also suggests that 
many firms seek guidance from lawyers regarding CSR initiatives, including how to structure 
the firm’s corporate foundation (Ward, 2012). 
Two of the participants in this study discussed how their legal advisors were 
influential in how the firm’s corporate foundation was structured: 
P8: “Pretty influential, because we’re a small corporation … because what 
we were really focused on was that DGR status, and [law firm], the solicitors 
we were working with had very good experience in that area [non-profit tax 
law], so we were going to take their advice, because we had a particular 
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outcome in mind, and we knew that they had the best chance of achieving 
it.” 
P9: “They’re pro bono lawyers, which is probably quite influential. So that 
would have been, [establishing firm] would definitely have taken their 
advice on that.” 
 
Such comments were supported within the academic literature, where other 
researchers have uncovered that lawyers are influential within firms when they are designing 
their CSR activities (Wilkins, 2012). Despite scant literature specifically relating to the 
influence of lawyers in the structuring of corporate foundations, there were indications that 
legal advice on corporate foundation structuring options does occur (e.g. Freehills, 2012), 
which will be discussed further in Section 5.3. 
 Only one participant in this study openly disagreed that legal feedback with respect to 
the establishment of corporate foundations was important:  
P14: “I think it [legal advice] didn’t change anything, it just confirmed that 
we were on the right track I guess … and we launched just after the public 
ancillary fund and private ancillary fund guidelines had just been together 
and revamped. So it was actually, there was quite a lot of material out there 
that made it really easy to figure out the right structure I guess.” 
In line with this, another participant suggested that seeking out legal advice can lead 
to the wrong outcome, such as when asking a lawyer to help establish a structured foundation 
without first understanding the governance needs, which can result in an inappropriate 
structure: 
P7: “A lot of people say [to a lawyer], this is what we think we want to do, 
give us a structure. But they may not have asked the right question to start 
with. And a lot of them [foundation managers] get caught out. They set up a 
structure like a private ancillary, or a public ancillary fund, and they said 
‘we don’t actually want to do fundraising public’. And you go, ‘well, why’d 
you set up a public ancillary fund?’ ... And yet I know of organisations who 
have gone to lawyers, set up a public ancillary fund, and they didn’t want 
any public fundraising, and they wanted to give the grants out to 
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individuals, and you can’t do either of those two under a public ancillary 
fund. So I think a lot of it comes down to, there’s not a lot of firms with deep 
experience in the space. And two, a lot of the clients aren’t quite sure what 
they want to do or what they can or can’t do to start with. And it gets all 
blurred and they get a response that fits what might have been their original 
brief, but not what they really want to do. And that’s where it goes haywire.” 
 
In another participant response, a connection was suggested between a foundation 
manager’s experience with legal trusts and their reliance on a lawyer to get the foundation 
structured as a trust: 
P2: “Yeah, sometimes I’m sure there will be some times in an organisation 
where you’ve got a lawyer that’s done it before elsewhere, or has experience, 
and so they might be able to run that themselves. But if they haven’t, then 
they’ll be on a learning curve to get up to speed with what it takes, and 
they’ll potentially access the services of the lawyers that they have retained.” 
The above comment aligns with what Ward (2012, p. 4) highlighted in the literature, 
that “Trust and taxation laws are complex and trustees may be personally liable for any 
breach of trust, so where there is any concern or doubt, trustees should seek professional legal 
advice”. There is often a risk issue associated with forming foundations, and legal advice 
might therefore be seen as a prudent act in such situations. 
In addition to firms seeking advice from lawyers, some participants referred to other 
stakeholders such as accountants or non-profit consulting firms providing advice in relation 
to the establishment of corporate foundations. This is consistent with Bernholz (2000) who 
found that when US firms started setting up foundations, they contacted a range of experts 
including lawyers and accountants. However, as these were infrequent mentions in this study, 
these other stakeholders were not classified as a separate code from lawyers. 
This section has reviewed the sub-theme of lawyer influence and other advisors in the 
firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation, which was positively perceived by 11 of 
the 16 participants, negatively by another two, and not mentioned by the remaining three. In 
most cases, lawyers were consulted prior to the firm establishing the corporate foundation. 
Lastly, while research in other countries has highlighted similar reliance on other stakeholder 
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types (e.g. accounts and consultants), this was infrequently raised by this study’s Australian 
participants.  
 
4.5.3 Isomorphic influences from other firms 
 
This sub-theme captures participant comments relating to the influence of other firms on 
corporate decisions relating to establishing a foundation. This motivation relates to 
institutional isomorphism (as discussed in Section 2.4.2.2), with respect to similar firms 
starting to resemble one another over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This sub-theme was 
positively identified by 12 of the 16 participants, negatively by two, and not mentioned by the 
remaining two. 
 Among the positive responses, some participants explained how their firm’s 
decision was influenced by other firms including perceptions that their existing structure was 
best corporate practice for undertaking corporate philanthropy. For example, one of these 
participants (P8) explained: “There’s this established way of doing things [establishing a 
foundation], so that’s what you do. And that’s the thing, I’m not sure if it’s the best way, but 
it’s the way it’s done”. Additional positive comments on this sub-theme were: 
P15: “... the other big [industry firm] that exists in [the same location], they 
had had a foundation in place by that stage. Their foundation had been in 
place for about four years already, and so I think the [founding firm] felt 
‘Well, if we’re to match them in a business sense, we probably also should 
be matching our competitors in this regard as well’. And the big [other firms 
in industry] were all doing it too. So, they wanted to be perhaps perceived as 
more of a serious player. So, to have a corporate foundation does position 
you as an organisation, I think, that’s taking this more seriously.” 
P14: “So I guess started looking around at different corporate foundations. 
I spoke to a lot of corporate foundations around how they were structured 
and what worked and what didn’t work for them.” 
P2: “So typically what would happen in an organisation if someone decided 
they wanted to do it [establish a foundation], they might have seen a 
corporate foundation doing great work, and thought wouldn’t it be good if 
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we had one of those? They would probably contact people within other 
corporate foundations to understand how they did it. So learn from others 
that have gone through the process.” 
Such comments aligned with the academic literature with respect to isomorphism 
generally, which has previously highlighted that best-practice behaviours demonstrated by 
leading and/or the majority of firms within an industry are then adopted by others (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). 
Furthermore, two of the participants in this study specified that their firm’s creation of 
a corporate foundation largely stemmed from the existing philanthropic activities of the 
establishing company or from being part of a larger, multinational conglomerate: 
P16: “… we’re part of a group of companies that are international. They 
were a Hong Kong based company, and they have a very strong 
philanthropic theme themselves, and so they encourage all of their 
companies internationally to do something in the community. So not all of 
our assisted companies would have a foundation, but we all do something 
for the community that we work in.” 
P2: “[Company] Group, which is a UK based company and has operations 
in about 30 countries around the world … It had established a group 
foundation, and had endowed a significant amount of money into that 
foundation, and then it was encouraging each of the operating companies in 
different countries to establish a foundation as well. It wanted to create this 
family of foundations. So at the time in Australia, we thought that was a 
fantastic idea …” 
Such comments reflect the common view within the academic literature that while 
multinationals adapt their CSR-related activities to host environments, most are guided by 
consistent overarching principles regarding how they practise their philanthropy (Chief 
Executives for Corporate Purpose, 2015). As shown with these two comments above, the 
local firms establish corporate foundations in the same way as other local affiliates have done 
within the same conglomerate. Additionally, these two participants also discussed using the 
name of the establishing firm within the name of the foundation (i.e. ABC Foundation) and 
supporting causes that align with the interests of the conglomerate. Thus, there appears to be 
some flexibility in how the local companies manage their philanthropic funding activities 
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while adhering to the best-practice requirements of the larger conglomerate, suggesting 
normative isomorphic behaviours are in place (Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose, 
2015). 
 In addition, one of the participants in this study that had previously managed another 
corporate foundation noted that the same structure was used to establish the current 
foundation based on that former experience, as he had a clear understanding of the structure. 
While this is not technically an isomorphic influence, these comments showcase a sense of 
doing what was thought to be ‘the right way of doing things’, which could suggest normative 
isomorphism: 
P3: “The other probably key influence, probably me because I had 
experience in the philanthropic sector and particularly running a corporate 
foundation and being aware of a number of different governance models.” 
Furthermore, two of the participants were critical of how some foundation mangers 
appeared to be part of a closed group or an ‘old boys club’, often based on a shared 
professional interest. Such perspectives are typical of normative isomorphism, where a group 
identity is reinforced and normalised via hierarchies and status attributions (Deephouse, 
1996). 
P2: “By creating a PAF, and there are other PAFs out there, you create a 
community of PAFs which in some way is good because they can share and 
help each other, and there's some really good examples of that happening, 
but you also create almost like a community that thinks it’s a bit special.” 
P4: “In fact, where challenges are existing because a lot of the board 
members of foundations sit on many foundations, it’s like an old boy’s club, 
so everyone thinks the same and they’re perpetuating the model.” 
 
In summary, the sub-theme of other commercial firms’ isomorphic influence in the 
decision to establish a corporate foundation was seen positively by 12 of the 16 participants, 
negatively by two, and not mentioned by the remaining two. The positive participants 
commonly described examples of both mimetic (imitating an envied competitor) and 
normative (following industry standards) isomorphism, while other factors included 
foundation managers’ past experiences and the expectations of conglomerate organisations, 
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which again relate more to normative isomorphism. Although the conglomerate expectations 
could also be seen to be negative forms of coercive isomorphism (as discussed in Section 
2.4.2.2), which is when change is forced onto firms. Although, in this study’s relevant 
examples, the participants indicated that their firm’s actions were voluntary. Two of the 
participants also complained about how some foundation professionals are inclined to form 
their own special philanthropy groups, which aligns to a normative isomorphism as it 
represents standard group behaviour. 
This section has analysed the theme of how stakeholder influences may have been a 
motivational factor in the firm establishing a corporate foundation, with three corresponding 
sub-themes arising in the data: 1) board and executives of establishing firm; 2) lawyer 
influence and other advisors; and 3) isomorphic influences from other firms. These 
stakeholder groups all appeared to exert some degree of influence, as also identified in the 
literature with respect to firms setting up foundations or undertaking philanthropy. This 
concludes the discussion of the primary Stakeholder Influences theme, which is followed by a 
discussion of the Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure theme. 
 
4.6 Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure 
 
The use of corporate foundations has been shown in the literature to deliver more financial 
advantages to the establishing firms than other forms of philanthropy (Webb, 1994). These 
financial benefits mostly result from positive government treatment with respect to taxation 
arrangements (Navarro, 1988). In this study, two sub-themes were identified within the data 
with respect to the Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure theme: 1) Section 4.6.1 
relates to the corpus or invested funds provided to establish the foundation; and 2) Section 
4.6.2 discusses potential taxation benefits from establishing a corporate foundation (see 
Section 2.4.3 that previously discussed the literature focused on such taxation benefits). 
 
4.6.1 Foundation corpus 
 
While this study’s literature review did not identify the associated corpus as a motivation for 
establishing a corporate foundation, this sub-theme arose during analysis of the participant 
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interviews. This gap between academic literature and what is known about the practice of 
corporate philanthropy research has previously been highlighted as a concern (Buchholtz et 
al., 1999), in particular the limited research into examining how firms operationalise their 
philanthropy via mechanisms such as corporate foundations (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). The 
impact of the foundation’s corpus and the likelihood of this being a motivational factor for 
establishing a foundation will also be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.  
 The corpus is a vested funding source for the exclusive use of the foundation (Leat, 
2004), and is usually held within a low-risk investment structure that is drawn down by the 
foundation to fund granting programs and may also be used for giving staff salaries (Ward, 
2012). In this study, this sub-theme was identified as positively influencing the establishment 
of the corporate foundation by 11 of the 16 participants, it was perceived as a negative factor 
by three of the participants, and was not raised by the remaining two. 
There are many examples of how participants positively identified that establishing a 
foundation with a corpus allocation allowed protection of the funding source from being 
repurposed. As discussed in Section 2.3, such funding arrangements is also one of the 
variables often used to measure the degree of foundation and firm integration (Corporate 
Citizenship, 2013). That is, allocating funding via trusts (i.e. corpus dispersed via a structured 
corporate foundation) precludes firms from reallocating these funds for other purposes not 
explicitly stated in its charter, which gives the foundation a higher degree of independence 
than other forms of corporate philanthropy (Chelimsky, 2001). The foundation charter is a 
document that provides guidelines to the regulators and trustees on the initial intent and 
ongoing purpose that the trust intends to serve (i.e. alleviation of poverty, education 
opportunities for disadvantaged) (Scaife et al., 2012). 
P2: “… [establishing the foundation] removed it from the risks of the 
budgeting reviews and cycles within the establishing company. So it gave 
greater certainty around the funding, and being able to maintain that 
funding. Because you put it into a separate bank account, and the 
establishing company has no ability or access to access that money.” 
P3: “… a corporate foundation would ensure the legacies of the 
endowment, and insure it against future changes in corporate structure 
within [establishing firm] that may lead you to have a different type of 
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board, a different type of CEO who might not want to support the 
foundation in the way it’s currently structured.” 
P9: “… from a community and from a purely philanthropic perspective, I 
think it’s very good to have a structure like a charitable trust or a private 
ancillary fund, because it really does quarantine those funds for 
philanthropic use, and the directors of that trust have an obligation to 
ensure that the money is spent for the purposes for which it was 
established.” 
In addition to protecting charitable funds, the foundation corpus was described by 
several of the participants as a regular and consistent source of funding for the foundation: 
P12: “… companies that have foundations, often the running costs of the 
foundation come out of investment if they have a corpus at all, and not all of 
them do, but if they do have the corpus, often the running costs of the 
foundation comes out of investment income.” 
Furthermore, some participants identified that the corpus within a foundation 
quarantines funds for philanthropic purposes in addition to preventing the establishing firm 
from repurposing these funds for other purposes: 
P2: “That money has to be in a separate bank account, it's quarantined or 
protected, and some people think that can be a positive thing because if the 
establishing firm goes through tough times you can't claw that money back. 
It can't go to the foundation and say ‘Right, I want that five million back 
now, we're going through a rough patch from a budget point of view’. Some 
people see that as quite a positive thing. It means you have certainty around 
the funding stream, but if you have a PAF established with a very big 
endowment to start with, a big amount of money given to it, that can be a 
really good thing.” 
This comment specific to funding certainty is validated by Scaife et al. (2012) who 
undertook a qualitative study of Australian-based foundations, including corporate 
foundations. In that study, some participants identified the corpus as a useful mechanism for 
ensuring perpetual grant-making, although the researchers did not discuss the idea that donors 
might seek a return of the funds. 
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In this study, five of the participants felt that the corpus was the primary purpose for 
the firm deciding to establish a corporate foundation, because it provided an independent 
‘perpetual’ fund as opposed to relying on ongoing funding from the firm: 
P3: “Yes, would be the fact we wanted to have something that was perpetual 
in nature, enduring. So that said to us, ‘no’, setting up an endowment as 
opposed to having a cost centre where we funded programs from was really 
critical.” 
This perspective was reflective of the definition of a corporate foundation identified in 
the literature: “…a perpetual trust designed to make grants to charities or carry out charitable 
purposes” (Philanthropy Australia, 2012, p. 1). 
In addition, one participant identified that the establishing firm’s managers objected to 
the provision of a funding grant because of their loss of discretionary funding for self-chosen 
causes. This was identified as one of the key reasons for establishing a foundation, to 
eliminate this potential agency issue: 
P6: “I think probably objection came when people [managers of 
establishing firm] were told that they couldn’t have budgets to sponsor 
people. So what happened is the firm also decided to not only give money but 
also to build a corpus … and the firm still gives money but to build the 
corpus for donations was quite substantial.” 
This aligns with the argument in the literature that establishing a corpus is one of the 
distinguishing features of a structured foundation over other forms of corporate philanthropy 
(Leat, 2004). Despite this, one of the participants from an industry foundation (i.e. foundation 
set up to support several firms across an industry or cluster of industries) pointed out that a 
corpus had not been established because it was felt that this would not ‘look good’ if the 
foundation held fund contributions in a long-term corpus rather than immediately using the 
funds for charitable purposes: 
P14: “… because we’re fundraising from staff and the general public, if 
they knew that their money was going into the corpus, we felt that would 
cause some issues. So we are very clear that 100% of the money that they 
give us goes out the door to the charities that we’ve chosen to support. So 
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no, we have no corpus of money. At the end of the financial year we try and 
have as little money as possible in the bank.” 
This perspective was supported by Scaife et al. (2012), who in a series of interviews 
with foundation managers including corporate foundations, found some did not want to sit on 
capital for a future date when it could be better used solving more immediate social problems. 
This was also supported by another participant in this study, who felt their corpus should be 
used for more immediate purposes rather than building a large investment pool for future 
philanthropic activities: 
P13: “… we’ve built up an endowment of 50 million dollars, and that is 
money that could be returned instead of going back into the pool if you will, 
or remain on our balance sheet and we could spend it on customer benefits. 
We could spend it on better programs or something, and instead we’re 
choosing to put it into a foundation which has a very clear mission to benefit 
all Australians …” 
Another industry foundation participant took advantage of a large volume of 
establishing firms’ funding at the time to establish a corpus, which coincided with the timing 
of the foundation being established: 
P8: “Given our structure though, the strategy [a corpus] suited us. Because 
we knew, essentially, the strategy for building the corpus matched the 
strength that we had at the time, which was that we were able to provide seed 
funding from [establishing firm], and we knew we had a group of high-net-
worth individuals and corporates who would put some money in personally 
and from an organisational perspective, support.” 
Another two participants identified how the demutualisation (i.e. converting a 
cooperatively owned private firm to a public company, see Section 1.05 for mutual society 
definition) of their firms led to the establishment of a foundation where the corpus was a 
major opportunity to have a large body of enduring investment funds. Although such 
opportunity would not be relevant to most organisations, given that the mutual society 
structure (and opportunities for de-mutualisation) are not that common:  
P9: “Well, I think [establishing firm] really did want, it was a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity of moving from a mutual to a listed company and being 
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able to raise a big amount of money like that, $25 million, through the issue 
of new shares. That opportunity doesn’t come around very often. So they 
seized it and they really wanted it to have a real and lasting impact in the 
community, and for it to be very authentic. For the community to really see 
that it was a real foundation. 
P10: “The value of a foundation in a monetary sense is having a large 
amount of capital in there, and maybe they [establishing firm] had one big 
year or a demerger or something like that, and they got the ability to put a 
large amount in one year.” 
In line with the above, Faucette (2001) previously identified benefits for those firms 
that are fortunate to establish a corporate foundation at the time of demutualisation, as also 
discussed in Section 4.7.1 with respect to the reputational benefits of a foundation. 
In summary, this section has provided participant comments with respect to the sub-
theme of the foundation corpus’s influence on the firm’s decision to establish a corporate 
foundation. Among the 16 participants, 11 perceived this positively, while three perceived it 
negatively, and the remaining two did not make reference to it. Positive participants 
described the corpus as useful for generating investment income to be used to fund the 
running costs of the corporate foundation and to allow for perpetual foundation funding 
without the need for additional firm funding. Some participants also highlighted that 
foundation corpus funds are protected from the establishing firm, particularly if it wants to 
use these funds for another purpose (see Section 2.2). Other participants identified trigger 
points for developing a foundation corpus base, such as during a merger or demutualisation 
where large amounts of capital can be purposed for philanthropic activities. It was also 
pointed out by some participants that a foundation corpus means that firm managers will lose 
their philanthropic giving discretion, leading to some not being that receptive of the corporate 
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4.6.2 Taxation benefits 
 
This sub-theme captures responses related to the influence of taxation benefits available to 
the firm by establishing a corporate foundation. While there is a large body of academic 
literature on the importance of taxation benefits to firms establishing corporate foundations 
(see Section 2.4.3), this sub-theme was only identified as a positive influence by seven of this 
study’s 16 participants, while it was perceived negatively by another two, and not raised by 
the remaining seven. Among the positive participants, the tax advantages were noted as an 
important consideration for deciding how to structure the foundation: 
P1: “… right at the start, the intention was that the company and others 
within the immediate circle of the foundation would be able to make tax-
deductible donations. So that was one of the founding requirements.” 
Some of these participants specifically referred to the trust entity as an important 
corporate foundation structure for such tax benefits: 
P9: “… the driving factor for us around that was we were then a PPF, a 
prescribed private fund, which was the precursor to the private ancillary 
fund. And there were tax advantages around that approach.” 
Such views are supported within the academic literature, with numerous examples of 
how the inherent tax benefits of a structured corporate foundation lead firms to establish one 
(e.g. Brown et al., 2006; Morris & Biederman, 1985; Webb, 1994). As previously discussed 
in Section 2.2.1, the PAF structure is known for offering the establishing firm income tax 
exemption and deductible options for donations (Ward, 2012). 
Furthermore, one of these participants explained how the tax benefits of establishing a 
foundation had been worth the additional administrative burden that the specific foundation 
structure placed on them: 
P1: “… you could probably cut in half the overhead effort required if you 
didn’t have that [foundation] structure. But then if you don’t have the 
structure you don’t get the tax benefit.” 
This comment is consistent with the academic literature finding that structured 
corporate foundations have higher administrative costs than other forms of organisational 
philanthropy (Faucette, 2001). 
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Some participants also spoke about being able to achieve DGR status through their 
foundation as per Australian trust regulations, which is an ATO designation that enables 
donors (e.g. the firm, employees or community members) that give to the DGR organisation 
to claim a tax deduction. DGR status also enables the corporate foundation to establish 
voluntary salary deductions from staff within the establishing firm as pre-tax contributions, 
which are then integrated into that firm’s payroll systems (Ward, 2012). Thus, firms that want 
to engage with their employees or external parties are more driven by establishing a legal 
trust in this way. 
P16: “… the DGR status means that I can take donations from members of 
the public, I can take pre-packed donations from our staff. So you know, a 
lot of our employees will give $10 a pay, but it only costs them $7 because it 
comes out as a pre-tax deduction.” 
P8: “We decided to establish a foundation [over direct giving], because that 
would give us the DGR status that we needed to do more broad-based 
fundraising.” 
In line with the above participant comments from this study, Scaife et al. (2012) 
suggested the DGR benefits gives corporate foundations the same tax advantages as other 
non-profits, when targeting donors. 
Furthermore, while this study’s interviews focused on firms with structured corporate 
foundations, one participant’s organisation as cited below had what they termed a 
‘foundation’ that was not a legally established trust (i.e. PAF or PuAF). Despite this, their 
funding was directed to DGRs which meant the organisation could still obtain tax benefits 
without their foundation being a legal trust.  
P4: “… what we did was identify all the benefits that a foundation does and 
can we solve it or address those benefits through other means. So for 
example, if we say ‘tax benefit’, the way we may structure some of these 
programs is we may still work with the charity, but we work with them 
across strategic programs and initiatives that the funding is dedicated to. So 
we still shape the outcome and the impact even as by funding. Putting the 
funds through an established charity or DGR, we still do get the tax 
benefit.” 
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In summary, the influence of the taxation benefits sub-theme on the firm’s decision to 
establish a corporate foundation was seen positively by just under half of the participants. 
Former academic research confirms that taxation benefits are often a primary factor in firms 
setting up foundations (e.g. Himmelstein, 1997; McDowell et al., 2003; Webb, 1994), and 
that many appear willing to trade off increased administration and compliance costs for such 
benefits. Several participants in this study defined the main tax advantage of the foundation 
was the ATO DGR status, which allows tax deductibility of funds donated to it. There was 
limited mention among the participants of the tax benefits beyond the ability for the 
foundation to offer workplace giving programs to establishing firm staff. Further discussion 
of the benefits of workplace giving programs is covered in Section 4.7.2, which discusses the 
staff engagement and participation sub-theme. 
This section has analysed the theme of how financial advantages may have been a 
motivational factor in the firm establishing a corporate foundation, via the two sub-themes 
relating to the corpus in the creation of the foundation and taxation benefits. The financial 
advantages identified through this study’s analysis suggest that in practice the foundation 
corpus is a motivational factor for some firms when establishing a corporate foundation, yet 
is scantly explored within the academic literature. Conversely, the sub-theme of taxation 
benefits is widely credited within the literature as a key driver of corporate philanthropy 
including corporate foundations, yet was perceived by this study’s participants to be one of 
the least influential factors. Thus, the lack of support for taxation benefits is an unexpected 
outcome of this study. This concludes the discussion of the Financial Advantages of 
Foundation Structure theme, which is followed by examination of the Strategic Benefits to 
the Establishing Firm theme. 
 
4.7 Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm 
 
This theme of Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm serving as motivation for 
establishing a corporate foundation, as opposed to other alternative forms of philanthropy, is 
covered in this section. This theme is comprised of three sub-themes: 1) Section 4.7.1 
reputational benefits; 2) Section 4.7.2 staff engagement and participation; and 3) Section 
4.7.3 shared value strategy. 
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4.7.1 Reputational benefits  
 
This sub-theme covers participant comments about how the corporate foundation enhances 
the reputation of the establishing firm. This sub-theme was identified as positively 
influencing foundation establishment by of 14 of the 16 participants, and was viewed as 
negatively affecting the decision to establish a corporate foundation by the other two. 
Most positive participants spoke about the active marketing of foundation activities 
by both the foundation and establishing firm, particularly to the establishing firm 
stakeholders: 
P14: “… it’s about what story can we tell your shareholders about what 
you’re giving back to the community, so your shareholders think you’re 
better and keeping their investment.” 
P3: “… within [establishing firm] we’ve got a lot of support out of our 
brand team, because that actually what we do resonates so strongly with the 
way that [establishing firm] is positioned in the market around supporting 
Australia, and now we are backing the individuals that are shaping the 
future of Australia. So there’s some really, really strong engagement, 
stakeholder engagement, both from our brand team and from [grant 
recipients].” 
The participant’s (P14) above suggestion that the establishing firm promotes the work 
of the foundation to influence shareholders to retain their investments in the firm is consistent 
with academic literature that has highlighted how firms often participate in acts of 
philanthropy to promote their adherence to the community values of their shareholders 
(Bartkus & Morris, 2015). Although the use of shareholder funds to promote philanthropic 
causes was identified as a contentious issue within the literature, as this can remove the 
freedom for shareholders to spend their own equity (reinvest or as cash dividends) in the 
manner they would choose (Broomhill, 2007). 
Perhaps with this contention in mind, another participant in this study pointed out that 
while they did not actively promote the foundation to the firm’s shareholders, the grantees 
and other charitable partners would be aware of the philanthropic work that the firm performs 
through its foundation: 
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P10: “To be fair, it wasn’t really used that way, and I know a lot of 
companies do and that’s sort of the textbook way of doing it. But we didn’t 
really promote it terribly much and I guess the charities who are getting 
money out of the foundation and partners of the firm would speak positively 
about it, but we certainly didn’t market it at all.” 
Despite theirs not doing this, this participant’s (P10) comments suggest many 
establishing firms actively market their foundations, and with over 15 years of philanthropic 
experience (see Section 4.1), this participant was in a good position to qualify their ‘textbook 
way’ remark. 
Furthermore, while foundations in Australia are technically independent of 
establishing firms, some participants indicated that establishing firms actively monitor the 
reputational impact of their foundations: 
P12: “The [establishing firm] does reputation research, and that seems to 
indicate where people know about the existence of the foundation and its 
work, they think more highly of the business.” 
P15: “I think because it was even more important than for [establishing 
firm] to be using the foundation’s communications and the work that we do, 
to help them tell their community investment story. So they’ve shifted their 
language and their focus, most of the [industry], towards talking 
predominately and first off about what they’re doing for you as a person and 
the community as a whole before they actually talk about their products. So, 
it’s very important that their foundation messages, along with their 
sponsorship messages, are first and foremost and at the forefront, if they’re 
to be competitive against the other institutions in this space. So, I think 
that’s why what we’re doing and our messaging became so important to 
them. Even more important than it had been.” 
Such comments connect to the academic literature that has highlighted how 
foundations often affect establishing firms’ stakeholder reputations (see Section 2.4.2.1). For 
example, Sjovall and Talk (2004, p. 278) contended that to best enhance the firm’s 
reputation, “corporate social responsibility should be highly salient and noticed by a broad 
range of stakeholders”. The above participant comment (P12) indicates that their founding 
firm confirmed this positive relationship on their reputation via their own internal research, 
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used to not only enhance the firm’s brand but to also improve its social legitimacy (Puncheva, 
2008). 
Another participant identified how other operational issues within the foundation, 
such as the firm’s senior manager involvement in its activities, assist in enhancing the 
reputation of the establishing firm:  
P16: “I certainly think it enhances it [establishing firm reputation] and 
yeah, no doubt at all that … and also from the point of view that our senior 
leadership team are quite engaged with the foundation as well … And I 
think when members of the public and our business partners see that our 
own people and our own leadership group are truly involved and engaged in 
making the Australian community a better place, it does enhance 
[establishing firm] reputation. It’s not the goal of it, but I think that 
certainly will occur.” 
Four of the participants were explicit about how the foundation was being used to 
promote the reputation of the establishing firm: 
P7: “Ideally the purpose of a foundation is to enhance the brand of the 
establishing. So it’s caring, it’s got a community linkage, all those sorts of 
things. So in essence, the brand relationship is extremely strong, even if they 
try and deny it.” 
P12: “Well we’re called the [firm name] foundation, and it’s clear that 
[establishing firm] is the source of the corpus …” 
P9: “Yes, I guess that’s one of the reasons that we exist, is to help 
[establishing firm] in that vision that it has of being a good corporate 
citizen. So when it established a foundation, and our name is [firm name] 
Foundation, so we are custodians of the corporate brand simply because it’s 
part of our name. Inevitably, that means that the good reputation, the good 
work that we do in the community that’s fairly well regarded, widely 
appreciated by people, particularly people who benefit from it, that has a 
flow-on effect to the corporate brand.” 
P3: “… part of what we do and how we support our [grantees] is to build 
their … get them to build their profile and networks … and on the flipside I 
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think the [establishing firm] gets a lot of brand benefit from the stories that 
our foundation supports.” 
 
The above participants were very clear that the reputational benefits delivered by the 
foundation to the establishing firm are intentionally sought. For example, organisations that 
establish a foundation will typically name the new entity as the ‘[corporate name] 
Foundation’ (e.g. IAG Foundation, BHP Foundation, Westpac Foundation), which applied to 
all foundations within this research. Both of the two industry foundations in this research 
were also named after their establishing firms, and were used to support the general 
advancement (e.g. training, government policy advocacy, and marketing) of the industry or 
cluster of industries. As previously discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, it has been recognised in the 
academic literature that corporate foundations are often named after their establishing firms 
to boost the latter’s public image, which makes sense from a strategic philanthropy 
perspective, as it is likely to increase name recognition and positive image transfer (Schrader 
et al., 2005). Thus, any positive halo effect is maximised from the foundation onto the 
establishing firm (Abzug & Webb, 1996). Although as discussed in Section 2.4.2.1 if the 
foundation’s giving strategy is explicitly designed to promote the establishing firm’s brand, 
this could raise community concerns about self-serving behaviour of the foundation, which is 
contrary to the legal requirements of trusts (i.e. the foundations) in Australia in the context of 
this study. 
With this self-serving issue in mind, one of the participants that managed an industry-
based foundation contended that being an ‘industry’ rather than a single firm foundation 
minimised the likelihood of conveying this less trust aligned reputation: 
P14: “I guess one thing, and I think it’s something that appealed to [several 
member firms] is that it’s very hard for a corporate foundation, a stand-
alone corporate foundation, to promote widely their activities without 
making it seem like the only reason they do it. And so we … one of the kind 
of value propositions we have for our members, is that we can actually 
promote out their community activities and raise the general awareness for 
all the things that are happening in the industry around giving back to the 
community without it looking like it’s self-serving for [member firms]. So 
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that kind of arms-length promotion of activity has definitely been a bit of a 
bonus.” 
It is interesting to note that this industry foundation participation recognised that a 
stand-alone corporate foundation’s activities could be seen as self-serving for the establishing 
firms. Ideally, corporate foundations’ point of differentiation from other forms of corporate 
philanthropy is that they must by law conduct their activities at arm’s length from the 
establishing firms, to minimise the self-serving reputation. 
The other participant in this study that managed an industry foundation expanded on 
the above perspective when suggesting their foundation could enhance consumer perceptions 
about their member firms: 
P8: “I think in Australia there’s a lot of cynicism around corporate 
Australia and how corporates operate. And I often tell people about what we 
do, and they’re astonished to find that businesses not only collaborate, but 
they’re non-competitive. And I say ‘yeah, of course they do’. And it seems 
that people almost can’t believe that that could happen, you know?” 
 
In line with this, another of the participants discussed how the demutualisation of their 
establishing firm had led to the creation of the foundation, designed to demonstrate the firm’s 
ongoing commitment to the communities where it had long-serving operations as a mutual 
society. This was also discussed in Section 4.6.1 with respect to the foundation corpus sub-
theme. 
P9: “Yes, so I believe our history is that we were established when [founding 
firm] was demutualised, and listed on the ASX. So at that time, [establishing 
firm] had been giving back to the community for its [long] history. But I 
guess they acknowledged that particularly here in the [region], where 
[establishing firm] is based, that they needed to show a really clear 
commitment to community at that time.” 
The above comment highlights how that particular firm had wanted to demonstrate 
pro-social behaviours while changing from a community owned to listed firm, and that the 
corresponding establishment of a foundation was to: 
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P9: “… have a real and lasting impact in the community, and for it to be 
very authentic. For the community to really see that it was a real 
foundation.” 
This participant (P9) also felt that the structured independent nature of the foundation 
was an ideal way to demonstrate that the firm was interested in philanthropy rather than using 
the foundation for marketing, which aligns with the literature finding that such behaviour 
often avoids the reputation of having a cynical philanthropic motive (Chernev & Blair, 2015). 
In summary, this section has covered the influence of reputational benefits on the 
firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation, which was seen positively by most 
participants (14 out of 16). Many confirmed that they promoted the activities of the corporate 
foundation to reflect positively on the establishing firm, including targeting both shareholders 
and consumers. Some also mentioned that their establishing firm engaged in research to test 
the impact of the corporate foundation on their brand reputation, which is technically in 
breach of the legal conditions in Australia that prevent firms from directly benefiting from 
their foundation’s activities. 
 
4.7.2 Staff engagement and participation 
 
This section discusses the sub-theme related to how the establishing firm uses their corporate 
foundation to increase staff engagement and participation. This sub-theme was identified as 
an important consideration in the establishment of a foundation by 14 of the 16 participants, 
and was not raised by the other two. It is closely related to the shared value strategy sub-
theme discussed in Section 4.7.3, in that many of the participants highlighted how 
establishing firm strategies helped to improve staff engagement and participation in their 
foundation’s philanthropic activities. For example, one participant (P2) stated: “Often 
corporate foundations are established to make a connection for employees to community”.  
The staff engagement and participation sub-theme was among those that attracted the 
highest amounts of feedback from participants, such as: 
P1: “And I think that was one of [the CEO’s] other objectives, like you 
know, in my mind the people part was, a lot of that was about staff becoming 
more engaged with the company, taking more pride in the company, giving 
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the company more heart and so on. To me that was, it was about morale and 
engagement …” 
This suggestion that the firm’s CEO wanted to leverage the foundation to improve 
staff engagement is in alignment with academic research that has indicated that firms often 
undertake philanthropic actions to boost staff morale (Haley, 1991). Such actions are 
therefore determined as practising strategic philanthropy, because they are undertaken with 
the primary intention of lifting organisation performance rather than supporting community 
altruism (Bartkus & Morris, 2015). Although some former researchers have contended that 
using philanthropy to engage staff is a win-win scenario where both the firm and community 
benefit (Porter & Kramer, 1999). 
In this study, there were a number of comments about how the firm distributes 
information to its staff regarding the philanthropic activities undertaken by the foundation to 
the general community: 
P1: “Yeah, well, and in the first instance a lot of that communication is 
simply to our own people. And when you say the work of the foundation, it’s 
sort of really the work of the foundation and of the staff in this case. So a lot 
of what you’re doing is marshalling and encouraging and involving staff, 
and just telling other people that they’re doing that is valuable.” 
P16: “Starting with the basis of it is communication, so getting our message 
out there [to establishing firm staff]. The goal is to improve the effectiveness 
of the communications and our employee engagement. I’m [performance] 
measured against how many [establishing firm staff] groups I get to visit 
personally in a year.” 
Such internal benefits appear to be built into some of these firms’ managerial 
evaluation frameworks for foundations, as indicated by the above participant (P16) when 
noting that role in the foundation has specific performance targets. In line with this in-role 
promotional activity, another participant highlighted that they gave presentations to new staff 
of the establishing firm about the work of the foundation, as part of the induction process: 
P11: “Oh, I think it’s very beneficial. It’s beneficial for the company but 
staff love it … from feedback I’m getting, on the last few that I’ve done, is 
people like to know that the company they’re working for are giving back to 
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society. Most wouldn’t even realise. So staff value [the foundation] because 
they know we’re giving back.” 
Some participants also referred to the direct positive such promotion of foundation 
work had on the establishing firm’s staff retention rates, as well supported in the academic 
literature (e.g. Broomhill, 2007; Hogan et al., 2014). 
P10: “Look, it’s pretty fair to say … the firm had a lot lower turnover than 
pretty much any other financial firm or you know, wealth management firm. 
It was always noted for that. So part of that is going to be the fact that they 
had a foundation and committed money to charities …”  
Several participants also spoke about the foundation’s grant matching programs (i.e. 
employee giving). As discussed in Section 2.4.4, such grant matching is where staff donate 
funds to a charity of their choice, and the amount given is then matched by the foundation (or 
the establishing firm), effectively doubling the amount being contributed (Freehills 2012). 
P12: “There’s a match-giving program, which is a program that matches 
the giving of employees to charity on a dollar for dollar basis.” 
Furthermore, some participants highlighted how their establishing firms implemented 
traditional workplace giving schemes whereby employees could donate part of their regular 
pay to support the foundation. One participant (P16) even stated that the foundation’s main 
source of income is through their establishing firm’s employee giving program. The reliance 
of corporate foundation funding from employees of the establishing firm was not identified in 
the academic literature. 
P15: “Yeah, we do have workplace giving … it still attracts funds of around, 
maybe I think, in the order of $40,000 or $50,000 a year, which is still quite 
significant, given we don’t even talk about it. We barely talk about it. I think 
new staff are told about it at induction and then there’s kind of a refresher 
through the year, and that’s about it.” 
P16: “So we have a payroll donation program which is quite strong, so 
people can salary sacrifice out of their pay each fortnight to the foundation, 
and that’s kind of our main source of income.” 
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All of the participants that referred to grant matching programs applied to the 
establishing firm’s employees all described them as operating in similar ways. Similar grant 
matching processes have also been commonly identified in the literature (e.g. Chief 
Executives for Corporate Purpose, 2015) as enhancing employee engagement and generating 
staff involvement in the foundation. As noted by Morris and Biederman (1985, p. 158), 
“matching employees contributions is an excellent way to democratize your grant decisions”. 
In addition, several of the participants described how the foundation enhances 
employees’ identification with and positive feelings towards the establishing firm, even if 
they do not necessarily know the specifics of what it is doing to help the community: 
P7: “I think it’s [corporate foundation] an internal brand as well as an 
external brand. People say [establishing firm] is caring, it has set this up, it 
runs it, it puts dollars into it, it’s us doing things. So the [establishing firm] 
is a bigger, better organisation with it than without it.” 
P8: “… even if they don’t necessarily participate, it can still make them feel 
more positive about the employer. So to me that’s quite an odd thing. I don’t 
want to actually do something myself, but the fact that the company I work 
for does something almost on my behalf, or as a proxy for me, that makes 
me feel happy.” 
One of the above participants (P8) suggested that staff engagement improves by just 
knowing about the foundation’s activities, even if they do not directly participate in them. 
Staff participation in foundation activities leading to improved engagement is supported in 
the literature, in terms of organisational ‘pride’ (Bruch & Walter, 2005; Strandberg, 2009). 
In addition, six of this study’s participants mentioned the establishing firm measuring 
staff engagement with the foundation to validate the benefits of such philanthropic activity. 
For example: 
P7: “… we had a chairman at that stage who just saw the foundation as a 
‘toy plaything’ to do some nice things … and wanted to get rid of it. And we 
used staff and members [surveys] who said, the foundation is the best thing 
you’ve ever done.” 
P6: “We have a survey, an internal survey here, and one of the questions is 
around our foundation and are people proud of it and do they basically 
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think it is a necessary part of the firm, and we’ve got something like 98% 
approval from our partners and our employees.” 
In the context of industry foundations, the two relevant participants described how 
they felt that the purpose of their foundation was to improve staff engagement for those other 
stakeholders working within the supporting industry: 
P8: “So what we are looking to do, we are not really looking at the 
reputation of [industry firm] in a mass market or an Australian sense. What 
we are looking at is the reputation of the [industry firm] for its employees as 
stakeholders, and as advocates for it as a great employer, and a great 
community corporate citizen. So that’s our focus.” 
P14: “... because it makes them [industry firm staff] feel good giving to an 
industry foundation as well as the fact that it’s giving to charity. So that tick 
around the fact that (a) it’s an industry foundation, so there’s a really nice 
little buzz that it creates, when people give it makes them feel better about 
the industry they work in, and (b) because we’re actually backing a number 
of charities that they then get a kind of sense that they’re not just putting all 
their money in one basket, they’re actually, it’s spreading beyond that.” 
There is scant information within the academic literature specifically focused on 
industry foundations, although such interest in staff engagement does align with other 
corporate foundation literature (e.g. Bruch & Walter, 2005; Glavas, 2012). 
This section has examined the influence of the establishing firm’s staff engagement 
and participation sub-theme on its decision to establish a corporate foundation, which was 
seen positively by most participants (14 out of 16). Their feedback indicates that many firms 
use the corporate foundation to boost staff morale and improve retention, making it more of a 
form of strategic philanthropy where the primary intention is to benefit the firm rather than 
for altruistic motives. In line with this, some of the participants mentioned their primary focus 
of communicating foundation activities was on the establishing firm’s staff rather than 
external audiences. One of these participants even specified that one of their performance 
measures as a foundation manager related to how many of the establishing firm’s staff they 
could speak with about these pro-social activities. Six of the corresponding establishing firms 
ran surveys to gauge staff engagement arising from the corporate foundation activities. 
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4.7.3 Shared value strategy 
 
This sub-theme focuses on how the practice of shared value strategy may have influenced the 
decision to establish the corporate foundation. Identified as a positive influence by six 
participants, as negative by four, with the remaining six not mentioning it, it is the least 
positively identified sub-theme within this research data. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the 
concept of shared value is an extension of strategic philanthropy and is a relatively new 
phenomenon, which has been defined as “creating economic value in a way that also creates 
value for society by addressing its needs and challenges” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 4). In 
line with its low mentions in this study, it has had limited empirical examination in the 
academic literature (Gautier & Pache, 2013).  
Among those participants that perceived shared value strategy positively, many 
related this sub-theme to how foundation activities are managed. For example: 
P10: “… the thinking of a corporate now, if you’re a listed company now 
and you wanted to set up a foundation and do your CSR stuff and all of that, 
the advice would be ‘let’s link it to what benefits the business’. And when 
you’re a listed company that makes a lot of sense and that’s what all the 
textbooks tell you to do – the shared value of the world and all that sort of 
stuff.” 
P7: “It’s nice to do good things, but people are now asking that there should 
be some sort of alignment. That’s what shared value is all about. There’s a 
shared reason why things are being done by that organisation. Why are they 
putting their time and resources into it? Why are they supporting it?” 
Such feedback indicates perceptions that shared value strategy is a way to align the 
interests of foundation giving with the ‘returns’ to the establishing firm. This directly 
connects with the previously cited issue of strategic philanthropy (see Section 2.1.1), which is 
the practice of assisting with the needs of external stakeholders only if those actions benefit 
the establishing firm (Bruch & Walter, 2005). 
Although one of these participants even suggested that a corporate foundation 
structure and a shared value strategy are mutually exclusive: 
P9: “I think it would depend on how altruistic their [the firm’s] motives are. 
If their motives are very altruistic in what they’re wanting to do, then the 
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true foundation structure probably works. But if they are taking much more 
of a shared value approach, where they’re wanting to be driving benefits to 
the business as well as benefits to the community out of every dollar they 
spend, then it’s probably not the best structure.” 
Such comments align with the philanthropy definition in the academic literature: “the 
voluntary giving and receiving of time and money aimed (however imperfectly) toward the 
needs of charity and the interests of all in a better quality of life” (VanTil, 1990, p. 34), and 
how it should be practised within firms (Gautier & Pache, 2013). Such a perspective is 
consistent with corporate foundations that are established via a legal trust structure, with strict 
rules about firms not seeking direct benefits from giving (Faucette, 2001). Thus, a corporate 
foundation formed as a trust should operate in a way that is not strategic (see Section 2.1.1), 
which is not philanthropic at its core. 
Interestingly, the most detail of a shared value strategy was provided by the manager 
of a corporate giving scheme that the organisation called a foundation, but was not really a 
formal trust: 
P4: “One of the concepts as it were, was establishing shared value creation, 
and I think you’ve heard of that shared value creation, right. So how do we 
get that social impact and do it in a way that the business also shares in the 
value, shares in the value whether in terms of staff engagement, staff 
motivation from volunteering or value in terms of the current expertise, the 
skills that we bring or the technology we bring … It’s a shared value. 
Obviously there’s a shared value model because what we’re trying to do is 
build a different ecosystem of players making social impact but not 
operating like a traditional charity where they’re dependent on charitable 
contributions or fundraising … If you actually operate the foundation, you 
wouldn’t be able to do it because you have to … put money into 
organisations which are either charities or DGR status, and you won’t have 
the ability to do things into the profit sector … On the one hand, there were 
some cases which we have included, clearer tax benefit structures or having 
an independent, say, advisory or board panel. But a lot more disadvantages 
we felt because we wanted to play strategically into that space where the 
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foundations actually narrowed the scope because it tended to focus more on 
the philanthropy.” 
As explained by the above participant, the firm did not establish a formal trust based 
foundation, because it felt that the legal requirements would not have allowed it to operate 
according a shared value strategy or strategic philanthropy perspective. This perception is 
supported in the literature by Porter and Kramer (2011), who contended that where economic 
value is the primary aim of the firm, shared value is “not social responsibility philanthropy, 
or even sustainability, but a new way to achieve economic success” (p. 4). Therefore, unlike 
the firm where the above participant (P4) was employed, which avoided establishing a 
corporate foundation to pursue a shared value strategy, other firms may be establishing trust 
structured corporate foundations without considering the potential conflict that a shared value 
strategy imposes on the strict trust regulations (Freehills, 2012). As previously noted in 
Section 4.5.2, it is feasible that some firms are acting on lawyers’ advice without fully 
understanding the implications of the trust foundation structure on giving strategies. 
In summary, the shared value strategy sub-theme was seen as a positive influence on 
the firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation by less than half of this study’s 
participants (6 out of 16). Furthermore, most of those that did perceive it as a motivational 
factor felt the obligation of the foundation should be focused on meeting the establishing 
firm’s needs. However, two participants felt the foundation structure was inappropriate for a 
shared value strategy, as it is not altruistically motivated. While Chapter 5 (see Section 5.5) 
will examine the broader implications of these inconsistent results, it is interesting to note 
that most of those participants that saw staff engagement and reputation benefits as 
motivations for establishing a foundation did not view shared value strategy in a similar way. 
This section has analysed the Strategic Benefits theme in the context of its influence 
on firms establishing a corporate foundation. Three sub-themes were identified in the data 
coding process: 1) reputational benefits; 2) staff engagement and participation; and 3) shared 
value strategy. While there were mixed views on the shared value strategy sub-theme among 
the participants, both reputational benefits and staff engagement and participation were seen 
by many as having a positive influence. Only six participants considered shared value 
strategy a positive influence on the decision to establish a foundation, making this the least 
positive sub-theme of all the motivational factors. This concludes the discussion of strategic 
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benefits with respect to a firm establishing a corporate foundation, which is next followed by 
an examination of the Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence theme. 
 
4.8 Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence 
 
This section examines this study’s findings in relation to the levels of independence of the 
corporate foundation from the establishing firm, which may in particular influence the 
decision to establish the foundation as a legal trust. This theme has been deemed as 
important, as forming a legal trust places a range of regulations on foundation operations to 
ensure compliance (as discussed in Section 2.2.1). Thus, it was analysed separately from the 
other main themes, with an emphasis on the degree of integration or separation of the two 
bodies (i.e. foundations and establishing firms). See Section 2.3, for the previous discussion 
on what constitutes an independent or integrated foundation.  
It has been recognised in the literature that the level of foundation independence 
impacts on the establishing firm’s ability to control it, as would generally occur if the ‘giving 
unit’ were an internal department of the firm (Roelofs, 2007). In this study, the level of 
corporate foundation independence has been evaluated based on five sub-themes as described 
below in Table 4.5 (and as previously discussed in Section 2.3), as per the Corporate 
Citizenship (2013) criteria. These are: 1) strength of relationships between foundation 
trustees and the firm; 2) involvement of senior management of establishing firm in 
foundation activities; 3) how the establishing firm funds and supports the foundation; 4) 
focus on shared objectives of the foundation and establishing firm; and 5) establishing firm 
staff volunteering and giving through foundation. 
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P1 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P2 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P3 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated 
P4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
P5 Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent 
P6 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P7 Independent Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated 
P8 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P9 Independent Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P10 Integrated Integrated Independent Independent Integrated 
P11 Integrated Integrated Independent Independent Integrated 
P12 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated 
P13 Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent 
P14 Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated 
P15 Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated 
P16 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated 
 +11 -4 +12 - 3 +9 -6 +9 -6 +12 -3 
Table 4.5: Measurement of foundation independence 
 
As shown in the above table, in addition to assessing the level of foundation 
independence, the extent of association between board members of the foundation and the 
establishing firm (see Table 4.6 below) was also examined in this study via multiple data 
sources including participant comments and publicly available online information such as 
corporate, foundation and personal (e.g. LinkedIn). This included manually assessing each 
foundation board member’s job history to identify the level of association. For example, a 
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board member that is a retired executive of the establishing firm has a strong degree of 
association with firm. The number of internal and external board members, as well as 
external board members’ degree of association with the establishing firm, are also reported in 





















P1 4 1 5 80% 20% Positive 
P2 5 1 6 84% 16% Positive 
P3 5 1 6 84% 16% Positive 
P4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
P5 5 1 6 84% 16% Negative 
P6 7 1 8 88% 12% Positive 
P7 5 2 7 72% 28% Negative 
P8 8 1 9 88% 11% Positive 
P9 2 4 6 34% 66% Negative 
P10 5 1 6 84% 16% Positive 
P11 4 1 5 80% 20% Positive 
P12 3 4 7 43% 57% Positive 
P13 5 2 7 72% 28% Negative 
P14 1 3 4 25% 75% Positive 
P15 3 2 5 60% 40% Positive 
P16 5 1 6 84% 16% Positive 
Table 4.6: Degree of association between board members and establishing firm 
 
The issues with respect to the level of corporate foundation independence are next 
discussed in the following four sections. Section 4.8.1 examines the relationship of 
foundation trustees to the firm, and whether senior managers of the firm are involved in the 
corporate foundation. Section 4.8.2 then examines how the establishing firms fund and 
support their foundations, which also impacts on the foundation’s level of independence. This 
includes the funding of the foundation, the firm’s oversight of grant making, and broader 
operational costs such as foundation staff salaries. Section 4.8.3 next examines results in 
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regards to the alignment of the foundation with the establishing firm’s objectives. This 
includes whether it is a more formal alignment, or whether there are less formally expected 
firm-directed performance outcomes on which the foundation is assessed. Lastly, Section 
4.8.4 discusses the extent that the establishing firm’s staff participate in corporate foundation 
volunteering and corresponding workplace giving programs. 
Before going into further detail about the level of corporate foundation independence 
from the establishing firm, it should be noted that there is limited academic literature in 
relation to this. As such, the basis for the criteria used to assess these sub-themes was the 
Trustee Handbook (Ward, 2012), which identifies the requirements for foundations formed as 
trusts in an Australian context, to ensure of independence from their establishing firms. 
 
4.8.1 Level of association of foundation trustees to the firm including firm managers 
 
This section explores the two sub-themes relating to the strength of relationships between 
foundation trustees and the firm, and the involvement of the firm’s senior management in 
foundation activities. While these two sub-themes were previously discussed separately (see 
sections 2.3 and 4.5.1), they were found by the researcher during the data analysis phase to be 
closely related and thus have been integrated into one sub-theme, even though Table 4.5 lists 
them in separate columns. These two sub-themes have previously been deemed important 
with respect to the level of independence of the foundation’s management from the 
establishing firm (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). 
In this study, eight of the participants described the composition of the foundation 
board as largely comprised of past and/or present executives from the establishing firm. 
Based on the evaluation of board members, all of the foundations in this study had at least 
one executive from the establishing firm on it board. The mean percentage of external board 
member representation among foundation members was 29%. Further, as shown in Table 4.6, 
11 of the 15 foundations’ boards had a RP with a degree of association with the establishing 
firm. This suggests a lack of independence among this study’s corporate foundations, despite 
an independent board and independent RP being a legal requirement within Australian 
registered trusts (as discussed in Section 2.2). It has also been highlighted in the academic 
literature that the placing of general firm-related individuals on the foundation’s board may 
put its independence at risk (Boesso et al, 2013). For example, Petrovits (2006, p. 337) 
suggested the foundation board typically comprised of “senior members of the establishing 
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company”, while Hennings (2014, p. 13) suggested that the corporate foundation board is 
where “foundations largely reflect the interests of the executives of the corporation”. The 
issue of lack of association between foundation board members and firm senior executives 
was identified by the following participant: 
P1: “… there had to be an independent person on the board and he was the 
chairman. And there were I think four senior execs, being four general 
managers [of the establishing firm].” 
Another participant pointed out how their firm’s CEO influenced the foundation 
based on their selection of board members, which it was suggested placed the foundation’s 
independence at risk. This CEO also had a strong influence on staff’s awareness of the 
foundation, which helped to foster staff engagement (as discussed in Section 4.7.2): 
P2: “They [foundation board] were chosen by the CEO I think primarily 
because they were, see again this comes back to the objectives, because they 
were the executives with the largest, greatest number of people working for 
them … And so [the CEO’s] logic was if I get those general managers, then 
they can spread the word to the bigger teams and we can have more staff get 
to hear the story.” 
This participant’s perspective was supported in the literature, where it was suggested 
that some firms use their foundations to promote their pro-social agenda to employees 
(Broomhill, 2007). In addition, there were only two participants that explained how the 
founding firm’s CEO selected the foundation’s board members, and there were also no 
examples in the literature of such activity. 
In the second example of unregulated CEO influence, another firm’s CEO appointed 
foundation board members independently of any formal electoral process: 
P15: “I have a board of six directors, three of whom are appointed by the 
founding firm. One of whom is appointed by the CEO, so an executive 
appointment from amongst his executive team … The executive appointment 
is there at the wish and whim of the CEO, and when he decides that 
executive needs to be turned over for whatever reason, he can.” 
Both of these examples show how the CEO is able to exert influence over the 
foundation’s board and thereby indirectly influence its activities. As previously discussed in 
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Section 2.4.2, the CEO’s impact on foundation boards can be pervasive if they are permitted 
access to the corporate foundation’s activities (Morris & Biederman, 1985). In line with this, 
another one of this study’s participants described how foundation board members could only 
formally convene when most of the representatives from the establishing firm were in 
attendance, highlighting the ability of the firm to indirectly ‘approve’ foundation actions: 
P13: “… the governance of the foundation certainly alludes to the fact that 
the chair has to be a director of [establishing firm] and that we have to have 
a majority of [establishing firm] directors on the board of the foundation, 
and indeed the quorum has to be a quorum comprised of a majority of 
[establishing firm] directors as well.” 
Despite potential repercussions, several of the participants believed the foundation’s 
board should be closely integrated with the establishing firm, because this allowed it to 
access the firm’s resources. Such an alignment was not seen to be a negative nor was it seen 
to impede independence among these participants, despite this contrasting with the general 
view about senior management involvement limiting independence (as further discussed in 
Section 5.7): 
P2: “So you want to, you make sure you do training with that board and 
make sure they understand those responsibilities. What I did though, to 
encourage us, and the board, to be as close as we could to the establishing 
organisation, and to leverage the skills, capabilities, scale, business and 
brand skills to help our foundation be more impactful in its work.” 
 
Australian trust law specifies that foundations have a chair of the board who is an 
independent responsible person (Ward 2012). Despite this, several of the participants in this 
study noted that the chair of the foundation was a retired executive of the establishing firm 
and/or a friend of the CEO. It would appear that these individuals were not selected because 
they had experience managing philanthropic activities, but rather because of their 
relationships with the firm. While such individuals formally meet the trustee guidelines of 
being an independent responsible person (Freehills, 2012), such selection is not within the 
intent of the independence requirement.  
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P10: “Yes, the board structure was individuals within the firm, so partners 
of the firm made up the board and the responsible person was a retired 
partner of the firm. So they didn’t have a legal association there anymore, 
but they knew of the firm quite well and had a history with them …” 
In contrast, there were some other instances where other board members were 
completely external to the establishing firm and its operations – they had been selected based 
on their relevant expertise. Such independence and objectivity meant they would be more 
likely to support the core goals of the foundation, rather than serve the interests of the 
establishing firm. 
P12: “The board is a mix of people from the [establishing firm] board and 
externals, people who have expertise in the area of education … there are 
three [establishing firm] and two external.” 
P9: “… for a corporate foundation we’re fairly unique in the way that we’re 
structured quite independently. So we have a completely independent board. 
Normally corporate foundations have at least half, sometimes all of their 
directors will have cross-over with the corporate [establishing firm] … I 
think it was very brave. I think it means that we’ve had a wonderful luxury 
of being very philanthropic in our decision-making.” 
Adding to this, one participant described how the composition of their foundation 
board had to consist of five representatives of the establishing firm including three staff 
members that were assigned to fundraising activities. In context, as shown in Table 4.6, there 
were only three foundations where most board members were external (i.e. two or more 
independent members). 
P7: “The board of the foundation is made up of four or five members of the 
[establishing firm] to get consistency. That was part of the governance 
control mechanism. So therefore they chair, or they appoint their chair – it 
must be a [establishing firm] board member. They have three staff 
representatives, and that group work with the fundraising part, but they’re 
also trusted, elected staff, so they’re actually elected positions. And they do 
have external representatives, who could be an expert in not-for-profits or 
could be an expert in philanthropy …” 
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In summary, this section has focused on: 1) strength of relationships between 
foundation trustees and the firm; and 2) involvement of senior management of establishing 
firm in foundation activities. In this study, most of the foundation boards included a higher 
number of establishing firm senior managers and employees, which potentially allows the 
firm to treat foundation activities as part of its core objectives. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that the chair of the foundation board was typically associated with the establishing 
firm, which potentially further limits its level of independence (see Table 4.6). The establish 
firms’ CEOs also appear to exert their influence on foundation activities, such as the selection 
of board members, which suggests that the agency issue that most foundations are designed 
to address (i.e. separate managers and decisions) is not achieved. Despite such issues, several 
participants in this study believed that foundation boards should be integrated with the firm, 
as this allowed it to access the firm’s resources.  
Furthermore, the data analysis indicates that all but one foundation in this study had 
some level of dependency with the establishing firm in regards to board composition and 
selection, which is inconsistent with the requirements of legal trusts. The implications of such 
issues will be further discussed in Section 5.11. 
 
4.8.2 How the establishing firm funds and supports the foundation 
 
This section relates to how the foundation is assisted by the establishing firm, in terms of 
operating activities and funding, which has also previously been examined in other studies to 
determine the foundation’s level of independence (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). In this 
study, nine of the 15 participating foundation managers indicated their foundation received 
ongoing funding and support from the establishing firm. 
Such support from the establishing firm appears to be expansive (as highlighted from 
quotes below), with the study results indicating that these foundations are dependent on their 
establishing firms for essential operational support, which suggests a lack of independence 
between them (McElroy, 2012): 
P9: “… I do get lots of in-kind support from [establishing firm]. I am 
housed in their head office, so I do have full access to finance, IT, 
marketing, HR, all of those kind of departments, who do in-kind work for 
the foundation.” 
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P1: “Used [establishing] firm resources all the time for marketing, for legal, 
for finance, audit, all of those.” 
P2: “… the foundation works closely with people in the shared value team 
and from other parts of the business to support and enable volunteering and 
development for our people.” 
Further highlighting a lack of independence, two of the participants indicated that the 
establishing firm directly manages the foundation’s corpus, which could mean that the 
establishing firm also controls the flow of those funds to the foundation (Corporate 
Citizenship, 2013). Such control of the funds is most likely used to exert control over the 
foundation, impeding it from making independent granting decisions (Ward, 2012). 
P13: “Our endowment is managed by the same group that manages the 
[billions] of assets of [establishing firm]. So there’s a lot of stuff that is not 
fully and transparently costed into the foundation operating costs.” 
P7: “… the actual trustees of the foundation is like any group of trustees. 
They manage the investment portfolio, although they actually delegate that 
across to the [establishing firm] investment team for that now. They used to 
run it themselves.” 
In addition to controlling funds, some participants pointed out that the establishing 
firm directly paid salaries for the foundation staff as well as operating costs. Despite limited 
discussion of this area in the academic literature, it was surmised here that firms most likely 
use this direct funding to control foundation actions. For example, if the firm does not agree 
with the direction a foundation manager is taking, it can simply stop paying. Furthermore, it 
may be that the firm is subsidising foundation staffing costs to achieve a lower administrative 
expense ratio – that is, the money put through the foundation leads to lower operating 
expenses coming from the foundation corpus, resulting in more funding to charities (Boris et 
al., 2008). It has been recognised in the literature that many NPOs try to keep their expense 
ratio as low as possible to avoid any perception that funds are being misspent (Cooper, 2017). 
Another theory stemming from this study’s finding in relation to the direct funding of 
foundation salaries and operating activities is that it could be that the firm promotes these 
payments as additional philanthropy provided by the firm, such as to staff and the broader 
community, to highlight going over and above their contribution directly into the foundation 
(Ward, 2012). 
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P16: “… they pay my salary out of the company, so the foundation doesn’t 
pay my salary, the company pays my salary, and all of my administration 
expenses are paid for by the [establishing firm].” 
P3: “Our foundation overall reports directly into a board, but also … we are 
employed by the [establishing firm] and we sit within the sustainability and 
community team at the [establishing firm].” 
P1: “The firm provided, that was the deal, that the foundation didn’t bear 
any of the expenses of running it – the firm covered all of those.” 
In line with the above theory, one of this study’s participants described how the 
foundation was used by the establishing firm to promote the perceived social benefit 
advantages of staff giving to the foundation over other external giving. This was suggested as 
a reason why a firm would choose to cover foundation staff and operating costs: 
P1: “And one of the examples was if you donate to the foundation, because 
we allowed staff to make donations directly to the foundation, then every 
dollar you donate goes to a charity. It’s not, unlike some charities where 
part of what you donate goes into their running expenses. So it was a much 
cleaner message, it really helped.” 
 
In summary, this section has discussed the sub-theme regarding foundation funding 
sources and support. The agreement among nine of this study’s participants that their 
foundation relies on the establishing firm for funding suggests they are dependent on the firm 
to deliver foundation services. Furthermore, in two cases the management of foundation 
assets (i.e. corpus) was also undertaken by the establishing firm, which again indicates a level 
of dependence. Some participants also specified that their salaries as well as other foundation 
running costs are provided by the establishing firm, separate from funding for granting 
activities, which again suggests a lack of independence based on the firm’s desire to control 
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4.8.3 Shared objectives of the foundation and establishing firm 
 
This section discusses the relationships between the corporate foundation’s objectives and the 
objectives of the establishing firm, which is another sub-theme highly relevant for 
understanding the level of independence (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). As formerly 
highlighted in Section 2.1.1, some foundations and their firms share aligned objectives, which 
may be an indication of the establishing firm practising strategic philanthropy (Bruch & 
Walter, 2005), and may also suggest a lack of foundation independence (Boesso et al., 2013). 
In this study, this sub-theme was identified by nine of the participants as an important 
consideration for their foundation. The remaining six participants did not consider the 
alignment of the firm and foundation’s objectives to be an important impediment in their 
managing of the foundation. These discussions included confirmation of corporate 
foundations focusing their giving activities on causes aligned with the establishing firm’s 
industry or CSR strategy (e.g. bank promoting financial literacy), and some foundations also 
avoiding causes that could cause the establishing firm reputational damage.  
In line with such shared objectives, three of the participants identified that their 
foundation’s charter specified its role was to support the establishing firm: 
P1: “Yeah I think, well, for example the foundation, part of its charter 
stipulated that its support shouldn’t be for things that are contrary to the 
foundation’s values as an example, or the company’s values.” 
P13: “So we feel that it is important, this is not intended to be a completely 
isolated research foundation, it is still bound into the ‘mother ship’ 
[establishing firm] in all sorts of ways.” 
In contrast with this apparent commonality of shared objectives among participants 
within this study, another participant explained how the foundation’s choice to support 
certain causes over others was not always directed by the establishing firm: 
P10: “So it wasn’t particularly linked to what the company did, so we didn’t 
target financial literacy or anything like that, that you might expect [an 
industry] firm to do, it was really targeted to be individual directors’ desires 
and causes.” 
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Furthermore, one of the participants recognised the potential conflict of aligning the 
objectives of the foundation with the establishing firm: 
P12: “The alignment between the foundation and the business is a 
fundamental and ethical level. And what you need to understand is that the 
foundation is a perpetual philanthropic foundation – it is not charged with 
doing the CSR role for the company. The company has its own CSR 
operatives, so when it comes to the company’s social licence to operate, 
that’s not the responsibility of the foundation.” 
The above participant felt strongly that the firm’s CSR function and the corporate 
foundation were separate functions. In contrast, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, CSR is often 
used by firms to promote their pro-social behaviours, which could include advertising their 
corporate foundation (Navarro, 1988). This participant also defined their corporate 
foundation as a “philanthropic foundation”, which has been recognised as making it distinct 
from a firm’s other CSR activities (Carroll, 1998), and also contended that that their 
foundation explicitly seeks to avoid CSR activities conducted to promote the establishing 
firm. 
Among those that deemed aligned objectives as important, five participants described 
how foundation activities were measured based on specific targets set by the establishing 
firm. As highlighted in the literature, any foundation compliance and reporting activities 
should be done in isolation from the firm and in accordance with legislation governing 
foundation activities (Alberg-Seberich, 2009; Bernholz, 2000), which conflicts with this 
participant feedback. As shown in Table 4.5, this same group of five participants indicated 
their foundations measured their giving outcomes in various levels of detail, while 10 did not 
undertake any type of evaluation. These results suggest that even though many participants 
identified the importance of the foundation having a social ‘impact’ (see Section 4.4.1), not 
all of them measured their outcomes. 
P12: “The [establishing firm] is comfortable with measuring things and 
being able to see progress through measurement. And so culturally it does fit 
there in terms of having a foundation that can measure its performance and 
report on that. And also there’s an equity issue here. Because we insist on 
measuring the performance of programs that we put money into [charitable 
grantees], there’s a reciprocal requirement for us to be transparent and 
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measure ourselves and report back to the people who fund our own 
performance.” 
In the following participant comment, it was highlighted that the foundation formally 
reports to the establishing firm’s global CSR department. Ordinarily, most firms are required 
to report on their philanthropy and CSR activities (Collier & Esteban, 2007), however the 
voluntary additional requirement for such activity in relation to their foundation outcomes 
indicates a high level of integration between them and the establishing firm. 
P16: “The pitch to our employees and the theme for the foundation here is 
that we as a group give back to the community that we live and work in. So 
the international side of it really doesn’t even come up for the guys that are 
participating in the foundation. It’s more that I just know, because I do 
reporting back to Hong Kong for how much volunteering we’ve done, how 
many donations we’ve made, how many events we’ve held, that sort of stuff. 
And they get that from all of our companies internationally.” 
Among those that deemed alignment important, five of the participants explained the 
similarities between their foundation’s objectives and those of the establishing firm: 
P15: “We have a strategic plan and for us it’s about, whilst that’s one of our 
objectives, now is alignment with the [establishing firm] and how we’re 
working with the business to tell the story, to tell the community investment 
piece.” 
P6: “… we have a strategy that aligns with what we [the establishing firm] 
do. But what we believe is that every person should have access to [services 
provided by establishing firm], so our foundation works with our 
[community outreach team of the establishing firm] to facilitate that.” 
P7: “Yes, it was apparent, very much so … the themes of the granting 
program match the corporate shared values and objectives. So if you’re an 
environmental organisation, you became eligible. If you’re into mobility and 
access for transport etc., you’re eligible. And that matched what the 
organisation was trying to achieve.” 
P8: “They [foundation and establishing firm objectives] would have 
something in common with their corporate responsibility strategy for the 
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most part. So there generally will be a strategic alignment between our 
objectives and what they’re [establishing firm] trying to achieve.” 
P9: “Our constitution says that we will give money and benefits to 
Australian charities in [same areas of business conducted by establishing 
firm] of the Australian community… So the foundation plays a key role in 
delivering on that good corporate citizen piece.” 
In addition to similar objectives, the above feedback also highlights open planning 
and collaboration between the foundation and establishing firm, which probably reduces the 
foundation’s level of independence and may even affect its legal status as a trust. It is also 
supported by the literature that has shown how firms and their foundations are often highly 
integrated (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). 
Stretching this open collaboration context even farther, one participant explained how 
the foundation’s core purpose statement was to enable establishing firm employees the 
opportunity to contribute to the community via its volunteering activities. Although this 
participant also argued there should not be shared goals between the establishing firm and the 
foundation. Despite this latter perspective, as previously discussed in Section 4.7.2, firms that 
integrate staff engagement objectives via their foundations all have some degree of 
alignment, even if it is unintended (Haley, 1991). 
P16: “So our purpose statement is to enable our [establishing firm] 
employees and their families and friends to make a positive contribution to 
the lives or the people in our community. So that’s what we’re about. So we 
don’t look at our company’s goals and objectives or strategic plan or any of 
those things when we’re looking at the foundation’s goals, and objectives 
and strategic plan. We do them completely separately.” 
Further adding to the open collaboration finding, another participant explained how 
the shared objectives of the foundation and establishing firm had become more formal over 
time, and suggested that this conveyed a sense of obligation by the foundation manager 
towards the establishing firm. This pressure of obligation being applied by the firm towards 
foundation objectives was also supported by another participant. 
P15: “Because this was actually set up, this PAF was set up as an 
independent entity. So, it has obviously its own trustee and constitution, and 
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so it’s a separately legal entity. And therefore, when you begin with that 
degree of independence, you’re coming from a position where you’re 
obviously very thankful to the founder for the money that they’re providing 
you, and you are taking into account some of their, I suppose, aims and 
objectives. But you’ve got to maintain independence so that there’s no 
influence occurring from the other side. But in recent times … there’s been 
far more emphasis between aligning the two entities [foundation and 
establishing firm] and making sure that we are listening carefully to each 
other and we’re working in parallel, I suppose, because we are, we have 
money from the founder. We are part of their community investment 
platform. So, we’ve got to make sure we’re not off on some wild tangent, you 
know, talking about, I don’t know, just something completely unrelated. 
Like even asylum seekers or something, you know what I mean? Like over 
on some advocacy space completely unrelated to what the business is 
actually about.” 
P16: “We would never do anything that is against what the company is 
doing obviously, because you don’t bite the hand that feeds you, but we 
don’t attempt to align ourselves.” 
In the first comment above, the participant (P15) was clear about how the foundation 
aligns their giving with the aims and objectives of the establishing firm, even though they 
recognise the foundation as an independent organisation. 
Furthermore, despite being a breach of how trusts should operate, including no self-
serving behaviours, as discussed in Section 2.3 (Ward, 2012), one participant was in favour 
of embedding the foundation within the establishing firm’s structure to avoid independence: 
P2: “… a PAF works well when it is strongly embedded in the organisation, 
and when it works very closely with the organisation. Then you avoid some 
of the dangers around separation, and the establishing company not getting 
value from it as well. But you also then avoid risk of the foundation not 
accessing the scale and capacity, and benefits that the establishing company 
can bring for the foundation as well.” 
In line with the above comments, another participant spoke about the issue of the loss 
of control that the establishing firm may face by establishing a corporate foundation: 
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P7: “Probably just in terms of loss of control. That’s the only thing. The 
organisation says we’re putting our money into this [foundation] as a 
corporation, and we’re supporting it in terms of other sorts of things. The 
danger is that if we make it too independent we lose control … You might 
still chair it, so you set up other governance structures within the trustees or 
the public ancillary fund to make sure you don’t lose control. So you want 
independence, but you don’t want to lose control.” 
In addition to the comment above, some of the other participants suggested that the 
only concern the firm’s managers had when establishing the foundation was their loss of 
control over which recipients and in which amounts the foundation’s funds were given. This 
indicates that some managers enjoyed their discretionary, ad-hoc giving ability prior to 
establishing the foundation and would have preferred to continue these practices, which has 
been supported in the literature (Boris et al., 2008). Although this agency problem is one of 
the reasons why other firms seek to establish independent foundations (see Section 2.4.1). 
In summary, this section has analysed results relating to perceived alignment between 
the foundation’s and establishing firm’s objectives, which was identified by nine of this 
study’s participants as an issue. Several of these participants felt there was a need for the 
foundation to align its giving strategies with the establishing firm’s objectives, including 
avoiding any controversial actions that may harm the founding firms’ reputation. The 
potential implications of aligning the foundation and firm objectives will be discussed further 
in Section 5.10. 
 
4.8.4 Establishing firm staff volunteering and giving through foundation 
 
This sub-theme relates to whether the foundation is directly linked to the establishing firm’s 
volunteering and workplace giving programs via its employees. Most of this study’s 
participants (12 out of 15) confirmed that their foundations facilitated employee volunteering 
programs for their establishing firms. This aligns with the staff engagement and participation 
sub-theme with respect to motivations for establishing a foundation (see Section 4.7.2), 
which was seen by participants as having a positive influence. 
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Corporate volunteering programs are where staff of the establishing firm are given 
paid leave to volunteer in community activities coordinated by the foundation (Bruch & 
Walter, 2005). Also recognised in the literature as a factor that indicates a lack of foundation 
independence (Corporate Citizenship, 2013), it was deemed important to understand the 
scope of the foundation’s volunteering programs within this study: 
P12: “… if people [of the establishing firm] volunteer or they’re part of the 
mass giving program, we ask them to give blind feedback to us on the value 
of those programs, and 72% of the participants in volunteering say that it 
makes them feel proud to work at [establishing firm].” 
P14: “So we’re almost like a volunteer facilitator, I guess in that sense … 
we actually have a big focus on the skilled volunteering piece and how to 
free up some of the expertise that fits within the industry for the charity.” 
P16: “… volunteering makes people happy, making a difference makes us 
happy and, you know, it’s something that we want to be proud of and be 
engaged with. So it’s not just about the money [that is given to charities].” 
Such comments are also reflected in the CSR-specific literature, where staff 
volunteering has been linked to improved engagement and participation within their firms 
(Campbell & Slack, 2008). However, while there is academic literature on corporate 
volunteering programs (e.g. Rodell, Breitsohl, Schröder & Keating, 2016), research into how 
firms operationalise such programs via their foundations has been limited (Gautier & Pache, 
2013). 
One of this study’s participants explained that the foundation’s management of the 
establishing firm’s staff volunteering program is a source of tension for the foundation board: 
P9: “And of course, employee programs have a dual impact. They raise 
money for the charity sector, which is great, but they also are about 
attracting and retaining and motivating talent within the business. So 
there’s that kind of, they can be seen as, employee programs are often seen 
as the responsibility of the corporate, not of the foundation. So that’s the 
tricky space that we are navigating. Because we are quite independent and 
philanthropic, my board has to kind of question, is resourcing an employee 
program at [establishing firm], is that our responsibility?” 
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The above participant’s comment indicates that this foundation identifies itself as 
relatively independent from the establishing board, which is why it questions the 
appropriateness of running the establishing firm’s employee volunteering program. However, 
it should be noted that this was the only foundation participant that raised this as a concern 
and/or a potential conflict of interest (as discussed in Section 2.2). Furthermore, there is 
limited empirical research in relation to how many corporate foundations are facilitating their 
establishing firm’s employee volunteering programs, and the implications of this lack of 
relevant literature are discussed in Section 5.5. 
In addition, five of this study’s participants noted that their workplace giving 
programs were designed to automatically deduct a set amount of money from employees each 
pay period (e.g. $5 per fortnight), and/or in some circumstances (e.g. national disasters) 
provide opportunities for one-off donations via nominated salary deductions.  Most of these 
donated funds were directed to the corporate foundation corpus, and in at least one case 
directly to other approved external charities (P12). In this context the corporate foundation 
then ‘matches’ the donation with an equal amount, which is why such practice is often 
referred to as ‘grant matching’ (as discussed in Section 2.4.4). 
P6: “And we also have a workplace giving program where our partners and 
employees join workplace giving and all the money from the workplace 
giving goes to our foundation.” 
P1: “We did workplace giving, so [the foundation] stimulated staff to do 
workplace giving and matched their donations.” 
P12: “And so there may be employees who have a passion and commitment 
… we will match it dollar for dollar, and in that way we hope that we are 
relevant to those people as a foundation.” 
Such grant matching activity among this study’s participants is supported in the 
academic literature (Varcoe & Sloane, 2003). In one of the relevant examples from this study, 
the foundation manager participant (P1) sent promotional material to employees of the 
establishing firm to promote how their ‘matching’ policy doubled their donation amount. 
These promotions also included calculations on how a $10 donation to the foundation would 
result in an approximate $3 tax return to the employee (i.e. $7 out of pocket), and would 
result in a donation of $20 once grant matching had been applied. It has been suggested in the 
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literature that promoting the corporate foundation in such a way can maximise staff 
engagement in foundation activity (Block et al., 2017).  
Another of the above participants added that their volunteering and giving programs 
were measured for their effectiveness in lifting employee engagement. The setting of 
performance targets to encourage foundations to involve establishing firm staff in their 
activities was also raised in Section 4.7.2, as well as in the academic literature (Hogan et al., 
2014) 
P12: “… if people volunteer or they’re part of the mass giving program, we 
ask them to give blind feedback to us on the value of those programs, and 
72% of the participants in volunteering say that it makes them feel proud to 
work at [establishing firm], [and] 50% of them say that it gives them greater 
job satisfaction. So those sorts of results are consistent with a lot of the 
academic work I think around the foundation and what it does for employee 
satisfaction and engagement.” 
 
In summary, this sub-theme has analysed results in relation to the corporate 
foundation’s facilitation of the establishing firm’s volunteer program, which is one of the 
measures used to determine its level of independence (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). While 
most of this study’s participants confirmed facilitation of the establishing firm’s volunteer 
program, those that did not still had volunteer programs that were run separately which 
suggested their recognition of the potential conflict of interest. The following section will 
offer a summary to this chapter, which is followed by Chapter 5 that provides a final 
discussion and conclusion for this research. 
 
4.9 Conclusion to Chapter 4 
 
This chapter has presented analysis of this study’s data. Section 4.1 provided an overview of 
the participants involved in this study, including their firms and their corporate foundations. 
The participant data was summarised and provides an overview of the participants and their 
corporate foundations, complementing the quotations provided in the chapter, giving a richer 
pool of data (Yin, 2011). In Section 4.2, the data codebook was presented, which was 
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developed based on the qualitative process detailed in Section 3.9. In Section 4.3, the 
motivational themes identified in this research are discussed. A summarization or scoring was 
utilised by the researcher, which involved applying a quantitising technique that is the 
“numerical translation, transformation, or conversion of qualitative data” (Sandelowski et al., 
2009, p. 208), to enable a broad assessment of the extent of agreement with the themes, 
providing a more aggregate discussion of participants’ individual views. Section 4.4 covered 
the Centralising Corporate Giving theme, including its two sub-themes. Most participants 
viewed this theme positively and felt that the centralisation of corporate giving via a 
foundation motivated firms to use corporate foundations to eliminate ad-hoc giving and 
reduce agency costs. Section 4.5 next covered the Stakeholder Influences theme and its three 
sub-themes. Again, most participants viewed this theme positively, with many indicating that 
boards and executives of the establishing firm were a key motivating factor in establishing a 
foundation; other stakeholders were not seen as being as influential, especially lawyers as 
corporate advisors. Section 4.6 then covered the Financial Advantages of Foundation 
Structure theme and its two sub-themes. In contrast with the academic literature identifying 
tax benefits as a major driver of corporate philanthropy including establishing corporate 
foundations, this sub-theme received the second lowest level of support among this study’s 
participants. Furthermore, the foundation corpus sub-theme received more participant support 
for justifying the establishment of a corporate foundation, despite scant extant research to 
support this. Section 4.7 next discussed the Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm theme, 
including its three sub-themes. Most participants viewed this theme as a positive influence on 
firms establishing a foundation, with exception of the shared value strategy sub-theme which 
received the least amount of participant support overall. Lastly, Section 4.8 covered the 
Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence theme, including its four sub-themes. Most 
participants also viewed this theme positively, suggesting overwhelming support in practice 
that corporate foundations are often highly integrated into the operations of the establishing 
firm. Having now summarised the structure for Chapter 4, this thesis now continues with 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.0 Chapter 5 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the key findings and implications of this research based on the analysis 
conducted in Chapter 4. The results are also compared to the academic literature presented in 
Chapter 2. The following discussion will address the core research question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
 
Chapter 5 contains 13 sections.  
Section 5.1 outlines the aggregate views of this study’s participants in regards to the four 
main motivational themes for firms establishing a corporate foundation. Overall, participants 
felt that all themes held some degree of importance in their firm’s decision to establish a 
corporate foundation, although this was not unanimous with respect to level of importance. 
Section 5.2 discusses the first motivational theme and its two sub-themes. Centralising 
Corporate Giving was identified at the research stage as a motivating factor for firms to 
establish a foundation. Such centralisation is achieved through a corporate foundation via the 
following sub-themes: 1) focus and formalisation of corporate giving; and 2) separation from 
business activities. Focus and formalisation is often pursued by firms in the belief that a 
formal corporate foundation structure will make their philanthropy more focused, although 
the issue of whether this is achieved has not been examined in this research. In addition, the 
separation of corporate giving from business activities via the establishment of a corporate 
foundation is generally done in the belief that foundations will reduce agency costs. 
However, it would appear that agency costs shift from firm managers to foundation managers 
(some of whom are the same), as most of the foundations in this study are highly integrated 
into the establishing firm (as discussed in Section 4.8) and hence the firm’s executives remain 
involved in its giving activities. 
Section 5.3 discusses the theme of Stakeholder Influences, which has three stakeholder 
groups or sub-themes: 1) board and executives of establishing firm; 2) lawyers and other 
advisors; and 3) isomorphic influences from other firms. All three stakeholder groups appear 
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to be integral at different levels to the firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation. The 
board of the establishing firm’s authorisation is a legal necessity for the establishment of a 
foundation in Australia, while lawyer and other advisor influence seems to relate more to the 
type of legal trust structure used by the firm when establishing the foundation (i.e. PAF or 
PuAF). This study also found that firms often closely monitor the actions of other firms in 
their industry, resulting in normative isomorphism being common behaviour that influences 
how they establish their foundations. 
Section 5.4 discusses how the Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure theme motivates 
firms to establish corporate foundations, with two related sub-themes: 1) foundation corpus; 
and 2) taxation benefits. This study identified moderate support that the corpus of funds was a 
motivating factor in establishing a foundation, and that firms are often more motivated by tax 
benefits to the community and their employees by participating in foundation activities than 
such benefits to the firm. The latter finding is inconsistent with the established academic 
literature, which suggests that organisational tax benefits are an important driver for 
establishing corporate foundations (Webb, 1994). 
Section 5.5 discusses the influence of Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm as 
motivation for establishing a corporate foundation. Within this theme, there are three strategic 
benefits or sub-themes identified as influencing such decisions: 1) reputational benefits; 2) 
staff engagement and participation; and 3) shared value strategy. It would appear that most 
firms promote their corporate foundation externally as a form of PR or advertising, and also 
proactively market it internally to enhance staff engagement and participation. However, 
while there was some agreement that shared value strategy drives the establishment of the 
foundation, this was not well understood by many of this study’s participants. Despite this 
general lack of knowledge, many saw it as a form of strategic philanthropy and thereby 
recognised the potential conflict between this approach and pure altruistic philanthropy.  
Section 5.6 discusses the Levels of Corporate Foundation Independence from the establishing 
firm, because the legal trust structure in Australia requires a separation of the firm and 
foundation. It would appear that many firms manage their foundations like an internal 
department, with vague reporting made directly to the establishing firm. As pre-Australian 
regulations, the foundation’s board is legally required to have at least one independent person 
(Ward, 2012), yet some of the foundations’ board members in this study were closely 
associated to the establishing firm. In addition, most foundation staff were found to be 
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directly employed and funded by the establishing firm, in addition to those costs related to the 
foundation’s office space and operating costs. Furthermore, most foundations appeared to 
focus on activities linked to the establishing firm’s corporate objectives rather than their own 
separate mission. Thus, there appears to be limited independence of foundations from the 
establishing firms, which appear to be a breach of the Australian trust requirements. 
Section 5.7 presents a more nuanced evaluation of corporate foundations’ level of 
independence or integration with the establishing firm. This study’s data analysis identified 
three levels of differentiation: 1) integrated foundations; 2) partially integrated foundations; 
and 3) independent foundations. It would appear that truly independent corporate foundations 
are rare in Australia. The results indicate all but one of this study’s foundations were fully or 
partially integrated into their establishing firm. 
Section 5.8 summarises the 10 motivational sub-themes under the four main themes with 
respect to why firms establish corporate foundations, as well as the five sub-themes relating 
to its level of independence. Overall, the following five motivational sub-themes appeared to 
be more broadly supported by this study’s participants than the others: 1) separation from 
business activities; 2) board and executives from the establishing firm; 3) staff engagement 
and participation; 4) focus and formalisation of corporate giving practices; and 5) reputational 
benefits. In addition, the following three independence sub-themes appeared to be more 
widely identified with among this study’s participants: 1) involvement of senior management 
of establishing firm in foundation activities; 2) establishing firm staff volunteering and giving 
through foundation; and 3) Strength of relationships between foundation trustees and the 
firm. 
Section 5.9 discusses the implications to theory from this study’s findings. Within the 
academic literature, agency theory was the most commonly cited theory, and this study’s 
results confirmed that most firms are motivated to establish foundations in an attempt to 
reduce their agency costs. However, this objective does not appear to be realised for many 
firms, as most of the foundations in this study were not independently managed, resulting in 
the agency costs being shifted to the foundation rather than those costs being reduced. This 
shift in agency costs arose as executives of the firm are still often involved in many aspects of 
the foundation, with few examples in this study where foundations managers operated 
independently. Furthermore, within this study’s sample all of the foundation staff were 
employed directly by the establishing firm, which also impedes true independence. In 
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addition to the implications to agency theory, this study was unable to support the academic 
literature premise that self-serving taxation benefits drive firms to establish corporate 
foundations. The firms in this sample instead seemed more interested in taxation benefits (i.e. 
tax deductions) for their staff and the general public, insomuch as an incentive for receiving 
donations to their foundations. 
Section 5.10 discusses the implications of this study’s results for practice, which includes 
some practical guidance for firms interested in establishing a corporate foundation based on 
the apparent lack of knowledge in this research sample of how the foundation structure 
influences how it operates. These issues need to be well understood by the firm’s board when 
considering establishing a foundation, and a set of guidelines on how to evaluate their options 
is also provided. 
Section 5.11 discusses the implications of this research for policymakers and regulators. It 
makes recommendations for regulators on how they can address reporting and compliance 
gaps within the existing governance framework. Two areas of concern are discussed in this 
section, relating to the lack of foundation independence identified in this study: 1) association 
between foundation trustees and the establishing firm; and 2) corporate foundation providing 
direct benefits to the establishing firm. The apparent close association between the firm and 
the foundation should be of concern to regulators, as they do not comply with the legal 
guidelines for structured foundations in Australia. Furthermore, the material benefits gained 
by the establishing firm through their corporate foundation are also a potential issue, with 
implications for tax deductibility benefits of donations to these foundations not qualifying as 
gifts because the establishing firm may expect a return. 
Section 5.12 discusses the limitations of this research, and identifies corresponding 
opportunities for further research. In particular, there are limitations due to the research 
design and the researcher bias which are discussed. An additional quantitative data collection 
mechanism (i.e. survey) may have increased the response rate of 43%. While additional 
respondents would have been valuable, with only 37 Australian based corporate foundations 
identified, quantitative data may not have become viable. 
Section 5.13 provides an overall summary of this study including discussing how the 
research question has been addressed. 
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5.1 Accrued support for each of the motivational themes  
 
This section presents aggregated participant views with respect to the four main motivational 
themes in this study. As shown in Table 5.1 below, each of these themes has been aggregated 
across the sub-themes, based on the number of positive (P) and negative (Neg) views, or 
when the themes were not mentioned during the interview process (NR). For example, both 
Centralise Corporate Giving sub-themes were viewed positively 29 out of a possible 30 
times, and in only one instance did a participant not mention one of these.  
Please note that the views of P4 were removed from the below table, as this 
organisation did not have a formal corporate foundation. They were included in the analysis 
discussed in Chapter 4 to understand motivations to establish a foundation selection, but not 
















 P Neg NR P Neg NR P Neg NR P Neg NR 
P1 2   3   2   3   
P2 2   3   2   3   
P3 2   3   2   2  1 
P5 2   2  1  1 1 1  2 
P6 2   2  1 1  1 2  1 
P7 2   3   2   3   
P8 2   3   2   2  1 
P9 2   3   2   3   
P10 2   3   1 1  2 1  
P11 2   2  1   2 2  1 
P12 1  1 2  1 1  1 2 1  
P13 2   2  1 1  1 1  2 
P14 2   2 1   1 1 2 1  
P15 2   2  1   2 2 1  
















 P Neg NR P Neg NR P Neg NR P Neg NR 
P16 2   3   2   2 1  
Total 29  1 38 1 6 18 3 9 32 5 8 
Table 5.1: Aggregated scores by motivational themes 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, most participants felt that all of the main themes and most of 
the sub-themes (10 out of 12 – see Table 4.4 for further detail) were important in their firm’s 
decision to establish a corporate foundation. The following sections discuss the relevant 
findings in relation to each of these themes in line with the academic literature, including how 
they extend previous knowledge. 
 
5.2 Centralising Corporate Giving 
 
This theme relates to whether firms are motivated to establish a corporate foundation to 
centralise their philanthropic activities, rather than undertaking activities through multiple 
executives or corporate divisions in an ad-hoc manner. Within this theme there were two sub-
themes: 1) focus and formalisation of corporate giving; and 2) separation from business 
activities. Such centralisation has been suggested as one of the core benefits of forming a 
corporate foundation (McDowell et al., 2003). Table 5.1 above indicates overwhelming 
support for this theme and its sub-themes (also see Table 4.4), with only one participant not 
identifying at least one of the sub-themes as important to the foundation formation decision. 
As previously discussed in Section 2.4.1, it has been suggested that one of the primary 
reasons why foundations are established is to reduce a firm’s agency costs (Masulis & Reza, 
2015). The centralisation of such corporate philanthropic activity may reduce these costs, by 
providing a structured, visible and easily managed system for channelling corporate funds 
(Minefee et al., 2015). Further, it has also been pointed out that this is generally predicated on 
the belief that foundations reduce agency costs rather than merely shifting these from the 
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firm’s direct giving programs to the activities (and individuals) within the corporate 
foundation (Brown et al., 2006). For example, the endemic problem of executives engaged in 
their firm’s corporate giving has been well covered in the literature (e.g. Minefee et al., 
2015). Furthermore, when executives remain in positions of influence over the firm’s 
corporate foundation, it has been recognised that such giving activities remain 
overwhelmingly aligned to the personal interests of those individuals (Werbel & Carter, 
2002); thus, the agency costs have shifted to the foundation.  
The complete elimination of agency costs can only really occur by establishing a truly 
‘independent’ foundation board to manage giving (Gautier & Pache, 2013). Yet within this 
study it was difficult to identify firms that had such independent foundations (see Table 5.2 
and Section 5.7.3); there only appeared to be one foundation that was truly independent of the 
establishing firm (and its managers). The literature highlights the importance of keeping the 
CEO and executives of the establishing firm at arms-length from the corporate foundation 
(Marquis & Lee, 2013; Morris & Biederman, 1985). Otherwise, agency costs may 
unintentionally be transferred to the foundation manager or other giving professionals, who 
make the giving decisions rather than the establishing firm managers. 
Based on this study’s participant comments that were discussed in detail in Section 
4.4.1, many firms appear motivated to establish a corporate foundation after negative or 
ineffective experiences of previous ad-hoc or direct corporate giving. This aligns with the 
literature argument that corporate foundations overcome the limitations of unfocused and 
limited formality associated with direct corporate giving (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006). 
Although it was not possible to identify in this study whether this focused approach translates 
into a more effective vehicle for philanthropy. The area of effectiveness of corporate 
philanthropy has scant coverage within the literature, so it is proposed as an area for further 
research (as further discussed in Section 5.12). Some of this study’s participants used the 
term ‘impact’ to describe how giving larger amounts to fewer charities meant they could 
affect more social change. However, it might be that improved efficiency of corporate 
philanthropy could also be achieved by better coordination of firm’s internal direct giving 
programs. 
As highlighted in the literature and through this study’s interviews, CEOs and other 
firm executives are traditionally able to use corporate philanthropic funds for personal gain 
(Gautier & Pache, 2013; Werbel & Carter, 2002). While corporate foundations are meant to 
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demonstrate to stakeholders a clear separation of philanthropic activities from business 
activities, in practice this may not always occur. Within this study, this separation appeared to 
be more pronounced among those firms that had established a large corpus to support their 
foundation, especially when funded via a demutualisation. Furthermore, it commonly seemed 
like the participants were more concerned about the appearance of separation rather than the 
actual exclusion of executives from corporate foundation activities (as further discussed in 
Section 4.8). 
In addition, there appears to be a contradiction in this study’s findings with respect to 
the intent of firms managing corporate foundations to operate in the best interests of the 
community against how they are actually managed. As will be further discussed in Section 
5.6, while many of this study’s corporate foundations were found to be highly integrated with 
the establishing firm, it appears that some establishing firms were motivated to establish them 
as their structures make the appearance of separation easier to espouse. This apparent lack of 
real separation is a significant finding, as the primary legal purpose of the trust is to conduct 
philanthropy on behalf of the community (Ward, 2012) as an independent organisation. 
In summary, this section has discussed how the centralisation of corporate giving is a 
core motivation for firms to establish a foundation. Such centralisation is often achieved in 
one of these two ways: 1) focus and formalisation of corporate giving; and b) separation from 
business activities. The focus and formalisation is often pursued by firms in the belief that a 
formal corporate foundation structure will make their philanthropy more focused, as found in 
this study. Future research is required to assess where such focus and formalisation results in 
more effective and/or impactful giving (as further discussed in Section 5.12). Furthermore, 
the separation of corporate giving from business activities via the establishment of a 
corporate foundation mostly appears in this study to be undertaken to reduce agency costs, as 
previously suggested in the literature. Although these findings have highlighted how such 
agency costs often shift from the firm to the foundation, because the firm’s executives are 
actively involved in the foundation’s decision-making. That is, the foundations lack of 
independence negates the opportunity to reduce agency costs. The next section that follows 
will discuss the Stakeholder Influences theme. 
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5.3 Stakeholder Influences 
 
This theme discusses whether firms are motivated to establish a corporate foundation based 
on the influence of stakeholders, which includes three stakeholder groups or sub-themes: 1) 
board and executives of establishing firm; 2) lawyers and other advisors; and 3) isomorphic 
influences from other firms. As shown in Table 5.1 above, there was strong support for this 
theme and its sub-themes in this study, with all participants identifying at least two of these 
stakeholder groups as important in the decision to establish a foundation, and only two 
having negative views of at least one of them, and another five not identifying with at least 
one of them. 
While there is minimal academic literature on the influence of the firm’s board of 
directors in the decision to establish a corporate foundation, it appeared in this study that 
firms were motivated to establish a corporate foundation as the result of such influence (as 
previously discussed in Section 4.5.1). Board action is often required for such a strategic 
decision, and while board members and executives of the establishing firm are influential in 
the firm’s decision to establish a corporate foundation, their specific reasons for their support 
for developing foundations are varied. 
The influence of lawyers in corporate strategic and tactical activities is well 
established in the academic literature (e.g. Heinz, 1982), including research that highlights 
lawyers’ influence on CSR decisions (e.g. Wilkins, 2012). While none of these works 
specifically focus on lawyer influence on the establishment of corporate foundations, their 
commonly recognised association with corporate philanthropy, especially the creation of 
legal trusts (Prewitt, 2006), suggests they have some influence in the firm’s decision to 
establish a corporate foundation. This study’s results in particular support Pitts III (2008), 
who contended that lawyers are highly influential within firms CSR and philanthropy (as 
previously discussed in Section 2.4.2.3). Only one of this study’s participants did not 
consider their firm’s lawyers to be influential in the decision to establish a corporate 
foundation, with another three not mentioning these stakeholders. 
 The importance of other firms has also been highlighted in the academic literature 
(e.g. Harrow, 2011) and is supported via this study’s interview findings. Isomorphic 
behaviours (i.e. imitating other firms) appear to be a key influence on whether firms choose 
to establish a corporate foundation, with many participants in this study clarifying they had 
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imitated the actions of other firms when doing so. Both normative and mimetic isomorphism 
types were observed in this research, while there were no instances of coercive isomorphism 
(see Section 4.5.3). This research found that most firms imitate the philanthropic activities of 
their peers, which has been recognised as a form of normative isomorphic behaviour 
(Sharfman, 1994). 
 In summary, this section has discussed the role of the following three stakeholders in 
motivating firms to establish a corporate foundation: 1) board and executives of the 
establishing firm; 2) lawyers and other advisors; and 3) isomorphic influences from other 
firms. This study found that the first two stakeholder groups are integral to establishing a 
corporate foundation; the board for initial agreement to investigate the establishment, and 
lawyers for deciding on the legal trust structure of the foundation (i.e. PAF or PuAF). It 
would appear that the firm’s board are most influential, as without their authorisation a 
formally structured corporate foundation cannot be lawfully established. It was also identified 
in this research that many firms closely monitor the philanthropy activities and strategies of 
other firms in their industry, which influences their decision on whether to establish a 
foundation. Most of these decisions followed a pattern of normative isomorphism, with 
mimetic isomorphism only occurring occasionally. The next section will discuss the Financial 
Advantages of Foundation Structure theme, with respect to it being a motivating factor for 
establishing a foundation. 
 
5.4 Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure 
 
This theme relates to whether firms are motivated to establish a corporate foundation to attain 
financial advantages, and includes the following two sub-themes: 1) foundation corpus; and 
2) taxation benefits. As shown in Table 5.1 table, there was moderate support for this theme 
and its associated sub-themes within this study. 
There is limited discussion within the academic literature with respect to whether the 
creation of a financial corpus influences the decision to establish a corporate foundation. As 
previously discussed in Section 4.6.1 some firms appear motivated to establish their corporate 
foundation based on a well-funded corpus being the end result. Three of this study’s 
participants specified that a foundation corpus had been formed when their organisations 
were demutualised (i.e. when a community-based organisation changes from private to public 
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ownership), which led to a sizable donation from the establishing firm. This sort of 
motivation has been identified in the academic literature (Faucette, 2001), whereby corporate 
foundation establishment is advised during the establishing firm’s demutualisation event 
wherever possible in order to influence that a larger foundation corpus be secured. 
It was also observed in this study that foundation managers overseeing a sizable 
corpus were generally more confident about the long-term viability of their foundations and 
had a clearer articulation of its objectives. Their foundations also conveyed higher levels of 
independence from the establishing firm, which is likely due to the corpus providing more 
certainty over future charitable granting (i.e. not affected by variations in the establishing 
firm’s budgeting processes). 
The second sub-theme of potential taxation benefits available to firms that decide to 
establish a corporate foundation has been well covered within the academic literature (see 
Section 2.4.3). Much of this literature highlights that taxation benefits are often a motivating 
factor for firms practising philanthropy in general (e.g. Boesso et al., 2013; Navarro, 1988; 
Webb, 1994). For example, it has been suggested that firms are motivated to give to their 
foundations when their profits are high, which allows them to reduce their tax and also allows 
them to maintain corporate giving when there are limited profits (Webb, 1994). In contrast 
with this common perception, this study’s results suggest that not all firms rate tax benefits as 
important to their decision to establish a corporate foundation. When tax benefits were 
discussed in this study’s interviews, participants appeared to be more focused on the ability 
of firm employees (payroll giving) and/or the general public (external giving) to make tax 
deductible contributions to the foundation. Such tax deductibility has been known to increase 
participation in charitable giving (Steinberg, 1990), which probably explains why many of 
these foundations were more interested in offering tax benefits to donors and employees of 
the establishing firm as an incentive. 
In summary, this section has discussed the influence of financial advantages and tax 
benefits on firm motivation to establish a corporate foundation. This study found moderate 
support for the sub-theme relating to the influence of foundation corpus on firms establishing 
foundations. It also found that firms are only moderately motivated by taxation benefits, and 
not because of the benefits to the firms but rather those accrued from tax deductibility to 
donors (i.e. staff and the general public). This apparent lack of importance placed on 
corporate benefits stemming from tax incentives is inconsistent with the established literature, 
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which has previously suggested that on such direct benefits to the establishing firm are 
motivating factors in foundation establishment (Navarro, 1988). 
 
5.5 Strategic Benefits to the Establishing Firm 
 
This theme is focused on whether firms are motivated to establish a corporate foundation due 
to the strategic benefits, and includes the following three sub-themes: 1) reputational benefits; 
2) staff engagement and participation; and 3) shared value strategy. As shown in Table 5.1 
above, there was strong support in this study with respect to the level of influence of the first 
two sub-themes (reputational benefits and staff engagement and participant), while the shared 
value strategy sub-strategy received the least amount of support of all sub-themes in this 
research (see tables 4.2 and 4.4). 
While the positive reputational benefits for firms that practise philanthropy have been 
well documented in the academic literature (e.g. Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007), this has not 
been specifically focused on the establishment of a corporate foundation. In this study, it 
appears that many of the firms were motivated to establish a corporate foundation to achieve 
reputational benefits (as discussed in Section 4.7.1), which fits with the pattern of broader 
philanthropy literature where firms use philanthropy as a means of corporate promotion 
(Altuntas & Turker, 2015), including via the firm’s marketing department (Delmas & 
Burbano, 2011). This study’s findings suggest some firms primarily use their foundations to 
promote the firm, rather than as vehicles to promote social good, with many proactively 
seeking to enhance corporate brand reputation via the foundation.  
Achieving corporate objectives does not appear to be considered a philanthropic 
behaviour (as defined in Section 2.1.1); it is generally deemed counterproductive to 
foundations’ legal obligations to operate for public rather than founding firm benefit (as 
discussed in Section 2.2). The implications of such founding firm objectives will be further 
discussed in Section 5.10, as well as Section 5.11 in relation to implications for policymakers 
and regulators in particular. This study’s findings support Schrader et al. (2005) who 
suggested that most foundations are named after their establishing firm to primarily improve 
the latter’s public image, to transfer the inherent positive image of the foundation to the firm 
and maximise the halo effect (as discussed in Section 2.4.2.1). 
Page 164 of 217 
Furthermore, many of the participants in this study agreed their foundations were also 
established to provide meaningful work experiences that increase employee engagement and 
participation within the founding firm, which is also supported in the academic literature (e.g. 
Kahn, 1990). As previously discussed in Section 4.7.2, many firms appear to have at least 
some focus on using their corporate foundation operations to engage the establishing firm 
workforce. Some of this study’s participants even highlighted that they were financially 
rewarded for driving such activities that improve employee engagement and participation, 
which suggests the foundations are run more for corporate strategic than philanthropic 
reasons. It was also identified in this study (by 12 participants), as well as in the academic 
literature, that the seeking of strategic benefits can extend to foundations running employee 
volunteering or giving programs (Grant 2012; Morris & Biederman, 1985), which would 
again appear to be more focused on firm rather than philanthropic benefits. 
In the context of strategic benefits, and in line with previous studies, this research also 
considered whether establishing a corporate foundation might enhance ‘shared value’ (e.g. 
Porter & Kramer, 2011). Yet while shared value strategy has been focused on in the academic 
literature, it has not been examined in the context of a firm’s decision to establish a corporate 
foundation. As previously discussed in Section 4.7.3, it appears that some firms, at least 
within this study, are unfamiliar with the concept. Where shared value strategy was 
understood in this study, it was commonly associated with the foundation’s primary purpose 
being to help the firm achieve its corporate objectives ahead of delivering tangible social 
outcomes. Terms like ‘shared value’ and ‘strategic philanthropy’ were interchangeably used 
in the corresponding participant comments. Yet as discussed in Section 2.1.1, strategic 
philanthropy is technically not philanthropy, as there is no altruistic intent (Porter & Kramer, 
2002). Thus, the establishment of a corporate foundation based on a shared value strategy is 
unlikely to meet Australian tax and trust regulatory requirements, meaning such behaviour is 
not truly philanthropic (as discussed in Section 2.2). This aligns with this study’s finding that 
most negative participant views of shared value strategy motivating the establishment of a 
foundation were based on perceptions of this being inappropriate within the legal structure of 
the corporate foundation. 
In summary, this section has discussed the influence of strategic benefits on firms 
establishing a corporate foundation. This study found that firms promote their corporate 
foundations as a form of commercial advertising, and proactively market the activities of the 
foundation to their own staff for the purpose of enhancing staff engagement. Many of the 
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firms in this study appeared to outsource their employee volunteering and workplace giving 
programs to their foundations to increase staff engagement and participation. Furthermore, 
the shared value strategy sub-theme was not well understood by participants, and was 
interchangeably associated with the term ‘strategic philanthropy’ that was commonly 
recognised as causing conflict with the foundation’s philanthropic objectives. The next 
section will discuss the levels of corporate foundation independence from the establishing 
firm. 
 
5.6 Assessment of corporate foundation independence  
 
This section presents the aggregate participant views in relation to the fifth theme examined 
in this study in relation to levels of corporate foundation independence from establishing 
firms. This has been highlighted as a critical legal issue in the context of tax and trust 
requirements in Australia (Freehills, 2012). Three levels of corporate foundation 
independence were identified in this study, based on the aggregated levels of participant 
support for this theme (see Table 5.2 below): 1) independent; 2) partially integrated; and c) 
integrated. These levels are discussed separately in Section 5.7, which examines the degree 
the establishing firm controls or impacts foundation governance and operations, via five 
independence dimensions: 1) strength of relationships between foundation trustees and the 
firm; 2) involvement of executives in establishing firm in foundation activities; 3) how the 
establishing firm funds and supports the foundation; 4) shared objectives of the foundation 
and establishing firm; and 5) establishing firm staff volunteering and giving through 
foundation (as previously discussed in Section 2.3).  
Table 5.2 below shows that managers had a view of foundation independence or 
integration with the parent firm, across all of the five sub-themes. Only one participant 
believed the establishing firm had limited influence, suggesting that the foundation was 
independent from the establishing firm. The remaining 14 participants identified the 
establishing firm as having a moderate or high degree of control of the foundation. The views 
of P4 have again been removed from this analysis, as this organisation did not have a formal 
corporate foundation. 
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Table 5.2: Aggregated scores by level of corporate foundation independence 
 
As shown in the above table, the degree of corporate foundation independence 
appears to have some influence on the firm decision to establish a foundation, despite this not 
being identified as a separate motivation. In the initial conceptualisation of this study’s 
independence dimensions the following sub-themes were separate – 1) strength of 
relationship between foundation trustees and the firm, and 2) involvement of senior 
management of establishing firm in foundation activities – as per the literature (Corporate 
Citizenship, 2013); however, in the interview data these were identified as closely related so 
were aggregated into a single sub-theme (as discussed in Section 4.8.1). 
As shown in Table 5.2 above, there was limited support for the assumption that most 
foundations are independent from the establishing firm, with only one of the participants 
agreeing that the five sub-themes existed in their firm-foundation arrangements. In contrast, 
there were four participants who felt that there was no independence across the five themes 
(i.e. scored 5 on the negative views). 
 Independence from establishing firm 
 Positive Negative Level of independence 
P1  5 Integrated 
P2  5 Integrated 
P3 1 4 Integrated 
P5 5  Independent 
P6  5 Integrated 
P7 2 3 Partially integrated 
P8  5 Integrated 
P9 2 3 Partially integrated 
P10 2 3 Partially integrated  
P11 2 3 Partially integrated  
P12 1 4 Integrated 
P13 2 3 Partially integrated 
P14 1 4 Integrated 
P15 1 4 Integrated 
P16 1 4 Integrated 
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Despite limited academic literature on the influence of corporate foundation 
independence in the firm’s decision to establish a foundation (Corporate Citizenship, 2013), 
some literature has suggested firms ‘use’ foundations (Bernholz, 2000) and philanthropy 
(Foster, Meinhard, Berger & Krpan, 2009) for their own benefit, which suggests they 
perceive this as an opportunity to undertake strategic philanthropy (Maas & Liket, 2010). As 
such, it might be generally expected that the foundation would be aligned with the 
establishing firm’s interests. This study’s corresponding data as discussed in Section 4.8.1 
indicate that many of the foundations’ external responsible persons are past/retired executives 
of the establishing firm or an executive of other firms in the same industry (see Table 4.6). 
This degree of association has not previously been discussed within the academic literature 
and raises concerns regarding the true independence of the foundation boards’ ‘responsible 
persons’ (Taxation Administration Act 1953). The participants in this study also indicated 
that most of the foundation board members are current executives of their establishing firm, 
leaving limited opportunity for the firm’s staff or external independent representation on the 
foundation boards. 
As highlighted in the academic literature (Alberg-Seberich, 2009) and further 
confirmed in this study’s interviews (see Section 4.8.2), many establishing firms provide their 
foundations with ongoing funding and support. Corporate foundation operating expenses 
were reported in this research as being treated similarly to other operation costs incurred by 
an internal department of the establishing firm. Almost all foundation staff within this study’s 
sample (other than P5 and P9) were also directly employed by the establishing firm, with 
their salaries and foundation office facilities fully covered by it. In addition, at least four of 
the participants (i.e. foundation managers) directly reported to managers of the establishing 
firm’s CSR department. Such arrangements suggest the firms are striving to maintain control 
over their corporate foundations, as foundation staff directly managed by the firm would be 
more likely to align foundation activities to the firm’s team objectives to which they report. 
Such reporting arrangements and structural placements of the foundation within the 
establishing firm is likely to remove its ability to remain independent of the establishing firm, 
which is also inconsistent with legal requirements for trusts in Australia (Ward, 2012). 
This study’s sub-theme related to firms aligning their foundations with their own 
corporate objectives has also previously been identified in the academic literature as an 
important issue (Bruch & Walter, 2005). In previous studies, some corporate foundations 
have been found to use their foundations as an extension of their firm’s CSR or philanthropy 
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programs (e.g. Minefee et al., 2015). In this study, only five of the foundations had 
mechanisms in place to measure the outcomes of their giving programs, suggesting the 
remaining foundations had limited interest in confirming their own objectives (if existent) 
were being met. It would appear in this study’s sample that most foundations (see Section 
4.8.3) primarily operated to achieve the objectives of the establishing firm. For example, 
some of the participants in this study confirmed that their foundations do not support causes 
without prior approval of their establishing firms, nor do they support areas of need unrelated 
to the establishing firm. Thus, it would appear that corporate foundations help the 
establishing firms achieve their corporate objectives in much the same way as any of the 
establishing firms’ internal departments, meaning they are used more as strategic 
philanthropy. 
The last sub-theme in this study related to the use of corporate foundations to 
facilitate founding firms’ employee volunteering and workplace giving programs. In this 
study, many participants indicated that their establishing firms leverage these volunteer 
programs to increase employee engagement and purposively drive volunteering through their 
foundations as part of their giving strategies (Freehills, 2012). It would therefore appear that 
this sub-theme is closely related to the motivational theme in relation to strategic benefits, as 
discussed in Section 5.5. As discussed in Section 4.8.4, only two of the foundations in this 
research were not used to facilitate employee volunteering or workplace giving programs for 
their establishing firm, and only one participant (P9) questioned whether such involvement 
should be part of the foundation’s role. The other 13 corporate foundations in this study were 
integrated into the establishing firm’s volunteering programs, although this research did not 
examine whether this had influenced the firm’s establishment of the foundation. 
In summary, this section has focused on the level of independence corporate 
foundations have from their establishing firms. This study’s data findings suggest that most 
firms manage their foundations like an internal department, giving the establishing firm 
access to foundation operations while also benefiting from its numerous advantages (as 
discussed in Section 2.2.1). This aligns with the literature suggesting that many corporate 
foundations operate with highly blurred managerial lines in regards to independence from 
establishing firms (Mindlin, 2012). For example, the legally required independent person is 
often closely associated to the establishing firm, by being a retired or previously serving 
executive of the firm. This study also found that operational costs for most of the foundations 
were fully funded by the establishing firm, including foundation staff salaries. Most 
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foundation staff were also found to be employed directly by the establishing firm, with some 
reporting into its CSR departments. It also appears that most foundations in this research seek 
to achieve the establishing firm’s corporate objectives rather than focusing on an independent 
philanthropic agenda, with only five of them measuring their outcomes irrespective of 
whether they were focused on their own or the firm’s objectives. Furthermore, most of the 
corporate foundations in this study facilitate employee volunteering and workplace giving 
programs on behalf of the establishing firm. Based on these findings, there appears to be 
limited independence of foundations from establishing firms, which is in breach of the 
Australian trust requirements. 
The next section will further discuss the three levels of corporate foundation 
independence identified in this study: 1) fully integrated; b) partially integrated. 
 
5.7 Corporate foundation accrued levels of independence 
 
This section presents levels of the corporate foundations based on their level of 
independence/integration from the establishing firm. Table 5.2 in the previous section shows 
there are three levels of foundations based on participant views in regards to the five 
dimensions of independence as identified in the literature (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). 
These three groupings are based on an aggregation of participant responses from Table 4.5: 
1) integrated foundations that are aligned with their founding firms across four or five of the 
dimensions; 2) partially integrated foundations that are aligned across one to three of the 
dimensions; and 3) independent foundations that have no alignment with their founding firms 
as per the dimensions. For example, one participant’s (P1) foundation was integrated with the 
founding firm across all five dimensions, resulting in a +5, -0 outcome, while another (P3) 
was integrated across four of dimensions giving them an outcome of +4, -1. Thus, this study 
presents a unique perspective of levels of corporate foundation independence which have 
rarely been observed within the academic literature (Boris et al., 2008). 
  
5.7.1 Integrated foundations  
 
This study’s integrated group was comprised of nine foundations, with four aligned with their 
founding firm across the five dimensions, and another five aligned with four (see Table 5.3 
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below). This group also consisted of seven large- and two medium-sized foundations based 
on defined annual revenue groupings (see Table 4.2). These corporate foundations were 
managed as internal departments of their establishing firm, with several of these participants 
appearing to operate under the guise of foundation independence while coordinating activities 
via establishing firm directives. For example, one of them (P2) reported that the CEO of their 
establishing firm had full control over the selection of their foundation’s board, which was 
aimed at maximising firm staff engagement with the foundation. In light of this, integrated 
foundations appear to be used to deliver the strategic philanthropy objectives of their 
establishing firms (Porter & Kramer, 2002). 
The lack of independence demonstrated by the corporate foundations within this 
study’s integrated group raises several concerns about their ability to fulfil the legal 
requirements of a trust in Australia (as defined in Section 2.2). The implications of these 












































































































































































































































P1 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated +5, -0 
P2 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated +5, 0 
P3 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated + 4, -1 
P6 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated +5, -0 
P8 Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated +5. -0 
P12 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated +4 -1 
P14 Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated +4, -1 
P15 Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated +4, -1 
P16 Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent Integrated +4, -1 
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5.7.2 Partially integrated foundations 
 
This study’s partially integrated group included five foundations that were aligned with 
between one and three of the five dimensions. As shown below in Table 5.4, partially 
integrated foundations had a mix set of behaviours. For example, all except one foundation 
(P9) within this group were integrated in terms of the association between executives of the 
establishing firm and the foundation. Furthermore, four of the foundations were involved in 
the facilitation of the establishing firm’s volunteering and employee giving programs, two 
had external board members (i.e. trustees) that had prior association with the establishing 
firm, and three had shared objectives with the establishing firm. This partial integration group 
consisted of three large- and two medium-sized foundations based on the foundation’s annual 
revenue grouping (see Table 4.2). Yet while there was some integration in this group, there 
were also aspects of independence with respect to foundation governance and operations. For 
example, one foundation (P9) had a fully independent board (i.e. no prior association to the 
establishing firm), despite receiving operational support from the establishing firm and 
facilitating its volunteering program. This participant also questioned whether it was 












































































































































































































































P7 Independent Integrated Independent Integrated Integrated +3, -2 
P9 Independent Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated +3, -2 
P10 Integrated Integrated Independent Independent Integrated +3, -2 
P11 Integrated Integrated Independent Independent Integrated +3. -2 
P13 Independent Integrated Integrated Integrated Independent +3, -2 
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5.7.3 Independent foundations  
 
This study’s independent foundations group was comprised of one foundation (P5), as shown 
in Table 5.5 below. As there were no areas of interdependence between the foundation and 
the establishing firm, this foundation can be considered as operating an independent 
corporate foundation (Corporate Citizenship, 2013). This foundation’s board consisted of 
external responsible persons with no prior association to the establishing firm, and it was 
medium-sized based on annual revenues grouping (see Table 4.2). This research found no 
operational differences between this foundation and the others to help understand why it 
operated more independently, such as foundation size, industry type or managerial time 
allocated to role. There were also no noticeable differences between this foundation 













































































































































































































































P5 Independent Independent Independent Independent Independent +0, -5 
Table 5.5: Independent corporate foundation 
 
In summary, this section has discussed this study’s grouping of the corporate 
foundations based on their level of independence or integration with the establishing firm: 1) 
integrated foundations; 2) partially integrated foundations; and 3) independent foundations. 
While there were no clear reasons within the data on why one foundation was more 
independent than another, the establishing firm board’s initial decisions on how the 
foundation was to operate appeared to have an influence. For example, one participant (P9) 
explained how the board of the establishing firm intentionally had created a truly independent 
foundation board from the beginning, which could have influenced the other dimensions of 
independence. The research findings also indicate that truly independent Australian corporate 
foundations are rare, particularly when assessed against the five dimensions of independence. 
This study therefore provides a rarely explored categorisation of corporate foundation 
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independence, with all but one of the foundations in the sample appearing to be integrated or 
partially integrated into their establishing firm. 
 
5.8 Themes identified for addressing the research problem 
 
The key motivation for this study (as discussed in Section 1.2) was to better understand the 
growing phenomenon of firms establishing corporate foundations, which has rarely been 
focused on in previous studies (e.g. Minciullo & Pedrini, 2015; Walker, 2013). With limited 
empirical research available globally, some scholars have called for empirical tests of “why 
foundations are established” (Minefee et al., 2015, p. 69) within the broader study of 
corporate philanthropy. 
This research has subsequently responded to such requests to better understand 
“retrospective accounts of [corporate giving] participants to the decision”, as to which giving 
strategy firms and managers pursue (i.e. foundation, direct giving) (Gautier & Pache, 2013, p. 
363). Thus, the primary research question stated: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
 
In this study, there were 10 sub-themes identified under the four motivational themes 
on why firms establish corporate foundations, as well as five sub-themes related to whether 
foundations are independent from the establishing firm. As shown in Table 5.6 below, some 
of the sub-themes were more broadly supported than others. For example, the 16 participants 
in this study mostly identified that the following five sub-themes (H) were used to varying 
degrees, to support the organisational rationale for establishing a corporate foundation: H1) to 
separate corporate giving from regular business activities; H2) influence from the board of the 
establishing firm; H3) to increase the establishing firm’s staff engagement and participation; 
H4) to focus and formalise giving practices; and H5) to improve the reputation of the 
establishing firm. There were also three moderately (M) supported sub-themes – M1) 
isomorphic influences from other firms; M2) lawyer influence and other advisors; and M3) 
foundation corpus – with two sub-themes least (L) supported – L1) taxation benefits; and L2) 
shared value strategy. 
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Table 5.6: Summary of scores for support of motivational themes 
 
In addition to the four motivational themes, a fifth theme related to firm foundation 
independence was examined in this study, which comprised of five sub-themes (as discussed 
in Section 5.6). As shown in Table 5.7 below, analysis of the 15 participants in this study (i.e. 
P4 was excluded as they did not have a formal corporate foundation) identified that the five 
sub-themes were used to varying degrees with respect to corporate foundation independence 
from the establishing firm. The three sub-themes most identified (H) were: H1) involvement 
of senior management of establishing firm in foundation activities; H2) establishing firm staff 
volunteering and giving through foundation; and H3) strength of relationships between 
foundation trustees and the firm. The other two sub-themes were moderately (M) supported: 
M1) how the establishing firm funds and supports the foundation; and M2) shared objectives 
of the foundation and establishing firm. 
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In summary, this study’s findings indicate that most firms establish corporate 
foundations to undertake strategic philanthropy, given corporate foundations confer 
legitimising benefits from within legally independent structures (see Section 2.1.2) as well as 
advantages over other forms of corporate philanthropy (see Section 2.2.1), while these 
corporate foundations are operationalised in a way that gives firms extensive control over 
their governance (see Section 2.3). Thus, the degree of corporate foundation independence 
appears to have some influence in the establishing firm’s decision to establish a corporate 
foundation. The lack of independence from the establishing firm indicates that the corporate 
foundation is in breach of Australian trust requirements (see Section 2.2). 
 
5.9 Implications for theory 
 
Agency theory was explored throughout this study because it is the most commonly cited 
theory explaining corporate philanthropy within the academic literature (Werbel & Carter, 
2002). While this study’s results confirm that many firms are motivated to establish 
foundations in an attempt to reduce their agency costs (Minefee et al., 2015), it also 
highlights how such costs are often shifted to the foundation rather than being eliminated. 
The motivation to reduce agency costs by establishing a corporate foundation is thereby 
problematic, as firm executives are still actively involved in many aspects of the foundation, 
from holding trustee positions to controlling its operations (see Section 5.2), while the 
managers influence (i.e. agency) still exists. Restricting executive influence from corporate 
foundations programs would likely result in greater foundation independence (i.e. Marquis & 
Lee, 2013). While this research has found that agency theory can help to explain corporate 
foundation establishment, the implementation is ineffective when foundations are integrated 
into the establishing firm. Further research to explore the relationship between corporate 
foundation independence and agency cost reduction is therefore recommended (as discussed 
in Section 5.12).  
 
5.10 Implications for practice 
 
This section discusses the implications of this research for firms seeking to establish 
corporate foundations. Based on the interviews and the academic literature (e.g. Bethmann, 
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von Schnurbein & Studer (2014), the results suggest that some firms lack the necessary 
guidelines on how to select the most appropriate corporate foundation structure. Furthermore, 
some corporate foundation managers within this study’s sample appear to have limited 
knowledge of both theirs and the establishing firm’s legal obligations under the Australian 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (see Section 2.2). For example, one of the foundations 
collected money from the general public while being registered as a PAF, which is not 
allowed under this specific trust arrangement (Ward, 2012). Furthermore, the lack of 
independence of foundations from establishing firms (as discussed in Section 5.6) also 
highlights the lack of managerial and trustee understanding of the requirements of foundation 
structures.  
As a result of such confusion and lack of knowledge, a list of compliance 
considerations (a checklist) regarding the establishment of foundation structures has been 
proposed in this thesis (see Table 5.8 below). This list may assist managers in establishing 
firms and managers of foundations to comply with their legal obligations. 
 
5.10.1 Checklist for firms investigating corporate foundation structures 
 
Based on these research findings, especially the lack of apparent independence of foundations 
from establishing firms as required under trust law, a regulatory checklist is included below 
to assist firms in choosing the most appropriate corporate foundation structure for their needs. 
 
1) Responsible person (i.e. independent) on corporate foundation board 
Within Australia, trusts need to have an individual who is classified as the ‘responsible 
person’ for managing trust activities. A responsible person has been defined as an “individual 
with a degree of responsibility to the Australian community as a whole” (Public Ancillary 
Guidelines 2011 s.14). This individual must be someone external to the firm (i.e. not an 
executive), and by law most board member positions for a PAF need to be independent of the 
firm. For PAF, there must be at least one independent person (i.e. the responsible person) on 
the board (Ward, 2012). This study’s findings have highlighted how firms need to ensure 
their responsible persons are independent of the establishing firm and appropriately 
represented on its board to avoid breeching legal obligations under the trust requirements. 
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2) Strategic corporate benefits 
If a firm wants to use a foundation to achieve strategic corporate objectives, they should not 
use formal legal trusts where the focus is on community rather than corporate benefits and the 
foundations need to be independent of the establishing firm. Structured corporate foundations 
are not permitted to operate for the ‘material benefit’ of their establishing firms, and there are 
legal penalties for trustees that breach these guidelines (as discussed in Section 5.11.2). 
3) Donating to specific causes 
Formal trusts (PAF or PuAF) can only donate to specific groups that meet the legal 
requirements of an ATO status known as DGR1. This status means that individuals and 
organisations that donate to them are able to claim the relevant amount as a tax deduction 
(Freehills, 2012). All DGR1 organisations are required to register for an Australian Business 
Number (ABN), which is publicly accessible via the Australian Government Register 
website. If an organisation wants to give to non-DGR1 entities, then it should do so through 
an unstructured foundation that means fewer limitations on the causes that can be supported. 
For example, DGR1 organisations have to be Australian based. 
4) Professionally managed foundations 
Having a trust structured corporate foundation (i.e. PAF or PuAF) requires more 
administrative and governance responsibilities than an unstructured foundation. Most 
corporate foundations have at least some support from a manager or administrator, and within 
this research these were normally employed by the establishing firm. There are generally no 
legal restrictions on the establishing firm hiring foundation staff directly, including the 
manager (Freehills, 2012), which may limit the level of independence that the foundation is 
legally required to maintain. Such issues of foundation independence, on the matter of staff 
costs would be for the foundation corpus to fully fund the foundation’s own operating costs, 
including staff salaries. Depending on the size of the corporate foundation and the complexity 
of its operations, a larger team within the corporate foundation may be required to effectively 
manage its legal compliance requirements, such as annual regulatory reporting (see Section 
4.1). 
5) Raising funds from the general public 
Unlike a PAF that can only accept direct donations from the establishing firm or its 
employees, it is mandatory that a PuAF (trust) additionally solicit donations from the general 
public. With respect to unstructured foundations, they can fundraise via the general public, 
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but are unable to offer tax deductions. Thus, the structure of a foundation should factor in 
how the firm wishes to promote it and raise funds through it. 
6) Corpus created for corporate foundation funds 
A corporate foundation structured as a formal legal trust (PAF and PuAF) means that it can 
accept funds from the establishing firm. Establishing firms often contribute significant 
amounts initially to support the foundation’s activities in what is known as a corpus (i.e. an 
investment fund for future use by the foundation), which enables them to receive tax benefits. 
Additionally, there is no tax payable by the foundation on investment income generated this 
way. The corpus gives the foundation some financial independence from the founding firm, 
as these are funds that cannot be repurposed by the latter. In contrast, an unstructured 
foundation (i.e. no underlying trust) would have no legal ability to quarantine is funds from 
the establishing firm, as it is more likely to be considered internal to the firm, and the funds 
would not automatically be a tax deduction as it would depend on how they were spent. 
Table 5.8 provides an overview of how these six requirements apply to foundation 
structures and can assist establishing firms’ managers in evaluating the most appropriate 
foundation structure. 
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What are the giving 





Corporate foundation – 
PuAF 
 
Corporate foundation - 
unstructured 
 
Corpus of funds 
created for corporate 
foundation 
investments 
Mandatory Mandatory Optional but may not 
have same taxation 
benefits 
Table 5.8: Philanthropy needs and ideal accompanying foundation structure  
 
In summary, this section has provided practical guidance for firms considering the 
establishment of a corporate foundation. This advice was compiled based on many of the 
participants in this research (i.e. foundation managers) appearing unaware of how the 
foundation’s structure influences the way that it operates, and due to the lack of clarity with 
respect to their legal requirements as managers of foundations operated as trusts. These issues 
need to be understood by the firm’s board when considering establishing a foundation and the 
specific type of foundation being formed. The aim of this section is to assist decision-makers 
in selecting the most appropriate form of corporate foundation. The next section discusses the 
broader implications of this study for policymakers and regulators. 
 
5.11 Implications for policymakers and regulators 
 
This section highlights two core implications for policymakers and regulators that have arisen 
from this research. To assist with this discussion, it is important to provide a definition of the 
terms ‘policymakers’ and ‘regulators’. Policymakers are government legislators that 
contribute to statutory law, meaning written laws, through parliament; and regulators are 
those that interpret those laws into the expected conduct of those working within those laws 
(Benshalom, 2009). The first set of implications (Section 5.11.1 below) relates to the 
associations between trustees and the founding firm, and the second set (Section 5.11.2 
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5.11.1 Associations between trustees and the establishing firm 
 
In this study, the binding relationships between foundation trustees and the establishing firm 
(see sections 4.5.1 and 5.6) indicate a lack of foundation independence. Within this study’s 
sample of 16 corporate foundations, there were a number of executives (and former 
executives) of the establishing firm that were on the foundation’s board (see Table 4.6). This 
is inconsistent with the Australian legislation on foundations that stipulates that a corporate 
foundation must have a board majority of responsible persons when structured as a PuAF, 
and have at least one responsible person when established as a PAF (Ward, 2012). In this 
study, even when the responsible persons met the ‘legal’ requirements of the trust, many still 
had close ties to the establishing firm (i.e. former executives) – this raises independence 
concerns, due to the strong degree of association these trustees have with the establishing 
firm. 
This conflict of interest for corporate foundation board members should be treated in 
the same way as those that arise within financial sector firms and their superannuation 
boards. For example, in December 2018 the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) sought to forcefully dismiss five executives of IOOF serving as responsible persons 
on the board of the IOOF superannuation division (APRA, 2018). APRA was concerned that 
these five trustees’ dual roles were in breach of legislative requirements to act in the best 
interests of the fund’s beneficiaries (Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993). 
Similarly, the most current Financial Services Royal Commission (FSRC 2017) exposed 
excessive use of establishing firm executives also serving on the boards of firms’ retail 
superannuation funds. It was suggested that this resulted in these funds using the products 
and services of the establishing firm at inflated costs. Thus, the superannuation fund’s board 
members were breaching their responsibility of protecting superannuation member interests. 
As was suggested by the Productivity Commission (2018), “… some retail fund directors, 
although considered ‘independent’, are on a number of related-party boards, which raises 
questions about their independence and fuels perceptions of (and sometimes actual) conflicts 
of interest. Indeed, one recent study estimated that nearly 80% of directors on retail fund 
trustee boards are affiliated with related parties” (p. 26). 
The Productivity Commission also recommended that the definition of an 
‘independent director’ should be more accurately defined to avoid the current conflicts of 
interest. It suggested that the proposed amendment to the Superannuation Laws Amendment 
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(Strengthening Trustee Arrangements) Bill 2017, should “preclude current and recent 
directors and executive officers of related parties from sitting on a trustee board as 
independent directors” (p. 437). 
As such, this study proposes that ‘responsible persons’ and ‘independent trustees’ 
definitions specifically relating to the PAF and/or PuAF be integrated into regulatory 
guidelines to ensure foundation trustees are truly independent. Additionally, it is 
recommended that there be better monitoring of the composition of foundation boards to 
ensure they comply, which could best be overseen by the Australian charities’ regulator 
ACNC. In line with this, charities would be required to report on the independence of each 
trustee, including whether their previous relationships could create a conflict (i.e. former 
executive of the firm), in addition to their current reporting requirements. 
 
5.11.2 Impacts of corporate foundation providing material benefits to the establishing 
firm 
  
As identified within the academic literature (Hogarth et al., 2018) and in this study, corporate 
foundations appear to be frequently used by establishing firms to provide a range of direct 
benefits (e.g. strategic benefits as discussed in Section 5.5). This should be of concern to 
regulators, as the guidelines for trusts and associated tax policies require that foundations 
should not be generating ‘material benefits’ to establishing firms. Thus, many Australian 
foundations directly breach the Private Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2009 and Public Ancillary 
Fund Guidelines 2011 under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 which states: 
“42. The fund must not provide any material benefit (except as set out in guideline 
43), directly or indirectly, to:  
• the trustee; or  
• a member, director, employee, agent or officer of the trustee; or  
• a donor to the fund; or  
• a founder of the fund; or  
• an associate of any of those entities (other than a deductible gift recipient).” 
 
In line with these guidelines some of the corporate foundations and their trustees 
appear to be failing to meet their legal obligations (as listed in Section 2.2). While there are 
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limited statutory powers available for courts to rescind trust status, the ATO has authority to 
remove individual trustees from their boards and revoke DGR endorsement if warranted, or 
even bring legal action against the trust (Ward, 2012). It is therefore recommended by the 
researcher that the definition of ‘material benefits’ be made more explicit for trustees, 
corporate foundation managers, as well as boards considering establishing foundations. 
Trustees, foundation managers and establishing firm boards all need to be aware that 
corporate foundation actions planned or undertaken could be interpreted as a material benefit. 
This increased awareness would need to include reference material explaining that a material 
benefit may result for the establishing firm when: 1) commercial advertising is conducted by 
or on behalf of the foundation (see Reputational Benefits Section 4.7.1); and 2) the 
foundation facilitates volunteering and fundraising programs as a means of improving staff 
engagement and participation (see Section 4.7.2). 
It also needs to be noted by the researcher that the Australian Commonwealth PuAF 
guidelines, which are relied upon by legal advisers and philanthropy professionals, do not 
adequately define the term ‘material benefits’ as it is within Ward’s (2012) Trustee 
Handbook. Although a clearer example of this term which is not referenced in the guidelines 
is provided by the ATO in their ruling for the tax deductibility of gifts, including how they 
define a gift (ATO Taxation Ruling TR 2005/13). The research and identification in this 
study of breaches of the ‘material benefits’ clause of the Australian trust regulations suggests 
that at least some of the establishing firms included in this study’s sample are not eligible for 
taxation benefits, as they do not comply with the requirements of legal trusts. For example, 
the ATO has defined “mere public recognition of the giver's generosity” as not being a 
material benefit, except when “there is public recognition for purposes of commercial 
advertising for the giver” (ATO Taxation Ruling TR 2005/13 p. 35, para195). Hence, any 
instance of material benefit conferred to the establishing firm (i.e. through its foundation) 
could nullify the contribution as a gift, which is a pre-condition for the contribution being tax 
deductible. 
In light of the tax implications for establishing firms, the definition of what is a 
material benefit is particularly important. Benefaction (i.e. the act of conferring a benefit, see 
Section 1.05 for benefaction definition), has been deemed an important concept within tax 
law (Martin & Todd, 2018). Thus, when a corporate foundation makes grants to gift 
recipients, they must be given with the sole intention of benefiting the recipient (Freehills, 
2012). Otherwise, the ATO may not deem that benefaction has occurred when the intent of 
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the gift is for the primary purpose of self-interest by the establishing firm. As the ATO has 
previously specified: “In cases where it is clear on the objective facts that the giver is giving 
effect to self-interested commercial or fiscal objectives rather than conferring benefaction on 
the DGR, it will be evident that the transfer does not proceed from detached and disinterested 
generosity” (ATO Taxation Ruling TR 2005/13 p. 6 para36). 
However, the application of this ATO ruling might be problematic for corporate 
foundations based on the responses of their managers in this study, as they might not be seen 
to be meeting the test of benefaction when granting funds to their DGR recipients. In this 
study, there were numerous examples provided where the foundation’s primary objective was 
to benefit the establishing firm rather than the charitable recipients. Thus, this research had 
highlighted the need for regulators to recognise some of the current giving practices of 
Australian corporate foundations are in breach of the ATO guidelines and look to retrieve 
previously granted tax refunds. 
In summary, this study has identified two core implications for policymakers and 
regulators with respect to: 1) associations between trustees and the establishing firm; and b) 
the corporate foundation providing direct benefits to the establishing firm. The close 
associations between external board members of the corporate foundation and the 
establishing firm that were observed many times within this research should be of particular 
concern to regulators, as such behaviours do appear to not comply with current guidelines on 
the operation of foundations (Ward 2012). Additionally, due to material benefits being 
created by establishing firms through their foundations, some of the latter may not be meeting 
the ATO test of benefaction when granting funds to their DGR recipients (i.e. not being given 
as a gift), which may be of interest to policy makers and regulators when reviewing the 
current giving practices of corporate foundations. The next section will discuss the limitations 
of this study and opportunities for further research. 
 
5.12 Limitations and opportunities for further research 
 
This section discusses the limitations of this study and opportunities for further research. This 
study offers a novel qualitative contribution to the field within the Australian context, 
following a systematic research design and analysis process to reach the conclusions 
highlighted in this chapter. However, as in all research endeavours, there are limitations with 
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this work as well as opportunities for further research based on the issues identified (Given, 
2008). 
These include the response rate (47%) of participants, which may have been improved 
by offering a speedier and more flexible option to participate, such as with a quantitative 
survey. A mixed-methods approach may have suited this research, as has been previously 
demonstrated within the academic literature with good results (e.g. Ostrower, 2004). 
Furthermore, the available population of corporate foundation managers in Australia was 
identified as only 37 in this study, meaning there may be an opportunity to expand it 
internationally for further research, as discussed later in this section. 
In addition, each of the establishing firms examined in this research was represented 
by a single individual, which may mean lower-quality data due to some of these participants 
not working in the firm during the establishment of the foundation, with the researcher unable 
to validate or confirm their opinions with others involved in this decision-making process. 
While the researcher was cognisant to consider the possibility of participants having limited 
historical context of this decision-making process, additional participants from the 
establishing firms may have been possible, although this may have been difficult as in some 
cases significant time had lapsed since the foundation had been established. 
There were also some researcher-based limitations during the interview process 
within this study. For example, one participant (P2) was with an experienced corporate 
philanthropic professional and required two interviews (i.e. 2 hours) to get through the 
questions. This participant kept referring to their extensive corporate foundation experience 
in other organisations, which made drawing linkages to their current position difficult. More 
care to direct participants would have been helpful. 
In addition, one of the participants (P17) was not engaged throughout the interview 
process and was distracted by office emails and phone calls. The researcher followed several 
of the techniques as suggested in Kvale (1996) to improve their responses, such as when the 
interviewer stops asking a question when the interviewee is distracted and remains silent until 
the activity causing the distraction has concluded. Unfortunately, this lack of engagement 
limited the quality of data and meant this interview was not able to be included in the 
analysis. This section will now more specifically discuss opportunities for further research. 
Given the limited population of corporate foundation managers in Australia (i.e. 37), 
there may be value in extending future research to include additional countries, such as the 
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USA and UK that have many similarities to those based in Australia. Such similarities 
include trustee regulations and granting to NPOs, rather than running programs directly 
(Altuntas & Turker, 2015). Further corporate foundation research could be conducted across 
these additional countries, with allowances made in the research design for any regulatory 
and/or operational differences (e.g. board composition, granting rules). This would provide 
increased richness of qualitative data and potentially a deeper understanding of issues. 
Furthermore, increasing the number of participants may enable an opportunity to incorporate 
a more objective research design, such as via quantitative instruments (Bartlett et al., 2001). 
An opportunity also exists to further explore the operational activities of corporate 
foundations with a sizable corpus. The study finding discussed in Section 4.6.1 suggests that 
corporate foundations with a large corpus are more certain over their goals and objectives. 
While some of these participants believed they operated their foundations more 
independently, as a result of having an exclusive use corpus, this did not appear to be the case 
based on the assessment via the five independence variables (see Table 5.2). There is also 
scant information available within the academic literature on the use or advantages of a 
corpus; hence, further study is warranted. 
Another recurring theme within this research was that establishing firms often attempt 
to influence the engagement and participation of their employees through their foundations. It 
would therefore be of interest to quantify the value generated, such as exploring the specific 
metrics of improved staff retention, change in organisational culture and improved workplace 
efficiency due to higher staff engagement levels associated with foundations and volunteering 
more generally. 
A further area of interest is to better understand the differences between structured 
and unstructured corporate foundations. Unstructured foundations are known to exist within 
Australia, and their operations and efficacy are under-explored both in the literature and in 
practice. Unstructured corporate foundations may be able to deliver similar social benefits to 
structured foundations, yet not be bound by the same restrictions associated with legal trusts 
(e.g. responsible persons, commercial advertising), which this study has found most corporate 
foundations failing to adhere to. Therefore, unstructured corporate foundations may be of 
interest to firms as a more flexible method in which to practise their philanthropy. A similar 
opportunity would be in comparing the operations and efficacy of alternative corporate 
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philanthropy methods, such as ad-hoc and direct giving, possibly by comparing these 
outcomes with those delivered by structured corporate foundations. 
Lastly, this research identified that the creation of a corporate foundation often simply 
shifts agency costs rather than reducing or eliminating them. The lack of foundation 
independence of the corporate foundations included in this study made it difficult to assess 
how agency costs may have been reduced by establishing the foundation, as many of the 
firms’ executives who may have been involved in ad-hoc corporate giving seemed to be the 
same managers involved in the operation of the foundation. Further research is therefore 
recommended to explore the potential relationship between corporate foundation 
independence and agency cost reduction.  
This section has discussed the limitations of this study, as well as opportunities for 




The aim of this thesis research has been to address the research question: 
Why do corporate firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations to conduct some or all 
of their philanthropic activities? 
This chapter concludes this thesis with respect to the motivational factors identified that drive 
corporate foundation establishment: 1) Centralising Corporate Giving; 2) Stakeholder 
Influences; 3) Financial Advantages of Foundation Structure; and 4) Strategic Benefits 
to the Establishing Firm. All of these themes were found to be significant to varying 
degrees. This study also explored the Level of Corporate Foundation Independence from 
the establishing firm as a theme, and can conclude that a lack of independence was found 
among almost all of the participant firms in this research. This apparent lack of independence 
raises legal concerns that require the focus of law makers, regulators and trustees. In fact, the 
high proportion of foundations potentially breaching corporate PAF and PuAF structures (see 
Table 5.2) represented in this thesis as exist in Australia (14 of 37) may call into the question 
the ongoing viability of these structures. 
The theoretical and practical implications of this study have been discussed in the 
preceding sections, including the limitations and opportunities for further research. It has 
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made a timely empirical contribution to the largely neglected study of corporate foundations, 
providing research previously unavailable within the academic literature. 
This study also provides a novel qualitative contribution to the field of corporate 
foundations and a basis for future research, as suggested by academic scholars. In addition to 
advancing the study of corporate foundations, it provides corporate philanthropy practitioners 
(i.e. foundation managers) with insights into the motivational factors leading to foundation 
establishment and the current state of foundation practice within Australian-based firms. In 
particular, trustees of structured corporate foundations have been presented with examples of 
how their trust governance obligations can be impacted by how their corporate foundations 
are being managed in practice. These trustees have sole legal accountability as to the conduct 
of their trust structures, and should therefore review their corporate foundations according to 
the findings and recommendations of this research. In addition, regulators and policymakers 
have been presented with the current state of Australian corporate foundation practice, and to 
enhance their regulatory processes have been raised for further investigation. 
Lastly, to answer the research question, this qualitative study completed 16 in-depth 
interviews with a large sample of the overall Australian corporate foundation manager 
population (37). The data collected from these semi-structured, in-depth interviews, along 
with the researcher’s subsequent data analysis, have attempted to answer the research 
question. This research has found that most firms voluntarily establish corporate foundations 
to practise strategic philanthropy and obtain a material benefit from the foundation. While 
strategically this may make sense and be aligned with strategic philanthropy, it does appear to 
breach the Australian guidelines for the operation of trusts. These foundations have 
historically benefited as socially endorsed and legitimised structures that provide firms a 
channel for commercial advertising subsidised by taxpayers, while enabling them to manage 
their foundation’s governance and operations as if they were an internal department. It would 
appear that many Australian firms establish corporate foundations to signal a pro-social 
agenda to their competitors and thereby potential staff and consumers, although little 
objective reporting is generated by foundations, or interest in doing so, to confirm their social 
impact. Firms establish corporate foundations to lift the engagement of their staff by way of 
facilitating their workplace giving and volunteering programs, with the objective of 
improving staff performance and retention. 
  




Appendix 1 – Brief History of Significant Events in Corporate Philanthropy 
 
Year Example and Region Importance of event 
1837 Proprietors of the Charles River 
Bridge v. Proprietors of the 
Warren Bridge - USA 
Determined that private companies did not have rights 
above those of individual private citizens, nor the right to 
control waterways without the prior consent of the 
government. This ruling was a check on the power of 
corporations. 
1881 Davis et al. v. Old Colony Railway 
Co – USA 
Prohibited corporate directors from using funds outside of 
the objectives for which the corporation was established. 
1883 Hutton v. West Cork Railway - 
UK 
Altered the strict interpretation of ultra vires, allowing 
firms to become involved in non-core activities which 
benefited corporate goals. Activities such as corporate 
philanthropy if clear benefit to goals. 
1896 Steinway v. Steinway & Sons et al 
– USA 
 
Corporations were able to engage philanthropically with 
their staff if this resulted in higher levels of staff 
engagement. In this example, land was purchased for staff 
facilities (i.e. homes, schools) in remote areas where 
otherwise these were not available to them. 
1899 Main v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Co - 
USA 
Shareholder funds could be legitimately used by firms to 
deliver charitable services to their employees. 
1918 USA National Bank Consolidation 
and Merger Act 1918 - USA 
Corporate philanthropy become legalised in place of 
having been considered ultra vires. 
1953 Smith, A. P Manufacturing Co. v. 
Barlow et al - USA 
Corporate managers could use shareholder funds to 
engage in philanthropy without a clear connection to how 
those funds would serve the interests of those 
shareholders. Owners of the firm could now be excluded 
from determining corporate philanthropy policy. 
1953 Howard Bowen publishes the 
book ‘Social Responsibilities of 
the Businessman.’ 
Helped to create the modern academic field of CSR and 
one of the most significant global authors on embedding 
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Appendix 2 – Email Invitation to potential interviewees 
 
****** Message Start 
Hi <name>, 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a research project that aims to better understand 
why some firms are establishing corporate foundations to undertake some or all of their 
philanthropy and CSR strategy.  
My involvement in this project is in the capacity of a student researcher as part of my Doctor 
of Business Administration (DBA) studies at Deakin University under the supervision of 
Professor Michael Polonsky. 
I would be very grateful if we could organize an interview, at a time and place to be agreed, 
over the next few weeks. The interview should take about 50 minutes and with your 
permission I would want to record this to be able to refer back to your comments. I will send 
you a transcript of the interview to review and edit if required. 
The discussion will focus on exploring why your organisation established a corporate 
foundation and how this is managed. During the interview, I will also be asking you 
questions about corporate foundations generally. 
Please find attached a Plain Language Statement and Consent form, which highlights the 
particulars of the interview process and research project in general. If you can spare some 
time to contribute to this important project, can you please review and sign the Consent form 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM – Individual 
 




Plain Language Statement  
Date: 27/06/2016 
Full Project Title: BL-EC 25-16 - Determinants for Corporate Foundation creation 
Principal Researcher: Professor Michael Polonsky 
Student Researcher: Mr Shane Genziuk 
 
 
Dear foundation manager, 
I am writing to you as a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Deakin 
University and a corporate foundation researcher, to invite you to participate in a project 
that aims to better understand why some corporate firms establish foundations, how they 
operate and how they interact with the corporate funders. This research is part of my DBA 
thesis under the supervision of Professor Michael Polonsky. 
This plain language statement contains detailed information about the research project. Its 
purpose is to explain to you as clearly as possible this project so that you can make a fully 
informed decision whether you are willing to participate. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to better understand why corporations establish 
foundations, how these foundations operate and how they interact with the corporate 
funders. 
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Methods 
I would like to interview you and discuss why your firm established its corporate foundation, 
how the foundation operates and how it interacts with the corporate funder. The interview 
should last approximately 50 minutes and will be organised at a time and place that is 
convenient for you. With your permission the interview discussion will be digitally recorded 
to allow me to refer back to the material. While I would intend to use your quotes within 
the thesis, these would be done anonymously (i.e. Manager X, Financial Sector Foundation). 
I will also send you a copy of the transcript to review and edit and any quotes used in the 
thesis will be anonymous in regards to you and your organisation. 
 
Possible Risks 
There are no foreseeable risks involved your participation, beyond that of inconvenience 
associated with spending 50 minutes with me. Examples of the questions to be used 
include: 
• Can you describe the process by which the firm decided to establish a corporate foundation?  
• Please describe your role in the foundation. Did you have any involvement with the 
establishment of the foundation? If so can you describe your involvement? 
• What is the age of the foundation? 
• What are the foundation’s objectives? 
 
Possible Benefits 
I will provide you with a summary document at the end of the research. Insights gained 
from this project may not be of direct benefit to you as a participant. However, as a 
manager of corporate foundation, you might gain practical insights into the contributing 
factors which influence the development of corporate foundations and how they interact 
with corporate founders. 
 
Expected benefits to the wider community; 
The primary goal of this research is to understand the factors that determine why firms 
establish corporate foundations and how these operate. The potential benefits for the wider 
community include: 
• Improved ability of corporate firms to deliver their philanthropic activities through 
foundations, which may create longer term, sustained programs, supporting the 
community through the funding of external non-profit activities. 
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How privacy and confidentiality will be protected; 
• Any information obtained in connection with this project will remain confidential. 
Your identity details will not be disclosed, subject to legal requirements. If you give 
us your permission by completing the in-depth interview, and discuss the aggregate 
results within my DBA thesis and academic articles. In any publication, participants 
will not be identifiable and only aggregated data will be reported, including the 
anonymisation of any direct quotes (i.e. Manager X, Financial Sector Foundation). 
• You are able to withdraw from further participation at any stage, which includes the 
disposal of any data you have provided.  
• While the in-depth interview will be conducted one on one and include audio taping 
onto a digital device, the overall research project will be monitored under the 
supervision of Professor Michael Polonsky. 
Contact details 
Mr Shane Genziuk – sgenziuk@deakin.edu.au 
Should you have any questions about the research please feel free to contact me or 




If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you 
may contact:  
 
The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 




Full Project Title: Determinants for Corporate Foundation creation  
Reference Number: BL-EC 25-16 
 
 
I have read, and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
• I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement.  
• I agree to have the interview audiotaped and will be provided a copy of the 
transcript to review and edit. 
• I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to 
keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, nor the identity of 
my foundation or founding organisation, in any publications or presentations. While my 
direct quotes may be used in the research thesis, these will be anonymous in regards to 
myself and my organisation.  
The interview discussion will include audio taping onto a digital device, and this file will then 
be transcribed into a digital text file, at which point I will be given the option of reviewing 
and editing interview transcripts. The information obtained from this study will be kept in 




Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………………………… 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date ………………………… 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: Members of a corporate foundation 
 
Withdrawal of Consent Form 
(To be used for participants who wish to withdraw from the project) 
Date:  
Full Project Title: Determinants for Corporate Foundation Creation 




I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research project and 
understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with Deakin University. 
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signature ………………………………………………………………. Date …………………… 
 
Please mail this form to: 
 
Professor Michael Polonsky  
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood, VIC 3125,  
03 92446968 
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Appendix 4 – The Question Set 
 
 Interview Questions 
1. Can you please describe your role in the foundation. Did you have any involvement with 
the establishment of the foundation? If so can you describe your involvement? 
 
2. What are the foundation’s objectives? 
 
Do the foundation objectives have anything in common with the firm’s objectives? If so 
what are these? 
 
How do you measure if the objectives have been successful? 
 
3. Can you please describe how your foundation operates, such as: 
• its board structure, 
• number of foundation staff 
• the areas that it involves itself in, such as charitable giving, volunteering, ETC. 
• process to determine how much money to allocate to charities each year 
4. At the time your foundation was established, was specific advice sought to determine the 
type of structure it should operate within? For example, a public foundation operating 
through a trust. 
If so, where did this advice come from and how influential was the advice for the final 
decision? 
5. Are there any coordinated activities between the foundation and the firm? 
6. Do believe there are any advantages or disadvantages with the use of a corporate 
foundation over other forms of direct corporate philanthropy? 
7. Which internal or external groups do you believe had the most influence in making that 
decision to establish your foundation? 
8. Were there any objections raised about the decision to create a corporate foundation? 
 
9. Which factors do you believe were the most important in determining whether to create 
a corporate foundation? 
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10. Which of these factors are the most important to you?  
 
And which factors are the least important to you? 
 
11. What are your thoughts on the role of the foundation in centralising corporate giving?  
 
Have you seen this occur due to the work of your foundation? 
 
12. Have you found the foundation more or less able to maintain a consistent level of 
charitable giving year on year, as opposed to as in a direct giving model, where more could 
be given from the firm in good years, and possibly none in poor years? 
 
13. Do you believe there have been any reputational changes that stakeholders may have of 
the founding firm due to the foundation? 
 
If so, has one stakeholder group shown this more than others? 
 
If so, do you believe the same changes to stakeholders could have resulted by other forms 
of corporate giving? 
  
14. Has the foundation had any noticeable impact on staff commitment to the founding 
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P7: “Just have to keep a separate account, it’s a division. And it can 
still be called a foundation, because there’s no rules from stopping 
you calling something A.B.C. Foundation. But it’s just a division 
within your own organisation, staffed by your own staff. You can, 
your issue will be, if you set it up as a division, you can’t, if 
someone donates to it, you can’t give them a DGR receipt. Now 
quite a few ones are set up, there’s a number of corporates set it up 
that where, where all they’re doing though is using their own funds. 
They’re not doing fundraising with staff. They’re not doing 
fundraising with general public. All they’re doing, they’re using 
their own resources primarily. They might run a few events. They 
can run a raffle, they can do fund raising, but it’s not charitable 
fundraising. So they’d definitely stay internal. The next level on, 
they’d say we can set up like an incorporated association, we can set 
up a proprietary limited, we can set up a small not for profit 
company limited by guarantee for charitable purposes, and we can 
apply for DGR status. And therefore our staff can donate, but we’ll 
still make it a subsidiary business of the parent company. Or set up a 
public ancillary fund, which is technically quite separate.” 
 
P10: “In a mathematical sense, the real advantage of a corporate 
foundation… so let me go back a step, so having a corporate 
foundation, it depends on what people mean by that. Most people 
think of a foundation as something that’s got a body of money sitting 
in it and they give away the income or 5% from that. Most corporate 
foundations don’t work that way, most of them are money in, money 
out in which case all you’re really doing is putting a bit of discipline 
over your giving and formalising it that way rather than actually 
doing it to smooth it out or you know, the normal reasons. So 
corporates don’t need a foundation to do their giving and still get the 
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same tax benefits, they don’t need a foundation to give away a 
certain amount of money each year.” 
4.5.3 – Other firm 
Influences 
P2: “This is 15 years ago, so there was less knowledge about 
corporate foundations at the time. I don’t think any of us knew there 
was that much good or bad going either way. We’d just seen that 
corporate foundations were being established through [an industry 
firm], and they were outlining for people to access this funding at a 
group level they wanted foundations to be established… So there 
was a mixture of engaging others that had been there and done it 
before. So other PAFs.” 
 
P8: “No, we couldn’t. Because we wouldn’t be able to, we couldn’t 
have fundraised in the way that we have. And I think that part of that 
is also that the environment in which we are operating, so if you 
think about the people, our stakeholder group, is corporate Australia, 
and the individuals, senior executives and chief executive levels in 
corporate Australia, their understanding of foundations and 
philanthropy is pretty clear and quite sophisticated. And so for us it 
made total sense for us to go and establish a foundation for the 
purposes of giving away and awarding scholarships. And I think, 
what I think would be difficult would be to do it without establishing 
a foundation, because I think they would say, why would you? If 




P2: “Yeah, of course there is a reputational benefit for running a 
corporate foundation … I think a corporate foundation that's 
established as a PAF and a DGR certainly does have some indirect 
brand benefits that come with it and people either in the community 
organisations themselves or receiving benefits of the community 
organisations work will recognise that the foundation is a part of the 
[parent firm] group and will therefore think more highly of the 
organisation because of that.” 
4.7.2 – Staff 
Engagement 
P3: “… you know what we want is probably when it comes back to 
staff engagement, so if we’re looking at that, there’s certainly a lot of 
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pride in what [parent firm] has done in setting aside this 
[foundation]. I think there’s a lot of pride.” 
“…to the extent that it [the foundation] has some profile would make 
them feel warm and fuzzy” (P13) 
P13: “We don’t necessarily consider the foundation to be the only 
philanthropic effort of the [parent firm], it is by far the largest and 
most coordinated piece, but as I said, it has a very specific mission, 
it’s not there to help encourage employee philanthropy for example.” 
4.8.2 – Foundation 
funding sources 
and support 
P14: “…we had to fundraise for our corporate donations that cover 
the running costs and then we also had to go out and fundraise for 
the money that we pass on to other charities.” 
P16: “So there is money coming through from the public, but we 
don’t go out to the public to seek money. So we don’t, you know 
don’t rattle tin cans in shopping centres or in the mall or anything 
like that. We don’t go out and sell our raffle tickets outside of work.” 
P3: “We also wanted to make sure we could offer scholarships every 
year forever so that very much means we still need to stay connected 
to [parent firm] because part of our offering taps into our ability to, 
you know, at some time in the future if we had a situation where our 
investments were severely tarnished, we would be able to still have 
an avenue to go back to [parent firm] for future endowment 
contributions.” 
 
4.8.3 – Foundation 
parent firm 
objectives 
P4: “You generally have a situation where that over time I suspect, 
and this is the feedback of other foundations, the companies of those 
foundations, over time you always have some crisis of divergence.” 
4.8.4 – Parent staff 
volunteering 
P15: “I mean the staff are very lovely to us [the foundation] and I 
think volunteering is probably your biggest gauge of that, that we 
have such huge figures around volunteering. So, you’ve got to take 
that as significant staff engagement and connectedness with who we 
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